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This thesis consists of three independent essays on the consequences of and market
for private equity buyouts. The introduction provides a brief outline of the growth of
buyout markets in recent decades and the conclusion summarises the main findings.
The first essay examines the exporting behaviour of buyout target firms relative to
control firms. We build a data set of over 1,400 buyouts in the UK from 2004 to
2017 and using a difference-in-differences approach, estimate the effect of private
equity ownership on target firms’ exporting activities at the extensive and intensive
margin, relative to a sample of carefully matched control firms. The results show
that: (a) private equity ownership increases the probability of firms exporting (the
extensive margin of trade); (b) private equity ownership increases the value of firms
exports (the intensive margin of trade); (c) private equity ownership increases the
exporting intensity of firms (the ratio of export sales-to-total sales). Our consequent
findings indicate private equity investors’ ability to alleviate financing constraints
of companies, as our results are amplified where the target company is more likely
to be in a constrained position. Along similar lines, target firms’ exporting is found
to have been more resilient during the global financial crisis. To explain our find-
ings, we postulate that improvements to target firms’ working capital management
allows them to overcome the associated costs of exporting. Our results support this
hypothesis: the working capital of buyout targets improves significantly relative to
control firms.
In an attempt to better understand how banking sector shocks can be transmitted
onto the real economy, the second essay examines bank-affiliated private equity buy-
outs and studies how portfolio companies respond to external shocks affecting their
parent banks. In particular, we assess how the 2011 European Banking Authority
(hereafter EBA) Capital Exercise impacted the portfolio companies of the private
equity arms of affected and unaffected banks. Our results imply that the shock
came with associated real effects: the portfolio companies associated with the pri-
vate equity arms of affected banks experienced weaker investment and financing at
the onset of the shock. These companies were consequently found to under-perform
the portfolio companies of unaffected banks. The effects are heterogeneous in two
ways: first, the negative effect on portfolio company performance is stronger for
companies which were more likely to be constrained at the onset of the shock. Sec-
ond, the effect is found to be stronger on portfolio companies whose private equity
owner is less experienced.
i
The last essay investigates the importance of capital market development for inter-
national buyout activity. Given the evidence of the diverse range of industry- and
firm-level benefits of buyout investment, studying the stimulants of an active buyout
market merits attention. Robust to a battery of checks, our findings strongly sug-
gest that well-developed stock and credit markets are an important driver of buyout
activity. We show that that capital market development is more important to buy-
out investment relative to other types of international investment flows. Lastly, we
underline the importance of countries’ institutional environments for their buyout
market activity. The positive effect of capital market development on buyout capital
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In 1989, Michael Jensen famously predicted that by the end of the twentieth century,
publicly-listed equity would be “eclipsed” by private equity, arguing that private eq-
uity involved a superior form of ownership for companies (Jensen (1989)). Whether
this is true or not remains the subject of much academic debate, but irrespective of
one’s belief, Jensen’s prediction appears to be materialising. Private equity invest-
ment as a form of financing has increased spectacularly over the last three decades.
Global private equity investment has increased from under $10 billion per year in
the early 1990s to over $100 billion in 2017 (Aldatmaz et al. (2020)). The US and
the UK dominate the scene, accounting for around 70% of the market in 2017. How-
ever, this figure has fallen from being close to 100% in the early 1990s underlining
the growth of the asset class and its market on a global scale, as private equity
investment has become a more mainstream form of financing across countries.
Similarly consistent with Jensen’s prediction, there has been a concurrent marked
decline in the number of publicly quoted companies in both the UK and the US
(Gao et al. (2013), Doidge et al. (2018)). Aldatmaz et al. (2020) report that the
number of listed companies in the UK and the US fell from around 10,000 in 1997
to around 6,5000 in 2017. Reasons for this decline in public listings may be linked
to the proliferation of forms of private financing available to SMEs and ’growth’
companies, resulting in companies staying private for longer, or, forever (Doidge
et al. (2018), Ewens and Farre-Mensa (2019)). Another reason may reflect a change
in private equity buyout strategy. When Jensen initially made his prediction, the
typical private equity buyout involved taking a large listed company private, and in
doing so, addressing an ’overinvestment’ problem. The infamous leveraged buyout of
RJR Nabisco characterized the early boom in private equity dealmaking (Burrough
and Helyar (1989). However, more recently, private equity investors have evolved
to target smaller, private companies, where they may be able to help companies
address an ’underinvestment’ problem 1. In this part of the market, private equity
is arguably offering an alternative to quoted equity markets for companies that have
never been listed before (Morris and Phalippou (2020)).
Focusing on the UK alone, the growth of the buyout market is illustrated in Figure 1,
where we graph the number of buyouts per year from 1990 to 20182. Buyout activity
1Consistent with this, recent empirical evidence has suggested that private equity firms may
be able to mitigate financing constraints facing their portfolio companies (Boucly et al. (2011),
Bernstein et al. (2019)).
2It should be noted that Capital IQ’s coverage of buyout transactions is weaker in the early
1990s. Capital IQ began tracking global private equity transactions in 1999 and through extensive
1
is cyclical, with declines during the dot com boom of the early 2000s and the global
financial crisis notable. To shed light on the importance of private equity-backed
companies to the UK economy, the leading UK industry body for private capital, the
BVCA, estimates that 2,980 companies in the UK are currently backed by buyout
and venture capital investors. With regards to employees, this amounts to around
840,000 people working for companies which are under private equity ownership3.
Figure 1: UK buyouts 1990 - 2018
This graphs the number of private equity buyouts of UK companies annually from 1990 to 2018.
Data comes from S&P’s Capital IQ database.





















research, has attempted to ’backfill’ transaction data prior to 1999.
3https://www.ft.com/content/809cb691-f4f9-48e8-80f8-2cfd08c14106
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The aim of this thesis is to help increase our understanding of the consequences
of private equity buyouts at the firm-level, and the drivers of buyout activity at
the aggregate-level. Specifically, at the target firm-level, in Chapter 1 we examine
the behaviour of target firms and how they respond to being bought-out by private
equity investors, and how their behaviour differs to that of firms which do not receive
private equity backing. In particular, we study the exporting behaviour of firms,
which to date, has been neglected by prior research. We build a data set of over
1,400 buyouts in the UK from 2004 to 2017 and using a difference-in-differences
approach, estimate the effect of private equity ownership on target firms’ exporting
activities at the extensive and intensive margin, relative to control firms. Our sample
of control firms is constructed by matching each buyout target to similar non-backed
firms in the pre-buyout year. In order to ensure a sample of control firms which are
similar in nature in the pre-buyout period, we match firms across their industry,
size, profitability and leverage. Our results are striking: private equity ownership
increases firms’ exporting at the extensive margin (ie. the probability of exporting)
and the intensive margin (ie. the value of exports). Moreover, the exporting intensity
of firms (the ratio of export sales-to-total sales) similarly increases relative to control
firms. We then extend the analysis to provide evidence of private equity investors
alleviating financing constraints facing their portfolio companies: the growth in
exporting is found to be stronger for firms which were ex-ante more likely to be
constrained in the pre-buyout period. In particular, smaller firms, firms with higher
leverage ratios and targets of private-to-private deals all exhibit greater post-buyout
growth. In subsequent analysis, we show that private-equity backed firms’ exporting
was more resilient in the face of the global financial crisis relative to non-sponsored
firms’ exporting. Finally, we ask why private equity-backed firms may be able to
increase their exporting relative to similar unsponsored firms. We postulate that
improvements to their working capital management allow them to overcome the
various fixed and variable costs associated with exporting. Our results support this
hypothesis: the working capital of buyout targets improves significantly relative to
control firms.
In Chapter 2, we turn our attention to buyout transactions where banks act as pri-
vate equity investors themselves. In the case of these bank-affiliated private equity
buyouts, where the investor is owned by a parent bank, we investigate how target
firms respond to an external shock to the parent bank of their private equity owner.
In order to do so, we exploit the Capital Exercise conducted by the European Bank-
ing Authority (EBA) in 2011, where selected banks had to increase their core tier 1
capital (CT1) ratios to 9% of their risk-weighted assets by June 2012. The exercise
3
was unexpected in both its magnitude and its timing. Our empirical analysis focuses
on a sample of over three hundred companies backed by the private equity arms of
different European banks. In a difference-in-differences setting, we examine how the
financing and performance of these companies was affected at the onset of the EBA
Capital Exercise. We first show that companies affiliated to affected banks reduced
their investment by between 5% to 8% relative to companies receiving investment
from private equity arms of unaffected banks; a result that is strongly significant
when controlling for various fixed effects and firm-level covariates. Moreover, when
we look at the timing of the effects, the two sub-samples of companies’ investment
levels did not significantly differ in the pre-shock period, but diverged from 2011,
the year of the shock. We then consider the financing of the portfolio companies
and show that equity and debt issuance was lower for companies linked to affected
banks. The results suggest that there is a knock-on effect of the shock to the parent
bank to the portfolio companies of its private equity arm. We then exploit firm-
level heterogeneity and find that the negative impact of the shock on affected banks’
portfolio companies’ performance is stronger for companies who were ex-ante more
likely to be financially constrained at the onset of the shock. This is consistent
for various measures of financial constraints, such as dependence on bank finance,
size, leverage and companies located in the countries most severely affected by the
concurrent sovereign debt crisis in Europe. Lastly, we show that the negative ef-
fect on the performance of portfolio companies was stronger for companies of less
experienced private equity investors.
Lastly, we examine the role of capital markets and political stability and their im-
portance for international buyout markets at the macro-level in Chapter 3. Using
a sample of 34 European countries from 2007 to 2019, we assess the role of stock
and credit market activity in stimulating buyout markets and find robust evidence
that active international buyout markets depend on well-developed capital markets.
This finding is robust to several model and sample re-specifications. Furthermore, to
account for the fact that active capital markets may be similarly important for other
forms of investment flows into countries and that buyout investment may be no dif-
ferent to these other investment flows, we scale buyout investment relative to other
important international capital flows and our findings remain intact. Finally, we
explore the importance of political and legal risks for international buyout capital.
We find that the positive association between well-developed capital markets and
buyout activity is prevalent in country-years exhibiting lower levels of political and
legal risk, implying that countries’ institutional setting is important in determining
the size of its buyout market.
4
5 Chapter - Private equity buyouts & firm ex-
porting
5.1 Background
Understanding the role of private equity (PE) investment when it comes to the
performance of firms has been an important aspect of corporate finance literature
in the past three decades. To date, there is a substantial body of literature which
documents enhanced operating performance of portfolio companies of private equity
firms in the US (Kaplan (1989), Guo et al. (2011), Acharya et al. (2012), Fracassi
et al. (2018), Cohn et al. (2020)) and in Europe (Boucly et al. (2011), Chung (2011),
Biesinger et al. (2020)). Moreover, there is evidence of improvements to target firms’
productivity (Harris et al. (2005)), investment in innovation (Lerner et al. (2011))
and increases in employment (Davis et al. (2014), Lerner et al. (2019)). Private
equity-backed companies are also been found to be more recession-resistant relative
to other firms (Bernstein et al. (2019)). More recently, studies suggest that private
equity investors can help run cleaner, safer businesses with fewer health violations
(Bernstein and Sheen (2016)), that buyouts can lead to reduced workplace injury
rates and fewer safety violations (Cohn et al. (2019)) and lastly, that target firms
can be more environmentally-friendly (Bellon (2020)).
These studies, however, remain largely silent about the role of private equity invest-
ment in firms’ exporting activities. This paper provides novel evidence on the chan-
nels through which private equity investment impacts portfolio companies’ exporting
both at the intensive and the extensive margin. We examine whether being backed
by a private equity investor encourages companies to expand into international mar-
kets and we study their ensuing behaviour in export markets. Firms’ exporting
merits special attention as there exists an abundance of literature attributing varied
and diverse benefits to firms which export, relative to non-exporting firms. Evidence
suggests that exporting improves firms’ financial health (Greenaway et al. (2007))
and that exporters have a higher probability of survival relative to non-exporters
(Bernard and Jensen (1999a)); something which is particularly pertinent today, as
firms continue to struggle for survival amid the economic crisis brought about by the
global COVID-19 pandemic. Exporting is also associated with a more efficient real-
location of resources which can contribute to industry productivity growth (Bernard
and Jensen (1999b)). Finally, there exists benefits at the employee-level, as consid-
erable evidence suggests that exporting firms pay higher wages than non-exporting
firms (Bernard et al. (1995), Schank et al. (2007)).
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Nevertheless, there is limited empirical evidence explaining how important changes
in the organizational structure of firms can be for their international expansion and
exporting activities. We argue that providing such evidence is important as it adds
a new dimension to help improve our understanding of the channels through which
private equity investors are able to help firms grow. Specifically, it sheds light on
portfolio company growth at the previously unexplored international level. A deeper
understanding of the firm-level effects of private equity investment is of paramount
importance today, as the industry currently sits on an unprecedented amount of
uninvested capital (estimated to be around $1.5tn in January 2020 according to
data from Preqin) and is in the midst of a fundraising boom, both of which imply
investors are likely to increase levels of investment in the near future. Moreover,
there has been an ongoing debate in the US related to the ’Stop Wall Street Loot-
ing’ act which was unveiled by Elizabeth Warren, a US senator, in response to a
number of high-profile buyouts which ended in businesses failing and left employees
and pensioners in a perilous state 4. The reform aims to hold private equity investors
accountable for the debt burdens of their portfolio companies, and would ultimately
force investors to reconsider how they structure buyout transactions. In light of this
ongoing debate and the unprecedented level of uninvested capital held by private
equity investors, it is therefore fundamentally important to have a clear understand-
ing as to the firm-level changes and consequences for firm behaviour brought about
by the organizational change experienced in private equity buyouts.
Our empirical work is based on an assessment of the probability that a firm will
initiate exporting and investigating the impact of private equity buyouts on the
value and intensity of firm-level exports. We merge data from Standard and Poor’s
(S&P) Capital IQ and Bureau van Dijk’s FAME database in order to link private
equity transaction data with firm-level accounting data for over 1,400 buyout tar-
gets in the UK from 2004 to 2017. We carry out a difference-in-differences analysis
to estimate how private equity investment affects firms’ exporting status. On this
basis, we define two groups of firms: treated firms with PE-backed investment and
a matched sample of non-private equity-backed control firms. The latter group of
firms is matched to our sample of buyout targets across four key areas: they operate
within the same two-digit SIC industry, and they are of a similar size, profitability
and leverage in the pre-buyout year. In doing so, we are able to construct a com-
prehensive panel data set of sponsored and non-sponsored firms, which are similar
in nature prior to our treated sample of private equity-backed firms being acquired.
In the empirical analysis which follows, a probit model examines the probability
4https://www.congress.gov/116/bills/s2155/BILLS-116s2155is.pdf
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of exporting for firms with and without private equity backing. We then use a
difference-in-differences model to investigate the effects of private equity buyouts on
the value and intensity of firms’ exports. In extensions of this, we exploit firm-level
and deal-level heterogeneity to investigate whether particular segments of firms and
deals can further improve their performance following the PE investment. Moreover,
we show that private equity-backed firms’ exporting was more resilient during the
financial crisis relative to matched non-sponsored firms. Lastly, in a bid to help to
explain our primary results concerning firms’ exporting, we examine movements in
firms’ working capital management before and after the buyouts.
The UK is an ideal setting for the empirical analysis for two main reasons. First,
it is the largest and most active private equity market in Europe. As outlined by
Bernstein et al. (2019), international comparisons of country-level private equity
activity are difficult due to the fact that different international industry bodies
compile their own data and the methodologies and definitions used can vary across
different data sets. Nevertheless, Bernstein et al. (2019) note that the UK has
had the highest average annual deal value and highest aggregate annual deal value
relative to GDP in recent years. Consistent with this, commercial data provider
Pitchbook report in their 2019 Annual European Private Equity Breakdown that
the UK & Ireland have accounted for 29% of European private equity deal value over
the last ten years, more than any other region in Europe. Similarly, it has accounted
for over 50% of funds raised in Europe over the same period. Second, all limited
companies in the UK are required by law to provide certain accounting information
to the public UK register. The depth and detail of this information varies according
to the size of firms, however as most firms in our sample are mid-market companies,
there is excellent coverage of balance sheet and profit & loss statement information
in our sample. Accordingly, through the FAME database of Bureau van Dijk, we
have access to a rich data set of firms and their annual accounting statements, over
98% of which are private firms. This characteristic is vitally important since these
firms are more likely to suffer from information asymmetry problems and hence their
exporting is likely to respond more strongly to private equity investment.
Our results are striking: private equity ownership appears to improve firms’ export-
ing at both the extensive and intensive margin. That is, in a difference-in-differences
setting, we find that private equity-backed firms have a higher probability of ex-
porting and that they export more, relative to control firms. Moreover, they have
a higher exporting intensity, as measured by share of export sales-to-total sales.
These findings are robust to controlling for various firm-level attributes and a range
of fixed effects, implying that differences in exporting behaviour are brought about
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by the change in organizational structure of firms, as opposed to any other firm-level
or macroeconomic factors. In particular, we find that the value of exports of private
equity-backed companies rises by around 30% post-buyout relative to non-sponsored
firms. The share of export sales to total sales is also found to increase by between
2-3%. These effects are found to be strongly statistically significant. When we ex-
amine the timing of the effects, sponsored and non-sponsored firms share similar
trends in the pre-buyout period, and the divergence in exporting appears only at
the onset of the transaction.
In addition, we present evidence that the positive effect on exporting value and inten-
sity is considerably stronger on companies which were more likely to be constrained
in the pre-buyout period; that is, companies with higher pre-deal leverage and com-
panies which were smaller in size in the pre-buyout year experience significantly
greater growth in exporting. At the deal-level, we find that our main results are
driven by private-to-private buyouts, as opposed to public-to-private transactions.
We interpret this as evidence of private equity investors mitigating constraints fac-
ing their portfolio companies. Along similar lines, private equity investors appear
to have been able to alleviate constraints facing their portfolio companies during
the financial crisis: private-equity backed firms’ exporting was significantly more
resilient relative tot he exporting of non-sponsored firms during the global financial
crisis. Finally, we show that the net working capital to assets ratio of private equity
backed firms increase after the buyout, relative to the control group. This indicates
that private equity investors may help targets to finance the working capital needs
associated with exporting (Amiti and Weinstein (2011)). Overall, our evidence pro-
vides a key contribution to the literature on exporting, private equity investment,
and credit constraints.
We contribute to the literature in three main ways. First, we add to the growing
body of work assessing the firm-level effects of private equity ownership (Kaplan
(1989), Boucly et al. (2011), Davis et al. (2014), Bernstein and Sheen (2016), Fra-
cassi et al. (2018), Cohn et al. (2019), Lerner et al. (2019), Bellon (2020)). We also
relate to the extant literature investigating the role of private equity investors in
easing the financing constraints of portfolio companies (Amess et al. (2016), Fra-
cassi et al. (2018), Bernstein et al. (2019)). Finally, we add a new dimension to
the understanding of firm-level participation and behaviour in international export
markets (Greenaway and Kneller (2004), Minetti and Zhu (2011), Manova (2013),
Muûls (2015), Chaney (2016)). As far as we are concerned, ours is the first study
to document a significant relationship between the private equity ownership of firms
and their exporting habits.
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The rest of the chapter is set out as follows. In Section 2, we provide a short
discussion of the related literature and derive our testable hypotheses. Section 3
describes our data and presents some summary statistics. In Section 4 we lay out
our econometric modelling strategy. Sections 5 and 6 illustrate our main empirical
results and robustness tests. Section 7 concludes.
5.2 Related Literature
5.2.1 Private Equity Firms & Value-added
To date a rich body of literature has examined the effect of private equity investment
on a diverse range of portfolio company outcomes. In early work, Kaplan (1989)
finds private equity-backed companies in the US in the 1980s to experience increases
in their post-buyout operating margin of between 10% and 20%, and likewise in-
creases in their cash flow margins. The target companies also exhibit reductions in
their capex investment, implying the increased profitability is achieved by means
of cutting costs. Similarly, Smith (1990) notes a post-transaction increase in the
operating cash flow per employee and per dollar of operating assets. The increase is
not a bi-product of layoffs or reduced spending on advertising, R&D or fixed assets.
Moving from firm-level to plant-level analysis, Lichtenberg and Siegel (1990) inves-
tigate the post-buyout productivity of US plants and find that buyout targets are
more productive relative to non-buyout plants in the three years following the buy-
out transaction. Reinforcing the idea that improvements in performance are a result
of firm’s reducing their costs, Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1990) study a sample of
reverse LBOs5 and report that while increases in sales were roughly in line with
a random sample of other firms, PE-backed firms experienced significantly greater
increases in profitability, as measured by their gross margin, implying a material re-
duction in production costs. They also report increases in the dollar amount of gross
profit and operating profit relative to their control sample. Likewise, Holthausen
and Larcker (1996) show that on average, the accounting performance (operating in-
come and operating cash flow) of RLBO target firms is significantly better than their
industries at the time of going public and for at least the following four years. Also
analysing reverse LBOs, Degeorge and Zeckhauser (1993) find contradictory results
in post-LBO firm performance, which they reason is explained by Muscarella and
Vetsuypens (1990) only examining firm performance from the LBO to the last fiscal
year prior to the firm going public, while they themselves also consider the period
following the IPO. Consistent with Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1990), they report
5A reverse LBO (RLBO) is the IPO of a company that was previously taken private via an
LBO.
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improved post-LBO (and pre-IPO) firm operating performance, however when they
extend the analysis to include the post-IPO period, they find that firm performance
disappoints relative to a control group6. Other early literature such as Smart et al.
(1994) finds evidence consistent with value creation through improvements in post-
transaction operating performance.
While the early literature considered samples of large US deals, later work has of-
fered insights into other markets, including that of the UK. Amess (2003) finds that
UK management buyout (MBO) targets have between 4% and 7% higher technical
efficiency, defined as producing the maximum output for a given range of inputs, in
the four years post-buyout transaction. Similar to Lichtenberg and Siegel (1990),
Harris et al. (2005) conduct a plant-level analysis. They find that MBO plants are
less productive than comparable plants before the transaction but thereafter ex-
perience a significant increase in total factor productivity, which they attribute to
outsourcing of production costs. Moving away from profitability and productivity,
Amess and Wright (2007) study UK transactions and examine the wage and em-
ployment consequences for target firms. Their results indicate heterogeneity across
different types of transactions as while wage growth is lower for both MBO and
MBIs, employment growth is higher for MBOs but lower for MBIs7. Finally, and
also analysing UK deals, Cressy et al. (2007) find private equity-backed companies to
outperform comparable non-private equity-backed companies. In particular, spon-
sored companies experience 4.5% higher operating profitability over the first three
post-buyout years. Moreover, they go on to show that industry specialization by
private equity firms raises this differential by an additional 8.5%.
More recently, and analysing a wide range of samples and transactions, research has
considered various different avenues of value creation in private equity. Boucly et al.
(2011) provide evidence that private equity firms create value by relaxing credit
constraints. They analyse a sample of buyouts of French companies and find that
private equity investment relaxes constraints, allowing firms to grow and expand.
Specifically, they note that target companies enjoy increases in profitability (ROA),
earnings and sales in the three post-transaction years relative to comparable non-
LBO-backed companies8. Aside from being more profitable, they also find that
6More recently, a comprehensive study by Cao and Lerner (2009) found a large sample of reverse
LBOs to perform as well as or better than other IPOs.
7An MBO is a management buyout, where existing management take control of the company,
while an MBI refers to a management buy-in, where an outside management team take a controlling
stake in the target.
8The control sample is constructed to be similar in terms of industry, size and profitability to
the LBO-backed companies
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sponsored companies issue more debt and increase capital expenditures, in contrast
to earlier work which found that improved performance was a result of reductions
in capital expenditures. Their results are more profound where the transaction is
a private-to-private buyout (as opposed to a public-to-private buyout, divisional
buyout or secondary buyout) and where the company operates in an industry which
is more dependent on external finance, suggesting that private equity firms create
value by easing credit constraints9. In the UK, Chung (2011) finds spectacular post-
transaction growth in buyout targets across sales, earnings, employment, capex and
property, plant & equipment. He notes that the growth is concentrated in private-
to-private buyouts, while public-to-private deals show evidence of downsizing. Guo
et al. (2011) consider large US public-to-private transactions and finds gains in
operating performance to be comparable or to slightly exceed those observed for
benchmark control firms. Acharya et al. (2012) find that improvements in operating
measures such as stronger sales growth and EBITDA margins during the private
phase relative to listed peers are important in explaining the abnormal performance
of US public-to-private deals.
Using tax returns to analyse target firms post-transaction performance, Cohn et al.
(2014) find marginal evidence that LBOs lead to improvements in targets operating
performance. When they narrow their sample to only targets with publicly available
accounting data, they do witness operating improvements post-buyout10. In a sub-
sequent study of private-to-private buyouts in the US, Cohn et al. (2020) document
evidence of significant increases in operating performance and post-buyout growth
in target companies. Moreover, they find buyout investors to target two types of
firms: those with poor operating performance, and those with growth potential but
who are highly levered and depend upon external financing. In a large-scale study
of over three thousand private equity deals from 1980 to 2005, Davis et al. (2014)
compare pre- and post-buyout target characteristics relative to a control group of
similar non-sponsored firms. They conclude that while buyouts result in modest
job losses (roughly 3% fall in employment relative to control firms), they lead to
substantial increases in job creation. Their analysis shows that target firms create
new jobs in new establishments at a faster pace relative to their controls and further-
more, the job reallocation rate at targets exceeds that of non-buyout-companies by
9Other work which has analysed European private equity deals includes Desbrières and Schatt
(2002), Bergström et al. (2007) and Goossens et al. (2008) who likewise report increases in private
equity-backed companies’ operating performance relative to a control group of non-sponsored firms.
10Leslie and Oyer (2008) find no evidence of improvements after U.S. LBOs during a similar
period, however their sample consists primarily of LBOs of already private firms and they do not
compare performance to a matched sample of firms that did not go private
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14% in the post-buyout period. They then consider the total factor productivity of
firms and their subsequent findings suggest that target companies outperform their
control firms with respect to TFP growth in the two-year post-transaction period.
Consistent with a positive impact of private equity firms on their targets’ operating
performance, Fracassi et al. (2018) show that in post-transaction years, US target
firms in the retail sector increase sales by 50% more than a matched sample of control
firms. Relatively similar to our own hypothesis, they go on to illustrate that this rise
is by virtue of launching new products and by expanding into new geographic areas
in the US, as opposed to increasing prices. This echoes the conclusions of a survey
of 79 US private equity firms by Gompers et al. (2016) whose findings suggest that
investors rely primarily on revenue growth and less so on cost cutting when it comes
to value creation in their portfolio companies.
Considering the heterogeneity across target firms, Faccio and Hsu (2017) find evi-
dence of higher job creation at targets of private equity firms with strong political
connections. In an extensive recent study of thousands of private equity transac-
tions, Lerner et al. (2019) document systematic differences in the real effects of buy-
outs depending on the nature of transactions, credit conditions and the state of the
economy11. They find buyouts of public companies to experience substantial post-
transaction employment losses, but overall productivity gains. Private-to-private
transactions exhibit gains in both productivity and employment. Furthermore, em-
ployment rises in secondary buyouts, but falls in divisional buyouts. Concerning the
wider macro-economy, they note that productivity gains are amplified when deals
are transacted in a tight credit market. Where credit spreads widen post-buyout, or
where the economy slows in terms of GDP growth, targets’ employment growth is
curtailed and productivity gains in public-to-private deals and in divisional buyouts
are weakened. Finally, they find the average earnings per worker falls in target com-
panies post-transaction. Biesinger et al. (2020) exploit value creation and execution
plans of private equity investments to analyse changes in the performance of target
firms. Their findings show that increases in firm-level operating performance and
profitability as a result of private equity investment are sustained even once the
investor exits the transaction.
Private equity investment has also been shown to impact portfolio firms’ innovation.
Lerner et al. (2011) find that while portfolio companies’ level of patenting does not
change post-LBO, patents are more frequently cited, therefore implying that these
companies are producing research that has a greater economic impact; however, they
11The study is an extension of Davis et al. (2014) using a larger data set
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are unable to determine whether this is a selection or a causal effect. Analysing
UK deals, Amess et al. (2016) provide evidence that private equity firms alleviate
financial constraints in their portfolio. They identify a positive causal effect of
private equity investment on patent stock and quality-adjusted patent stock and then
show that this increase is concentrated in private-to-private deals. Along similar
lines, Cumming et al. (2018) study a sample of public-to-private buyouts over a
twenty year period and conclude that public-to-private buyouts are associated with
a significant reduction in patents and patent citations. On a similar note, Ayash
and Egan (2019) find that LBO target firm’s flow of patents is reduced by 33% for
the duration of a leveraged buyout, which leads to a decrease of 28% in an acquired
firm’s patent stock relative to non-LBO firms.
Aside from buyout targets’ operating performance, profitability, employment and
innovation, another strand of literature has considered the impact of private equity
deals on target companies’ distress risk. Thomas (2010) analyses over three thou-
sand private equity-backed companies during the financial crisis and documents that
sponsored companies defaulted at less than one half the rate of comparable compa-
nies (2.84% against 6.17%), rebuffing claims that ’overleveraged’ portfolio compa-
nies will default at higher rates than other companies. Tykvová and Borell (2012)
examine European buyout-backed companies over 2000 to 2008 and find buyout-
backed companies to exhibit similar bankruptcy rates to comparable firms. How-
ever, their results suggest that where the private equity firm is more experienced,
the bankruptcy rate is actually lower relative to control firms. Similarly, Wilson and
Wright (2013) conclude that private-equity backed buyouts are no more suspect to
insolvency risk than non-buyout firms. While the aforementioned studies examine
the likelihood of falling into distress, Cressy and Farag (2012) examine companies
which have already fallen into distress and analyse the recovery rates of buyout
targets relative to public companies, and find that private equity-backed companies
actually exhibit longer recovery rates, approximately twice that of public companies.
Hotchkiss et al. (2014) considers a sample of firms which borrow in the leveraged
loan market and, consistent with the above studies, find that private equity-backed
companies are no more likely to default than other leveraged loan borrowers. When
they do default, buyout-backed firms restructure faster and their results imply that
private equity firms can help to efficiently resolve distress in portfolio companies.
Examining a sample of UK buyouts, Wright et al. (2014) explore the restructuring
of buyouts around the financial crisis. They document that despite buyout targets
having greater associated risk, they often already contained provisions to boost re-
covery rates under insolvency, increasing their recovery rates significantly relative to
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control firms. Moreover, they quickly adjusted the capital structures of new transac-
tions in response to the changes in the economy from 2007 onwards resulting in lower
failure rates relative to publicly-listed firms and non-PE-backed buyouts. Finally,
Weir et al. (2015) reveal that companies involved in take-private buyouts exhibit sig-
nificantly better financial health post-buyout years relative to the pre-buyout years,
and that they improve significantly more than companies which remain public.
Wilson et al. (2012) investigate the impact of the global financial crisis on UK private
equity-backed companies. Their results suggest that private equity firms attenuated
the effects of the crisis on their portfolio companies, as they document positive
differentials in both productivity and profitability between private equity-backed
companies and comparable non-sponsored companies. Also focusing on the recent
financial crisis, Bernstein et al. (2019) likewise examine UK transactions and pro-
vide evidence that private equity firms eased credit constraints facing firms during
the crisis. They find that sponsored companies decreased their capital investments
and debt and equity issuance less than non-sponsored firms, suggesting that pri-
vate equity firms alleviated financing constraints of portfolio companies when credit
markets dried up. They then go on to show that these companies consequently out-
performed other comparable companies and increased their relative market share12.
In more recent years, literature has begun to examine more refined areas of the
value-added by private equity firms. Bloom et al. (2015) find private equity-backed
companies to have better management practices in terms of performance monitoring,
effective targets and performance incentives, relative to other firm structures, such
as family firms, founder-owned and government-owned companies. Analysing the
CEO turnover in LBO-backed firms, Cornelli and Karakaş (2015) find that LBO
firms take around 33% of seats on the board of portfolio companies and that a
higher involvement of LBO sponsors reduces CEO turnover but improves operating
performance.
At the industry-level, Bernstein et al. (2017) find that industries where private eq-
uity funds have invested grow faster in terms of total production and employment
and they provide evidence rebuffing claims that economic activity in industries with
private equity backing is more exposed to aggregate shocks. Aldatmaz and Brown
(2020) examine industry spillovers arising from private equity activity and find ev-
idence of employment, productivity, and profitability increases for public peers fol-
lowing private equity activity in the sector.
12The control group of comparable non-private equity-backed companies is constructed on the
basis of similar industry, size, profitability and leverage
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While earlier work focused on the corporate performance of targets, Bernstein and
Sheen (2016) extended this line of work to examine the operational consequences
for restaurants being bought-out in an LBO. They note that restaurants become
cleaner, safer and better-maintained post-buyout, committing fewer health viola-
tions. Operations improve more in stores where the private equity firms have direct
ownership, and hence more control. Similarly, Cohn et al. (2019) investigate work-
place safety in US public-to-private targets and document a decline in workplace
injury rates and safety inspection violations. Considering the ESG impact of pri-
vate equity, Bellon (2020) investigates private equity sponsorship in the US oil &
gas sector and finds that target companies produce significantly less carbon dioxide
and toxic chemical pollution.
Nevertheless, studying the impact of private equity on the education sector, Eaton
et al. (2018) document that, despite enrollment and profits increasing in buyout-
backed for-profit education institutions, private equity ownership leads to institu-
tions exhibiting lower graduation rates, lower loan repayment rates, lower earnings
in graduates and increased levels of per-student debt. Along similar lines, Gupta
et al. (2020) analyse the impact of private equity activity in a similarly delicate
sector: care homes. Using facility-level data, they provide evidence that private eq-
uity involvement leads to significant declines in per-patient nursing staff availability,
patient health and in facility’s compliance with healthcare standards. The quality
of care is likewise found to decrease: staff-per-patient counts fall, as do readmission
rates and federal government ratings of facilities. These declines are not experi-
enced after takeovers by chains and non-PE corporates, suggesting private equity
investor’s incentives are accountable.
As for the employees of private equity targets, Agrawal and Tambe (2016) show that
many employees gain transferable IT-complementary skills, boosting both long-run
employability and wages relative to what they would have otherwise been, implying
positive effects at the employee-level. However, Antoni et al. (2019) find some-
what contrasting evidence. They conclude that LBOs are followed by an increase
in employee turnover and that employees experience significant earnings declines,
and show that managers and older employees are typically the worst affected. Fi-
nally, Garcia-Gomez et al. (2020) use employee-level data on 55,000 buyout target
employees and examine the differential impact of buyout transactions on employees
based on their pre-buyout health, in a difference-in-differences setting. They find
that buyouts have a stronger negative impact on the careers and human capital of
employees with pre-buyout health issues.
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5.2.2 Financial Frictions and International Trade
5.2.2.1 Theoretical Background Firms rely on external capital when they
face large upfront costs associated with entering into the export market, that can-
not be funded through retained earnings or their internal cash flows. These costs
may be fixed (R&D, advertising, fixed capital equipment) or variable (rental fees,
intermediate input purchases, advance payments to salaried workers). Exporters
may be even more dependent on external financing than domestic producers for
different reasons. Entering into a new foreign market involves incurring several new
costs. Fixed costs will reflect areas such as the analysis of the potential profitability
of foraying into new geographies, acquiring local information, product customiza-
tion to fit local markets, regulatory compliance and installing and maintaining new
local distribution networks. Moreover, the cross-border transporting and delivery
of goods can take significantly longer than domestic delivery. As such, an exporting
firm’s working capital is strained relative to that of a domestic producer. Finally,
the greater risk associated with international operations requires exporters to obtain
trade insurance. As such, an active market exists for the financing and insurance of
international transactions. Specifically, Manova et al. (2015) report that up to 90%
of world trade has been estimated to employ some form of trade finance.
Existing models have introduced credit constraints into theoretical models of inter-
national trade with heterogeneous firms, in light of Melitz (2003). Manova (2013)
builds a model where firms need to borrow to cover both the fixed and the variable
costs of exporting. This is due to the imperfect enforceability of international trans-
action contracts13 together with imperfect information on the potential returns from
entering into foreign markets. In equilibrium, total exports will increase with lower
credit constraints. Less constrained firms and more productive firms will be more
likely to export. Credit constraints will decrease both the firm extensive margin
and the overall intensive margin. In Chaney (2016), firms must pay up-front a fixed
cost of entry into foreign markets and hence need sufficient liquidity to do so. They
finance these costs with cash flows from their domestic operations. Firms which face
a liquidity constraint and are prevented from entering foreign markets may be able
to do so profitably, but are unable to do so as they lack the internal funds and access
to external capital to cover the associated fixed costs of export market entry. Once
a firm has entered foreign markets, financial constraints do not impact the marginal
cost of exporting: the firm will finance an increase in the scale of its exports through
13ie it may be more difficult for investors to collect the proceeds of international sales in the
event of a disagreement. Put differently, a potential exporter cannot pledge much of its foreign
activities as collateral, and this translates into ex-ante under-investment.
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its internal cash-flow and foreign trade credit. In equilibrium, financial constraints
impact the extensive but not the intensive margin of exports. In summary, these
models show that in equilibrium, credit constraints affect the intensive (extensive)
margins of exports if financial constraints are assumed to affect the variable (fixed)
costs of exporting.
5.2.2.2 Empirical Evidence The existing theoretical evidence therefore sug-
gests that more productive and less constrained firms are more likely to enter the
export market (Manova (2013), Chaney (2016)). Early empirical literature largely
supports this, finding that larger, more productive, more efficient and less con-
strained firms are more likely to export (Clerides et al. (1998), Bernard and Jensen
(1999a), Bernard and Jensen (2004), Girma et al. (2004), Greenaway and Kneller
(2004), Van Biesebroeck (2005)). More recent work has found similar conclusions.
Greenaway et al. (2007) find evidence that exporters are more liquid and less lev-
ered than non-exporters, controlling for firm size and productivity. Nevertheless,
they find ex-ante financial health to be uncorrelated with export entry, and export
starters display worse financial ratios, perhaps reflecting the entry costs they have
just incurred. Berman and Héricourt (2010) use two measures of financial health
and study 5,000 firms in 9 developing economies: liquidity and leverage, calculated
respectively as the ratios of cash flow-to-total assets and total debt-to-total assets.
Firms are considered less constrained if they have more liquid assets that can be
quickly deployed and fewer outstanding debt obligations, relative to pledgeable col-
lateral, which complicates raising more funds. Lagged financial health is strongly
positively correlated with export entry and more weakly with export revenues, con-
trolling for firm size and productivity. This pattern is more pronounced in sectors
with high external finance dependence. Yet conditional on export status, lagged
financial health is not significantly associated with export survival or the share of
exports in total sales.
Bellone et al. (2010) find that firms enjoying better financial health are more likely
to become exporters and that financial constraints act as a barrier to export partici-
pation. They show that better access to external finance increases the probability to
start exporting and also shortens the time before firms decide to serve foreign cus-
tomers. Similarly, Buch et al. (2010) show that financial frictions matter for firms’
export and FDI engagement at the intensive and extensive margins. In particular,
more productive and less constrained firms are more likely to engage in export and
FDI activity. At the plant-level, Ilmakunnas and Nurmi (2010) find that larger,
more productive plants are more likely to enter the export market and to survive in
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the market for longer.
Minetti and Zhu (2011) examine over four thousand Italian firms in 2000 where they
define a company to be weakly credit rationed if they would have liked to borrow
more at the market interest rate but did not try to. Similarly, a company is said
to be strongly credit rationed if they demanded more credit than they obtained.
Controlling for industry fixed effects and various company attributes including pro-
ductivity, credit-rationed firms are 39% less likely to export and exporters sell 38%
less abroad. These effects are stronger in sectors with exogenously high levels of
external finance dependence. While credit rationing also impedes domestic sales, its
impact on international trade is somewhat greater.
Feenstra et al. (2014) provide complementary evidence using data on the interest
payments of 160,000 Chinese companies in 2000-2008. Their findings indicate that
credit constraints become more stringent as firms’ export share grows, especially
when shipping times are longer and working capital needs therefore more acute.
Examining the role of exporting in the link between financial health and firm sur-
vival, Görg and Spaliara (2014b) assess whether firms at different stages of export
activity (starters, exiters, continuers, switchers) react differently to changes in dif-
ferent financial variables such as their leverage, coverage ratio and cash flow. In
general, export starters and exiters experience much stronger adverse effects of fi-
nancial constraints for their survival prospects. By contrast, they find that the exit
probability of continuous exporters and export switchers is less negatively affected
by financial characteristics.
Muûls (2015) examines a large sample of Belgian manufacturing firms over the pe-
riod of 1999 to 2007 and defines a more constrained firm as one with a weaker credit
rating. Her results show that firms are more likely to be exporting or importing
if they are less constrained, and that they export or import more. Moreover, the
growth in the number of products exported and destinations served is positively cor-
related with the credit rating measure which supports the hypothesis that entering
a new market or exporting a new product implies fixed costs for the exporting firm.
Overall, the results underline the link between credit constraints and export and
import margins.
Along similar lines, Manova et al. (2015) also provide Chinese firm-level evidence
that credit market imperfections restrict firms ability to engage in international
trade. Specifically, they show that credit constraints restrict companies’ total ex-
ports, prevent them from foraying into more markets, and limit their export product
range. They also shed light on how firm structure and consequent credit constraints
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can play a role: foreign subsidiaries and joint ventures have superior export perfor-
mance in financially more vulnerable sectors relative to private domestic firms. This
comparative advantage is consistent with multinational corporation affiliates being
less constrained due to their easier access to foreign capital markets and funding
from their parent company.
Besedeš et al. (2014) find that more constrained exporters to the US and EU mem-
bers grow faster. The effect of constraints on export growth is found to decrease
over time. Amongst a sample of Belgian firms, Araujo et al. (2016) conclude that
firm export growth decreases with the quality of the foreign country’s institutions.
Finding that tighter, more stringent credit constraints induce firms to significantly
lower export prices and produce lower quality products, Fan et al. (2015) detect
a positive relationship between firm productivity and export prices. On a similar
note, Bernini et al. (2015) examine a large sample of French manufacturing firms
and document a negative relationship between firm leverage and export product
quality, implying that more levered and hence more constrained firms produce lower
quality exports.
Examining ordinary trade versus processing trade under financial frictions, Manova
and Yu (2016) provide evidence that credit constraints induce firms to carry out
more processing trade. They find ordinary trade to have a higher value-added and
profitability and therefore conclude that credit market imperfections prohibit firms’
involvement in more profitable opportunities in trade.
More recently, Chan (2019) investigates the role of financial intermediaries and posits
that since exporting through an intermediary involves lower fixed costs but higher
variable costs, more constrained firms are more likely to export indirectly via an in-
termediary. A large-scale empirical study supports this hypothesis and the evidence
on over 9,000 global firms shows that more constrained firms are more likely to rely
on trade intermediation to export relative to unconstrained firms. The results are
paralleled at the country-level: countries which are less financially-developed are
more likely to trade internationally through an intermediary. The results in both
cases are stronger in more vulnerable sectors and are robust to the inclusion of other
firm- and country-level determinants of exporting.
Using the FEMA policy reform in 2000 as an external economic shock to firms, Bose
et al. (2020) examine its impact on a panel of Indian firms over a 26 year period in a
difference-in-differences setting. This export-oriented intervention is found to have a
material effect on firm performance: affected firms increased their productivity and
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exporting intensity significantly more than unaffected firms as a result of the policy
initiative. Interestingly, their results contrast with traditional findings regarding the
differing effects on more and less financially constrained firms. More indebted and
more liquidity-constrained firms were found to gain more from the reform than their
less constrained counterparts.
5.2.2.3 Banks and Crises/Shocks Another related body of literature exam-
ines the role of banks in firms’ exporting. Minetti et al. (2018) show that banks
matter in the export market. Their findings imply that bank-oriented financial sys-
tems boost the size of the export sector more than market-oriented financial systems.
However, particularly in middle- and low-income countries, they find that this effect
mostly stems from banks slowing down exporters’ exit rather than boosting firms’
entry into the export market. Paravisini et al. (2014) use a sample of Peruvian
firm-bank data and show that a contraction in bank funding has a negative impact
on exporting at the intensive margin. However, they find no evidence that the credit
shock impedes entry into new products or destinations. Similarly, Iacovone et al.
(2019) show that banking crises have a material, negative impact on exports, with
sectors more reliant on external finance suffering more in export markets. Likewise,
Buono and Formai (2018) find that shocks to banks’ credit supply causes exporters
to export less, despite having no impact on their domestic sales. Niepmann and
Schmidt-Eisenlohr (2017) exploit the market for letters of credit, a trade-specific,
risk-reducing instrument. They show that shocks to the supply of letters of credit
statistically and economically affect US firms’ exports. The results are stronger
where the export destination is a smaller-export country and in times of financial
distress.
Meanwhile, Caballero et al. (2018) document evidence that links formed between
international banks increase exports. They show that new connections between
banks in a given country-pair result in an increase in trade flows between these
countries in the following year. On a similar note, also highlighting banks’ activity
in promoting firm-level exports, Ferri et al. (2019) discover a link between banks’
access to information and firm exports. Their results suggest that the probability
of firms suffering an export drop in 2009 was lower when their banks had access to
soft information about export prospects.
Another interconnected and relevant strand of work investigates the role of external
shocks in the export market. Levchenko et al. (2010) document that the reduction in
trade in 2008/09 crisis relative to overall economic activity was greater than in pre-
vious economic downturns. Bems et al. (2013) find evidence suggesting that shocks
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to credit supply are detrimental to export supply, further exacerbating the decline
in trade during the crisis. Considering 179 episodes from 1970 to 2009, Abiad et al.
(2014) find that financial crises are associated with declines in both imports and
exports of affected countries. Chor and Manova (2012) reveal a negative associa-
tion between financing constraints and exports during the recent crisis. Specifically,
they show that countries with higher interbank rates and thus tighter credit markets
exported less to the US during the peak of the crisis. Their findings are more pro-
nounced in more vulnerable sectors implying that exports of financially vulnerable
industries were thus more sensitive to the cost of external capital than exports of
less vulnerable industries, and this sensitivity rose during the financial crisis. Eaton
et al. (2016) develop a dynamic multi-country general equilibrium model and find
a shift in final spending away from tradable sectors, largely caused by declines in
durables investment efficiency, accounts for most of the collapse in trade relative to
GDP during the recent global financial crisis.
At the industry-level, Borensztein and Panizza (2010) find that sovereign defaults
hurt export-orientated industries, however the effect is found to be short-lived. Ariu
(2016) provides evidence that unlike trade in goods, trade in the services sector did
not fall during the recent global crisis, and instead continued to grow.
Moving to the firm-level, Dell’Ariccia et al. (2008) find no evidence that more export-
orientated industries perform better during banking crises. They do, however, find
evidence consistent with the hypothesis that export sectors should perform better
during currency crises on account of the real exchange rate depreciation. Similarly,
Bougheas et al. (2018) find that exporters are among the best performers during
currency crises given that their foreign sales are more competitively priced under a
devalued currency. Also using banking shocks, Amiti and Weinstein (2011) find that
exporters whose main bank experiences a fall in its market-to-book value reduces
its exports whilst leaving domestic sales unchanged. In contrast, non-exporters
reduce their domestic sales. Behrens et al. (2013) use microdata from Belgium and
conclude that exports and imports mostly fell during the recent crisis because of
smaller quantities sold and unit prices charged as opposed to fewer firms, trading
partners, and products being involved in trade.
Constructing firm-specific measures of global demand to disentangle the effect of
falling demand from that of financial constraints on sales, Coulibaly et al. (2011)
provide evidence indicating that the presence of credit frictions is among the factors
that contributed to the disproportionately large decline in international trade during
the crisis. Bricongne et al. (2012) study French firms around the crisis and find
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that financial constraints are a significant microeconomic determinant of exports.
The crisis affected large firms at the intensive margin and resulted in a smaller
portfolio of products being offered to export destinations. Smaller exporters were
found to reduce the range of destinations they exported to or left the export market
altogether. Görg and Spaliara (2014a) show that financial variables, such as liquidity
and leverage, are important in predicting export market entry, particularly in the
midst of the recent global financial crisis.
With regards to a change in currency, Pappalardo and Vicarelli (2017) examine the
effect of the introduction of the euro on the export behaviour of Italian firms along
the intensive and extensive margins of trade. They find an increase of flows to
‘peripheral’ eurozone countries is channelled through the intensive margin. When
heterogeneity in terms of firm-level labour-productivity is controlled for, they doc-
ument a reduction of the intensive margin for less productive firms and an increase
for the more productive ones. Finally, more financially-constrained firms decreased
the extensive margin in core markets, regardless of their productivity level. Lastly,
Görg and Spaliara (2018) assess the relationship between a firm’s financial position
and its export market situation paying particular attention to the ERM currency
crisis and the global financial crisis. They find that the deterioration in firm’s finan-
cial health increased the hazard of export market exit during the 2007–09 crisis but
had no significant effect on the ERM crisis. They then investigate whether firms in
financially vulnerable industries face a greater sensitivity of export market exit to
financial conditions and conclude that they experienced higher hazards of exiting
the export market during the recent financial crisis.
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5.3 Hypothesis Development
5.3.1 Private equity and exporting
There is an extensive line of theoretical work which shows that in light of the asso-
ciated fixed costs (R&D, advertising, capital equipment) and variable costs (rental
fees, intermediate input purchases) of entering into foreign markets, credit con-
straints maintain an important role in determining a firm’s participation in export
markets. Manova (2013) proposes a model whereby firms must borrow to cover the
fixed and variable costs of entering the export market. In equilibrium, credit con-
straints negatively impact both the extensive and intensive margins of exporting.
Likewise, in the model of Chaney (2016) where firms are required to pay a fixed
entry cost to enter into foreign markets, similar conclusions are met.
Empirical evidence of firm-level international trade flows has been largely supportive
of the above predictions (see Clerides et al. (1998), Bernard and Jensen (1999a),
Bernard and Jensen (2004), Greenaway and Kneller (2004), Minetti and Zhu (2011),
Muûls (2015)). Studying French firms around the recent financial crisis, Bricongne
et al. (2012) document financial constraints to be a significant determinant of firm
exports. The crisis had a material impact on firms’ total exports and resulted in a
more narrow range of products being offered. Related to extreme economic events,
Görg and Spaliara (2018) assess the relationship between a firm’s financial position
and it’s exporting status around two recent crises. More constrained firms and those
operating in more financially vulnerable industries were found to be more likely to
exit the export market during the global financial crisis.
The insights offered from the above discussion lead to a natural question: if bet-
ter financial health is linked with higher levels of exporting both at the intensive
and the extensive margin, how do firms respond when they are being bought out
by private equity firms? In the value-added literature surrounding private equity,
there is ample evidence that private equity targets experience a growth in produc-
tivity as a result of being bought out. Amess (2003) finds that UK management
buyout (MBO) targets have between 4% and 7% higher technical efficiency, defined
as producing the maximum output for a given range of inputs, in the four years
post-buyout transaction. In a plant-level analysis, Harris et al. (2005) find that
MBO plants are less productive than comparable plants before the transaction but
thereafter experience a significant increase in total factor productivity, which they
attribute to outsourcing of production costs. In a large-scale study of over three
thousand private equity deals from 1980 to 2005, Davis et al. (2014) conclude that
aside from creating new jobs at a faster pace relative to control firms, private eq-
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uity targets experience greater productivity growth in the two year post-transaction
period. Moreover, in an extensive recent analysis using an improved data set of
Davis et al. (2014), Lerner et al. (2019) provide further evidence that the overall
productivity of target firms increases. The study documents systematic differences
across different deal types and macroeconomic conditions: private-to-private trans-
action targets experience a significant rise in labour productivity, but the effect on
other deal types is insignificant. Furthermore, productivity gains are found to be
amplified when deals are executed in a tight credit market. Enhanced productivity
of target firms aligns with evidence documented in Bloom et al. (2015), who survey
a sample of buyouts of middle-market firms and find that private equity investment
brings about better management practices.
Fracassi et al. (2018) study the effects of buyouts on consumer product markets
in the US and find that target firms’ sales increase by 50% more than matched
control firms. They go on to show that this rise in sales is driven by new product
integration and geographic expansion; price increases do not play a role. More
recently, Bernstein et al. (2019) study the effect of the financial crisis on UK buyout
target companies. They find that the impact of the crisis on the investment levels
of private equity-backed target companies was weaker relative to a matched control
sample of similar unsponsored firms. They attribute this to private equity targets
being less constrained during the crisis, as their issuance of debt and equity was
significantly higher over the period14. Taken together, the existing literature posits
that more productive and less constrained firms are more likely to export and are
more likely to export more, and that private equity investors relax credit constraints
and help their portfolio companies to grow. Based on the above discussion, we
stipulate the testable hypotheses as follows:
Hypothesis 1a: Private-equity backed companies are more likely to export than
non-private equity-backed companies (extensive margin).
Hypothesis 1b: Private-equity backed companies are more likely to improve their
export intensity than non-private equity-backed companies (intensive margin).
5.3.2 The role of credit constraints
Prior portfolio company-level research has attributed value creation of private equity
investors to their ability to ease financial constraints facing the companies in which
14Consistent with this idea, Demiroglu and James (2010) find that more reputable private equity
investors obtain narrower bank spreads to finance their acquisitions, suggesting that some of these
groups may be able to decrease the financing costs of their portfolio companies.
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they invest. This effect is shown to be dependent on the different types of buyout
transactions. Public and private firms differ in many ways. The former are more
likely to be larger and more mature and suffer from potential agency problems
(Jensen (1986)), while the latter are more likely to be smaller and more constrained
(Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist (2016)). Boucly et al. (2011) suggest that target firms
involved in take-private transactions involving listed firms and divisional buyouts of
subsidiaries of larger groups are less likely to be constrained pre-buyout, as they are
more likely to have better access to capital markets, and as such, Boucly et al. (2011)
speculate that these firms are less likely to grow after the buyout relative to firms
involved in private-to-private buyouts. Their results support their hypothesis, as
private-to-private target firms experience spectacular post-deal growth, while firms
in other types of transactions do not. Chung (2011) finds supporting evidence that
investors alleviate constraints facing private firms, facilitating their growth, while
take-private target firms are found to downsize. Similarly, Fracassi et al. (2018)
shows that the sales growth in targets is predominantly in private, and not public
targets, while Lerner et al. (2019) observe that gains in productivity and employment
occur in private target firms, as opposed to public-to-private and divisional deals.
On a similar note, Amess et al. (2016) find the positive impact of private equity
ownership on firms’ patenting to be concentrated in private-to-private deals and in
industries and firms which are ex-ante more likely to be constrained.15. The findings
are consistent with the hypothesis that private equity firms ease financial constraints
of their portfolio firms, facilitating their investment in innovative activity. In a study
of UK leveraged buyouts, Chung (2011) documents spectacular post-transaction
growth of private-to-private target firms, while public-to-private targets are found
to downsize and scale back on investment in the post-transaction period. As such, he
interprets the results as private equity investors alleviating credit constraints faced
by private-to-private target firms, and facilitating their growth. Finally, Bernstein
et al. (2019) note that target firms which were smaller, more leveraged or operating
in more financially dependent industries outperformed buyout target firms which
were less likely to be ex-ante constrained during the global financial crisis. Likewise
considering constraints at the firm-level, the post-buyout growth reported by Boucly
et al. (2011) is found to be greater in firms which operate in industries which are
more dependent on external finance. In light of the above discussion, we formulate
our next hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2: Following the deal, private-to-private transactions and financially
15Similarly, Cumming et al. (2018) find that public-to-private buyouts are followed by a reduction
in patents and patent citations
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constrained companies are likely to witness greater increases in export activity.
5.3.3 Exporting during the financial crisis
Along similar lines, we then explore the exporting behaviour of firms during the
recent global financial crisis. There is ample evidence that more constrained firms
tend to be significantly more affected by economic shocks relative to less constrained
firms (Cingano et al. (2016), Bottero et al. (2020)). Within the literature on inter-
national trade, the evidence likewise suggests that more constrained firms suffered
more during the global financial crisis: Görg and Spaliara (2018) show that more
constrained firms and those operating in more vulnerable industries were more likely
to exit the export market during the crisis. Furthermore, Bricongne et al. (2012)
find that smaller exporting firms reduced the range of destinations served or stopped
exporting altogether. As the previous section outlined, there is a breadth of evidence
implying that private equity investors are able to help to relax the constraints facing
their portfolio companies (Boucly et al. (2011), Amess et al. (2016), Fracassi et al.
(2018), Bernstein et al. (2019)). Piecing these together, we hypothesize that private
equity firms are able to help attenuate the effects of the crisis and the associated
constraints facing firms, allowing private equity-backed firms’ exporting to be more
resilient to the crisis relative to non-sponsored firms.
Hypothesis 3: Private-equity backed companies exporting’ is more resilient during
the financial crisis relative to the exporting of non-sponsored firms
5.3.4 Working capital
Finally we explore how private equity backed-firms are able to outperform similar,
unsponsored firms in export markets. It is well known that an increase in ex-
ports leads to higher working capital needs. This reflects that completing an export
transaction involves a long time lag, due to the high number of days involved in
the transit and custom procedures (Amiti and Weinstein (2011)). The consequent
strain on working capital and the higher working capital needs implied by exports
translate into stronger funding requirements. These are often provided by banks
through letters of credit. Due to the working of export markets, we posit that in
parallel to the growth in exports we should empirically observe an increase in the
volume of trade receivables of private-equity backed firms. This would reveal a ben-
efit of the weaker credit constraints of portfolio companies, namely that they are
able to finance higher trade receivables.
Specifically, we expect private-equity backed firms to experience an increase in their
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claims against customers, referred to in accounting as trade receivables, and their
net working capital. A formal empirical examination of the relationship between
private equity ownership and portfolio companies’ working capital management is
hitherto unexplored. Wright et al. (1992) provide evidence from a survey of 182
European buyout deals and the results from respondents stress the importance of
improving financial control through reducing debtor days (43% of respondents allude
to this) and extending creditor days (31%) in their portfolio companies16. Examin-
ing firm performance during the recent global financial crisis, Wilson et al. (2012)
show summary statistics implying that private equity-backed companies had better
working capital control during the crisis. Finally, Weir et al. (2015) find evidence
that target companies’ working capital improves following a buyout, using a sample
of public-to-private transactions. All of this suggests that private equity sponsor-
ship may help to improve firms’ working capital management and financial control,
however no study is yet to provide a rigorous empirical analysis of this. Our final
testable hypothesis is therefore:
Hypothesis 4: Private-equity backed companies increase their holdings of working
capital, relative to non-private equity-backed companies.
16Debtor days refers to the number of days taken to obtain cash from credit sales, and creditor
days is the number of days taken to settle debts
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5.4 Data & Descriptive Statistics
In the following section, we describe the data used in the empirical analysis and
outline the methodology behind the construction of our sample.
5.4.1 Sample construction
A variety of databases are used to construct our data set. Firstly, to build our sample
of private equity-backed companies, we use S&P Capital IQ to identify all private
equity transactions where the target firm is located within the UK17. Capital IQ is
the primary source of private equity transactions used in recent academic studies18.
We consider deals which are shown as being ’completed’ and took place between the
years 2004 and 201719. We omit deals which are announced but not yet completed.
Following prior work, we identify private equity transactions by searching for “lever-
aged buyout”, “going private”, “management buyout” and “platform” transactions
in Capital IQ. This yields an initial 7,505 private equity transactions. We then drop
all deals where there is no defined buyer/ private equity investor, leaving us with
3,310 transactions.
We take all relevant information such as the transaction date, the name(s) and
location(s) of buyer/investor(s), the transaction value and the type of transaction.
Using Capital IQ, we also check the size of the fund of the private equity investor
through which the transaction is made. Where the target company is not explicitly
linked to a fund of the private equity investor in Capital IQ, we take the size of the
most recent fund raised which is in its investment period prior to the transaction
(Arcot et al. (2015)). In order to identify how and when the private equity investor
has exited a deal in each case, we make use of a variety of resources. We use Capital
IQ’s merger & acquisition database to search for sales to trade buyers and sales to
other private equity investors (secondary buyouts). We also use Factiva and manual
searches through financial news and journalism to search for acquisitions, initial
public offerings and bankruptcies/liquidations involving the target firms. In some
cases, we have to conduct extensive web searches on a deal-by-deal basis to deduce
the ultimate outcome of the transaction.
To source companies’ financial accounts, we use FAME, a Bureau van Dijk database
17Thomson Reuters Eikon is also used to supplement our deal search.
18It is used as a source of private equity buyouts in, among others, Strömberg (2008), Fang et al.
(2013), Jenkinson and Sousa (2015), Bernstein and Sheen (2016), Faccio and Hsu (2017), Fracassi
et al. (2018), Bernstein et al. (2019)
19The choice of sample years is driven by the desire to have relatively sufficient pre- and post-deal
accounting information for target companies and, as we explain later, we have companies’ accounts
from 2000 through to 2019.
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which sources historical accounts of companies located in the UK from Companies
House, the national UK registrar. We first download company accounts (balance
sheets and profit/loss statements) and static firm information (such as industry
codes, location of firms, date of incorporation) for all companies in the FAME
database for each year from 2000 through 2019 (this is every year available in the
current FAME database as of April 2020). The next step is to match target firms
from our list of transactions from Capital IQ to the FAME database. In order to
maximize our match, we do so manually. An advantage of FAME in this case is
that it tracks firms’ prior names where firms have changed their names at given
points in time. Where the name of a company differs between our list of trans-
actions from Capital IQ and FAME, we verify that the correct company is being
tracked by cross-checking that various company information such as reported firm
sales, total assets and the company address and website are consistent between the
two sources. Companies House is also used in this respect. In total, we are able to
match 1,434 private equity-backed companies from Capital IQ to FAME over a 14
year period. This equates to 44% of the deals initially identified in Capital IQ with
a defined private equity investor. Using similar data sources, Jenkinson and Sousa
(2015) report a 40% match from an initial sample of 2,567 exited deals involving
European targets20.
Tables 1 and 2 offer an initial insight into our sample of transactions. Table 1
describes the annual distribution of deals in our sample. Deal activity increased in
the run up to 2007, before dropping dramatically at the onset of the global financial
crisis, and recovering thereafter (Shivdasani and Wang (2011)). As shown in Table
1, we have a relatively equal spread of deals across each year, outwith years during
crises periods.
Table 2 provides some further analysis of our sample of transactions. Panel A shows
the industry distribution of the target firms, which tend to be concentrated in the
services and manufacturing sectors, similar to other recent work in deal-level private
equity research (Chung (2011), Jenkinson and Sousa (2015), Bernstein et al. (2019)).
Other important sectors include retail trade and transportation & communication.
Panel B of Table 2 gives a breakdown of the types of deals in our sample. Similar
to other papers such as Strömberg (2008), Kaplan and Stromberg (2009), Boucly
et al. (2011) and Bernstein et al. (2019), the majority of the deals in our sample
are private-to-private buyouts. Around 5% are public-to-private transactions, a
20The only difference is that Jenkinson and Sousa (2015) match from Capital IQ to all of FAME,
Amadeus and Orbis, all of which are managed by Bureau van Dijk. Amadeus and Orbis provide
coverage of European firms, whereas FAME only follows UK and Irish firms.
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figure very similar to the samples in the above papers. Likewise, our proportion
of secondary buyouts is also representative of the literature which largely reports
similar deal type distributions. Our sample contains a slightly lower proportion of
divisional sales (10.1%) compared to the above studies. This can likely be explained
by the fact that accounting information can be more difficult to find when divisions
are carved out of companies. Finally, in Panel C, we can see how the transactions
are exited. Consistent with other samples of deals, selling to a strategic buyer (trade
sale) or to another private equity investor (secondary buyout) are the primary forms
of exit, whereas going public via an an IPO is less common (Strömberg (2008),
Kaplan and Stromberg (2009), Jenkinson and Sousa (2015))21. Around 65% of the
transactions have experienced some form of exit22.
Aside from the details reported in Table 2, other aspects of our sample of transac-
tions also relate to recent studies involving samples of buyouts and private equity
investors. The median (mean) deal size in our sample is £46m (£182m) which is not
dissimilar to other studies. Strömberg (2008) reports a median deal size of $64m in
the US and $36m in the UK over the period of 2001 to 2007 and according to Boucly
et al. (2011) the median-sized French deal is $63m. The median holding period in
our sample of deals is 5 years, similar to other studies which examine European
private equity transactions (Strömberg (2008), Jenkinson and Sousa (2015)).
With regards to our sample of private equity investors, domestic (UK-based) in-
vestors are prevalent, with 77% of transactions involving a UK-based private equity
acquirer. Nevertheless, an important fraction of targets are acquired by interna-
tional investors. Specifically, around 16% of deals involve a US-based investor and
5% involve European investors. Table 3 details the top 15 most active investors in
our sample of transactions. LDC, the mid-market buyout arm of Lloyds Banking
Group is involved in the most transactions (94). The majority of the other most fre-
quent investors operate somewhere in the lower to upper mid-market space. Larger,
global private equity investors such as KKR, Apollo and Blackstone also feature
frequently in our sample.
Lastly, we consider the size of our investors. Our range of transactions covers small-
cap buyouts to mid-market transactions to deals made by the larger, global ’mega-
funds’. With regards to the size of the corresponding fund through which the in-
vestor executes the transaction, our sample has a median (mean) fund size of $600m
21Similarly, figures from the BVCA, the leading UK industry body for private equity investors,
report that of 5,533 deal divestments from 2007 to 2019, selling to trade acquirers was by far the
most common exit route, with almost 25% of target companies being sold to trade.
22As of April 2020
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($1.82bn)23. This is also consistent with other studies. Barber and Yasuda (2017)
cite a median (mean) US buyout fund size of $650m ($1.53bn), and in a global
sample of buyout funds, Metrick and Yasuda (2010) report a median fund size of
$600m24.
23Where Capital IQ does not specify the exact fund through which a deal is executed, we take
the size of the most recent fund raised relative to the transaction date which is still investing.
24Harris et al. (2014a) and Harris et al. (2014b) also report similar summary statistics on buyout
fund size
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Table 1: Deal time series distribution


















Table 2: Sample statistics
This table provides sample statistics on the transactions used in our study. Panel A displays the
industry distribution of the target company involved in the transactions. Panel B describes the
type of deals, while Panel C details the exit status of the deals.
Number Percentage
Panel A: Industry Distribution




Transportation & Communication 130 9.2%
Wholesale Trade 76 5.4%
Retail Trade 147 10.4%
Finance, Insurance, Real Estate 131 9.2%
Services 530 37.3%
Public Administration 4 0.3%
Panel B: Deal Type
Private-to-private 1,003 70.1%
Public-to-private 67 4.7%
Secondary buyout 215 15.0%
Divisional buyout 145 10.1%
Panel C: Exits
Sale 485 34.1%




Not yet exited 517 36.3%
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Table 3: Sample statistics: transactions by PE investor
The below table shows the top 15 most active PE investors in our sample of transactions




ECI Partners 28 1.8%
Equistone 27 1.7%
Phoenix Equity 26 1.6%
3i 24 1.5%
Bowmark Capital 23 1.5%
The Carlyle Group 22 1.4%
Bridgepoint 21 1.3%
HgCapital 21 1.3%
Sovereign Capital 21 1.3%
Close Brothers Private Equity 20 1.2%
Exponent Private Equity 20 1.2%
Lyceum Capital Partners 20 1.2%
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5.4.2 Creating a matched control sample
The next step, and an important empirical application in a difference-in-differences
approach, is to construct a matched control group of non-private equity-backed firms
which are similar in nature in the pre-buyout period to our sample of sponsored
firms. In order to do so, we use a matching procedure inspired by the recent work
of Boucly et al. (2011) and Bernstein et al. (2019). Each matched control company
meets the following four criteria: 1) it belongs to the same two-digit SIC code as the
target firm; 2) it has total assets in the pre-deal year within a 50% bracket of the
target; 3) it has a ROA in the pre-deal year within a 50% bracket of the target firm,
and 4) it has leverage, defined as the ratio of total debt-to-assets in the pre-deal
year within a 50% bracket of the target firm .
Using this procedure, we match up to 5 control firms for as many target firms as
possible. Where a target generates more than 5 matches, we retain the 5 closest
matches as measured by the sum of the squares of the difference between the target
and the control firm’s total assets, ROA and leverage. Naturally, the choice of
percentage bracket involves a trade-off between the matching accuracy and finding
control firms for as many targets as possible. Using a 50% bracket, we are able to
find control firms for 733 of our 1,434 private equity-backed firms, equating to a 51%
success in matching 25. This is not too dissimilar to the matching success obtained in
Bernstein et al. (2019) who report a 60% match using a similar matching technique.
We finish with a sample of 733 private equity-backed firms and 3,104 control firms.
Table 4 presents pre-buyout descriptive statistics and provides initial evidence that,
by construction, our two groups of firms are fairly similar in nature in the pre-
buyout period. The two groups of firms share similar characteristics, with the only
significant exception being that private equity-backed firms have slightly higher pre-
buyout sales; a difference which is statistically significant only at the 10% level.
Prior studies like Boucly et al. (2011) and Bernstein et al. (2019) have likewise
found private equity-backed firms to be slightly larger relative to control firms in
terms of turnover, prior to being acquired. In any case, in all empirical specifications
we augment our model with a vector of control variables (which includes firm sales)
taken in the pre-buyout year. The distribution of pre-transaction profitability (ROA)
and leverage is very similar across both groups, as is the size (as measured by total
25In a robustness check, following Bernstein et al. (2019) we tighten the matching bandwidths
to 30% and while the sample size is reduced, the main results are upheld. Specifically, this reduces
our sample to involve 651 private equity-backed firms and 2,184 control firms. Likewise, if we
follow Boucly et al. (2011) and remove leverage as a matching factor and use 50% bandwidths,
our treated sample increases to 935 private equity-backed firms. Again, all of our main results are
intact.
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assets) and the industry in which they operate. This is unsurprising given that these
formed part of the matching process. Other variables such as cash flow, earnings
and firm productivity are very similar across both samples of firms. Moreover, the
magnitude of pre-transaction variables such as firm sales, profitability and leverage
are very similar to those presented in Bernstein et al. (2019). Finally, the export
sales of the two groups is similar, with very little difference between the pre-buyout
dollar value of their export sales. However, the non-private equity-backed firms
tend to have a higher pre-transaction exporting intensity, as measured by the ratio
of export sales to total sales.
Moving a step further, Table 5 explores the parallel trends assumption behind the
difference-in-differences model where we consider the pre-buyout one- and two-year
growth rates of various firm-level variables. Again, the target firms and controls
exhibit similar trends across most variables. The only difference of note across both
the one- and two-year growth trends is that target firms have a higher pre-buyout
growth rate in sales26. We later show that our results are upheld when controlling
for the pre-transaction growth in sales, as well as other variables measured in the
pre-buyout year. The mean growth rates of profitability (ROA) and earnings show
significant differences, however when we consider the rates over one- and two-year
periods, and take into account the median rates, there are no systematic differences
which provides some form of comfort. Taking the static pre-buyout period figures
and the pre-buyout growth rates together, we can appreciate that both groups of
firms are generally similar in nature in the pre-transaction period.
Finally, Figure 2 offers a graphical interpretation of the evolution of firms’ export-
ing around the transaction. Specifically, the graphs shows the αt of the following
equation:
(yit) = αt + αi + εit (1)
Where αt captures year fixed effects and αi captures company fixed effects. The x
axis of the graph depicts the years relative to the buyout transaction occurring; four
years prior to the deal and four years after the deal occurs. The year precedent to
the buyout is used as the base period and its corresponding coefficient is normalized
to zero. The equation is estimated separately for both the private equity-backed and
control samples, with standard errors being clustered at the firm level. The graphs
26Boucly et al. (2011) likewise find that private equity-backed targets exhibit greater growth in
sales in the pre-transaction period relative to a sample of matched control firms
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suggest that both our treated and control samples follow similar paths in the run up
to the transaction, after which there is a divergence in exporting behaviour, giving
us an initial insight into the effect that private equity ownership may have on the
exporting behaviour of target firms. Taken together, we can plausibly assume that
the parallel trends assumption is satisfied. As we discuss in the next section, our
estimates are robust to the inclusion of a host of firm-level control variables taken
in the pre-buyout period, as well as the inclusion of a wide range of fixed effects and
robustness checks.
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Table 4: Descriptive Statistics
The below table details summary statistics of sample firms in the pre-transaction year across
treated (PE-backed companies) and control firms (non-PE-backed companies) PE-backed refers to
all PE-backed companies; Control refers to a sample of control firms, matched on their 2 digit SIC
code, ROA (net income/total assets) (within a 50% bracket) and total assets (size) (within a 50%
bracket) in the pre-transaction year. Export dummy is a binary variable taking the value of 1 for
firm-year observations where export sales exceed zero, and 0 otherwise. Log(export) is the log of
the value of export sales. Cash flow is defined as a firm’s net income plus depreciation and is scaled
by total assets, earnings is EBITDA normalized by total assets, while ROA is net income divided
by total assets. Leverage is calculated as a firm’s ratio of debt to total assets and productivity is
the earnings generated per-employee.
PE Control
Variable N Mean Median SD N Mean Median SD t-test
Exporting
Export dummy 733 0.36 0.00 0.48 3,104 0.29 0.00 0.45 0.07***
Log(export) 271 8.15 8.29 1.80 912 8.31 8.49 1.82 -0.16
Export/total sales 271 0.29 0.18 0.30 912 0.34 0.22 0.32 -0.05**
Firm Variables
Total assets 733 98,961 18,625 394.238 3,104 76,693 15,181 332,988 22,267
Sales 717 71,997 25,115 172,078 2,867 59,307 20,742 158.727 12,690*
Cash flow 719 0.16 0.13 0.11 2,815 0.15 0.13 0.10 0.01
Earnings 730 0.26 0.17 1.85 3,075 0.17 0.15 0.19 0.09
ROA 733 0.12 0.10 0.10 3,104 0.12 0.09 0.10 0.00
Leverage 733 0.63 0.63 0.26 3,104 0.63 0.63 0.22 0.00
Productivity 701 24.26 17.01 20.65 2,692 25.50 17.14 22.15 -1.24
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Table 5: Growth rates
The below table displays 1- and 2-year pre-transaction growth rates of firm-level variables across
treated (PE-backed companies) and non-treated firms (non-PE companies). PE-backed refers to
all PE-backed companies; Control refers to a sample of control firms, matched on their 2 digit SIC
code, ROA (50% bracket) and total assets (50% bracket) in the pre-transaction year. Cash flow is
defined as a firm’s net income plus depreciation and is scaled by total assets, earnings is EBITDA
normalized by total assets, while ROA is net income divided by total assets. Leverage is calculated
as a firm’s ratio of debt to total assets and productivity is the earnings generated per-employee.
PE Control
Variable N Mean Median SD N Mean Median SD t-test
Exporting - 1 year rate
Log(export) 225 0.18 0.11 0.71 785 0.13 0.09 0.67 0.05
Export/total sales 225 0.28 0.02 1.36 785 0.26 0.01 1.39 0.02
Firm variables - 1 year rate
Total assets 724 0.26 0.15 0.54 2,999 0.24 0.10 0.71 0.02
Sales 658 0.19 0.13 0.31 2,631 0.16 0.08 0.37 0.03***
Cash flow 675 0.08 0.03 1.86 2,579 0.22 0.05 2.27 -0.14*
Earnings 683 0.16 0.04 1.49 2,841 0.21 0.03 1.93 -0.05
ROA 632 0.27 0.07 0.50 2,606 0.37 0.11 0.79 -0.10**
Leverage 722 -0.01 -0.14 0.89 2,693 -0.02 -0.12 0.85 0.01
Productivity 652 0.29 0.10 1.76 2,481 0.34 0.09 2.16 -0.05
Exporting - 2 year rate
Log(export) 200 0.25 0.22 0.92 694 0.23 0.16 0.89 0.02
Export/total sales 200 0.33 0.03 1.72 694 0.41 0.02 2.02 -0.08
Firm variables - 2 year rate
Total assets 707 0.72 0.32 2.41 2,923 0.87 0.21 3.61 -0.15
Sales 607 0.49 0.26 1.03 2,413 0.37 0.17 1.02 0.12**
Cash flow 626 0.49 0.09 2.56 2,414 0.34 0.08 3.14 0.15
Earnings 637 0.35 0.07 3.01 2,673 0.06 0.03 3.33 -0.29*
ROA 559 0.57 0.19 1.13 2,350 0.59 0.16 1.14 -0.02
Leverage 634 -0.05 -0.07 0.24 2,602 -0.04 -0.06 0.26 -0.01
Productivity 599 0.68 0.17 3.38 2,295 0.36 0.14 3.50 0.32*
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Figure 2: Effect of being PE-backed on export activity
These figures illustrates the change in exports and the ratio of export sales to total sales separately
for both PE-backed companies and control companies in our sample around the transaction, where
year 0 is equal to the year of the transaction. Specifically, the figure reports the αt of the following
equation: (yit) = αt +αi +εit. Where αt captures year fixed effects and αi captures company fixed
effects. The year precedent to the transaction is used as the base period and its corresponding
coefficient is normalized to zero. The equation is estimated separately for both the PE-backed and
control samples, with standard errors being clustered at the company level.
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5.5.1 Extensive margin of export
We begin our empirical investigation by asking whether being backed by a private
equity sponsor affects the probability of a portfolio company exporting (ie. the ex-
tensive margin of export). We model the probability of exporting using the following
equations:
Prob(Xit > 0) = αt + αi + αc + β1(PEi) + θXit + εit (2)
The above model sheds light on whether or not being private equity-backed increases
the likelihood of a firm being an exporter. However, in order to better understand
whether the probability of exporting actually increases from the onset of the buyout
transaction we estimate the following model:
Prob(Xit > 0) = αt + αi + αc + β1(PEi ∗ Postit) + θXit + εit (3)
In line with exporting literature to date, we estimate both linear probability and
probit models based on the above specifications27. In each case, the dependent
variable is a firm-year dummy variable taking the value one if firm i reports a
positive amount of exports in year t, and zero otherwise. PE is a dummy variable
that takes the value one for all private equity-backed companies and zero for controls.
Post is a dummy that equals one after the transaction and zero before. For control
firms, Post equals one when the target corresponding to the control has undergone
the transaction, and zero beforehand. A positive coefficient for PE*Post supports
H1a.
The models include additional controls as follows: α represents sets of firm, industry
and year fixed effects. Moreover, we also include specifications with (industry*year)
fixed effects to mitigate concerns about any contemporaneous changes in demand or
any other time-varying industry characteristics. We also construct several firm-level
control variables to capture the pre-buyout heterogeneity in firm-level characteris-
tics. Following Bernstein et al. (2019), we control for firm size (the log of sales), cash
flow scaled by total assets, leverage, profitability (ROA) and earnings (EBITDA)
normalized by assets. Including such controls helps to alleviate any concerns re-
garding any differences between the treated and control samples in the pre-buyout
27See for example Greenaway et al. (2007), Minetti and Zhu (2011), Minetti et al. (2015), Muûls
(2015)
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period. These control variables are taken in the pre-transaction year and are inter-
acted with the Post variable in order to avoid any endogeneity concerns. Finally,
we cluster standard errors at the firm-level.
5.5.2 Intensive margin of export and firm performance
In this sub-section we explore whether the value of firms’ exports and their exporting
intensity are affected by being backed by a private equity sponsor. To do so, we
use a standard difference-in-differences (DiD) approach to estimate the changes in
firm-level exporting after buyout transactions, relative to changes at control firms.
A similar model for different firm activities has been used by Boucly et al. (2011),
Bernstein et al. (2019) and Cohn et al. (2019). Our baseline specification in this
respect is as follows:
(yit) = αt + αi + αc + β1(Postit) + β2(PEi ∗ Postit) + θXit + εit (4)
The dependent variable is the log of export sales and export sales as a percentage of
total sales. The main coefficient of interest is β2 which captures the estimated change
in private equity targets’ exporting from before to after a buyout for target firms
relative to control firms. Support for H1b would be reflected in positive coefficient for
the PE*Post interaction. The remaining control variables and fixed effects remain
unchanged.
While the estimates from Equation 4 capture the average change in exports of the
target firms relative to the controls, they do not indicate the timing of these changes.
As such, we investigate how firms’ exporting evolve over time after buyout transac-
tions in more detail by estimating the following regression:
(yit) = αt + αi + αc + Σβk(PEi) + θXit + εit (5)
where the dependent variable is the log of export value and export sales as a per-
centage of total sales. We estimate a different βk for every year between t-4 and
t+4 relative to the buyout, using the last year before the transaction, t-1, as a ref-
erence year28. This allows us to formally examine the time-varying behaviour of the
treatment effects for firms’ exporting behaviour. The vector of firm controls are the
same as those in Equations 2, 3 and 4. The coefficient βk captures the difference
28In an unreported robustness check, we rerun Equation 5 using a narrower two year window
either side of the buyout, as opposed to a four year window, and we find similar results.
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between firm-level exporting in year K relative to the transaction year and firm-level
exporting in the pre-transaction year.
5.5.3 Accounting for credit constraints
Next, we take into account how credit constraints affect the relationship between ex-
port participation and intensity and private equity financing. Specifically, our main
interest lies in examining whether firms facing different levels of financial constraints
within the treated group exhibit different sensitivities to their exporting after the
buyout compared to firms in the control group. In order to ensure robustness, we
focus on two dimensions of financial constraints: size and leverage. Size is the key
proxy for capital market access by manufacturing firms in Gertler and Gilchrist
(1994) because small firms are more vulnerable to capital market imperfections and
thus more likely to be financially constrained. In addition, firms that are highly
indebted are more likely to face higher liquidation risks and hence are more likely
to be financially constrained (Mizen and Tsoukas (2012)). Therefore, we estimate
Equation 4 for two sub-samples (constrained and unconstrained firms). These spec-
ifications capture how deal- and firm-level heterogeneity, measured by deal types,
firms’ size and leverage, affect the way exporting responds to private equity invest-
ment in firms which were more and less likely to suffer from financial constraints
at acquisition. To support H2 we would expect the impact of the private equity
investment to be stronger for firms classified as financially constrained compared to
their unconstrained counterparts.
5.5.4 The working capital mechanism
Finally we test how private equity ownership affects the net working capital holdings
of targets. Again, we use a DiD approach to estimate the changes in firm-level trade
receivables after buyout transactions, relative to changes at control firms. In our
baseline models, we use as a dependent variable the stock of net working capital
(NWC) to firms’ total assets and to sales 29. Net working capital is receivables
(credit to customers) minus payables (debt against suppliers), from both exports
and domestic sales. High values reveal strong working capital needs, as signal that
companies provide more trade credit to its customers than get from its suppliers.
To better understand the mechanism, we also analyze (the logarithm of) gross trade
receivables and payables.
29We scale NWC by total assets and sales as we find private equity-backed firms to experience
a growth in assets and sales post-buyout
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5.6 Results
5.6.1 Extensive Margin of Export
We start by examining whether private equity-backed firms are more likely to be
exporting than comparable unsponsored firms. Table 6 shows the results from the
estimation of Equation 2. In columns 1-3 we report estimates from linear probability
models, and in columns 4-6 we show estimates from probit models. Columns 2 and 5
contain a vector of firm-level covariates which are taken in the pre-transaction year
and interacted with the Post variable. These include firm size, cash flow, leverage,
profitability and earnings. Moreover, all specifications include firm, industry and
year fixed effects. Lastly, in columns 3 and 6 we include (industry*year) fixed effects.
We report coefficient estimates and standard errors clustered by firm. The main
finding is that private equity ownership positively and significantly, both statistically
and economically, affect firms’ probably of exporting.
The inclusion of firm-level controls does not have a material impact on the sig-
nificance or magnitude of the coefficients, a shown in columns 2 and 5. However,
given that we are interested in the evolution of firms’ behaviour as a result of being
private equity-backed, we extend the model to ask whether the difference in the
probability of exporting from the pre-deal period to the post-deal period is greater
for private equity-backed firms relative to control firms. Accordingly, we estimate
Equation 3 and report the output in Table 7. Our key variable of interest is the
interaction between the firm-level dummy PE and the time period dummy Post
(PE*Post). This shows the impact of the private equity buyout on the extensive
margin of exporting. Controlling for firm characteristics and macroeconomic shocks
and industry differences, the impact of the buyout is substantial for the sponsored
firms, as demonstrated by the positive coefficient on the interaction term across all
specifications. As private equity investors provide financial support to their port-
folio companies by alleviating credit constraints, we find that portfolio firms can
relax their credit constraints and positively influence their participation in export
markets. The results show qualitatively and quantitatively significant effects. Based
on the estimates in column 1, being PE-backed increases the probability to enter
the export market by 4.6 percentage points after the transaction. In the following
columns of Table 6, we rerun the same regressions and find that the main results
persist even after controlling for other firm-level characteristics, industry and time-
varying shocks that could affect PE and non-PE-backed firms differently.
Our results thus far are valuable in light of previous studies, as we document that
private equity investors are able to relax credit constraints, allowing their portfolio
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companies to be subject to fewer distortions and hence improve their exporting
infrastructure. In this sense, PE-backed firms can attract foreign consumers and
initiate global sales. Therefore, our findings provide strong support for H1a and
the idea that private equity firms play in helping companies grow and improve their
operating performance relative to unsponsored peers by easing financial constraints
they may face.
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Table 6: Extensive margin of exporting
This table investigates the effect of private equity buyouts on the intensive margin of exporting. The dependent variable is a dummy variable taking the
value one where a firm exports in a given year, and zero otherwise. PE is a dummy taking the value one for buyout target firms and zero otherwise. Firm
controls include firm sales, earnings, leverage, profitability (ROA) and cash flow. These controls are taken in the pre-deal year and are interacted with the
Post variable. Standard errors are clustered at the firm-level. *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level.
Linear Prob Probit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PE 0.064*** 0.062*** 0.058*** 0.545*** 0.539*** 0.533***
(0.011) (0.012) (0.014) (0.079) (0.080) (0.094)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Year FE Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
(Industry x Year) FE No No Yes No No Yes
Firm controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Observations 72,219 72,219 72,219 70,699 70,699 70,699
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Table 7: Extensive margin of exporting
This table investigates the effect of private equity buyouts on the intensive margin of exporting. The dependent variable is a dummy variable taking the
value one where a firm exports in a given year, and zero otherwise. PE is a dummy taking the value one for buyout target firms and zero otherwise, while
Post takes the value zero before a transaction and one after. Firm controls include firm sales, earnings, leverage, profitability (ROA) and cash flow. These
controls are taken in the pre-deal year and are interacted with the Post variable. Standard errors are clustered at the firm-level. *** denotes statistical
significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level.
Linear Prob Probit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PE*Post 0.046*** 0.042*** 0.040*** 0.224*** 0.217*** 0.202**
(0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.083) (0.084) (0.085)
Post -0.005 0.009 0.011 -0.028 0.226 0.255
(0.006) (0.022) (0.022) (0.044) (0.202) (0.209)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Year FE Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
(Industry x Year) FE No No Yes No No Yes
Firm controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Observations 72,219 72,219 72,219 70,699 70,699 70,699
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5.6.2 Intensive margin of Export
In this sub-section, we investigate the impact of private equity backing on the in-
tensive margin of exporting by looking at the effect of private equity buyouts on
the value of foreign sales and on exporting intensity (ie the share of foreign sales
in total firm sales). We estimate our baseline DiD specification, Equation 4, and
present the results in Table 8. Our dependent variable in columns 1 to 4 is the
logarithm of the sterling pound value of export sales and in columns 5 to 8 it is
the ratio of export sales to total sales. We focus on the sign and significance of the
double-interaction term (PE*Post), which reveals whether private equity-backed
firms are more likely to have a higher exporting intensity compared to our carefully
constructed sample of control firms during the post-transaction period. We find
that, following the buyout, the intensive margin of exporting is more sensitive for
sponsored firms. Specifically, we find a positive and highly significant coefficient
on the double-interaction term PE*Post, which implies that private-equity backed
firms increased their value of export sales by approximately 30 percentage points,
relative to similar non-private equity-backed firms. When we control for firm-level
covariates, the statistical significance and economic magnitude of our baseline coef-
ficient are barely affected. Considering the exporting intensity, in columns 4, 5 and
6, we, likewise, detect a significant effect of private equity ownership on the share
of export sales to total sales. In particular, we find that the share of exports in
total firm sales of buyout targets increases by around 2.5% more than their matched
control firms. Once again, this is robust to the inclusion of various sets of fixed
effects and firm-level control variables. In columns 3 and 6 we adjust our model
and include (industry*year) fixed effects to control for any potential time-varying,
industry-specific variables such as contemporaneous changes in demand, or other
time-varying industry characteristics. The results are unaffected.
In summary, our results provide strong empirical support for H1b as we show that
private equity-backed firms sell more abroad and have a higher exporting intensity
relative to similar non-private equity-backed firms. Private equity firms provide
market specialization and financial and active strategic support to help companies
accelerate their growth. Exporting firms can reap the benefits of PE sponsorship by
experiencing a growth in international sales.
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Table 8: Intensive margin of exporting
This table investigates the effect of private equity buyouts on the intensive margin of exporting. The dependent variables are the log of the value of exports
and the ratio of export sales to total sales. PE is a dummy taking the value one for buyout target firms and zero otherwise, Post takes the value one after
the transaction and zero before. Standard errors are clustered at the firm-level. *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and
* at the 10% level.
LogExport Export/sales
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PE*Post 0.305*** 0.293*** 0.289*** 0.024*** 0.024** 0.023**
(0.073) (0.074) (0.074) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010)
Post -0.003 -0.254 -0.269 -0.007 -0.030 0.033
(0.036) (0.283) (0.282) (0.005) (0.032) (0.032)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Year FE Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
(Industry x Year) FE No No Yes No No Yes
Firm controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Observations 16,970 16,970 16,970 16,970 16,970 16,970
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5.6.3 Evolution of exports over PE buyouts
While estimates in Tables 7 and 8 capture the average change in exporting from the
pre-buyout to post-buyout period, they do not indicate the timing of the relative
increase in exports of private equity-backed companies. We, therefore, examine
how firms’ exporting evolves over time after buyout transactions by estimating the
regression in Equation 5, where we estimate a different βk for each year between
t-4 and t+4 relative to the transaction, using the last year before the transaction,
t-1, as a reference year. If βk accurately captures the causal effect of private equity
ownership on firms’ exporting, we would expect to see an effect arise only at the
onset of the buyout transaction. The dependent variable is the log of export value
and exports as a percentage of total sales, while the firm controls are the same as
before. The βk coefficients will capture the difference between firm exports in year
K relative to the buyout year and firm exports in the pre-buyout year.
The results, presented in Table 9, are in line with the pattern we see in Figure 2.
There is very little difference between private equity-owned firms and the matched
control firms in the pre-buyout period for both the value of exports (columns 1
and 2) and the exporting intensity (columns 3 and 4). After the buyout occurs,
we then see a marked divergence between the two sets of firms, as private equity
firms increase their value and proportion of export sales in the post-buyout years,
as illustrated in Figure 2. Moreover, the magnitude of the coefficients increases
over time in the post-transaction period, again echoing the increasing divergence we
witness in Figure 2.
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Table 9: Evolution of exports over time
This table reports the estimates from a time-varying fixed effects model. Specifically, the table
reports βk of Equation 5. Even-numbered columns augment the baseline model with a set of firm-
level controls measured before the transaction and interacted with the Post dummy. In Columns
1 and 2 the dependent variable is the log of export value and in Columns 3 and 4 the dependent
variable is the ratio of export sales to total sales. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
*** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5%, and * at the 10%
LogExport Export/sales
PE*t-4 -0.063 -0.060 0.001 0.001
(0.083) (0.084) (0.011) (0.010)
PE*t-3 -0.004 -0.002 0.011 0.010
(0.072) (0.071) (0.008) (0.007)
PE*t-2 -0.019 -0.021 -0.002 -0.003
(0.055) (0.055) (0.007) (0.007)
PE*t0 0.071 0.064 -0.002 -0.003
(0.051) (0.052) (0.006) (0.006)
PE*t+1 0.114* 0.105 0.012* 0.011
(0.283) (0.066) (0.007) (0.007)
PE*t+2 0.283*** 0.273*** 0.019** 0.018**
(0.072) (0.072) (0.009) (0.009)
PE*t+3 0.351*** 0.345*** 0.016 0.016
(0.081) (0.081) (0.010) (0.010)
PE*t+4 0.442*** 0.436*** 0.025** 0.024**
(0.097) (0.097) (0.013) (0.013)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm controls No Yes No Yes
Observations 9,477 9,477 9,477 9,477
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5.6.4 Exporting, firm growth and financial constraints
We now turn to the hypothesis relating private equity investment, financial con-
straints and exporting. We conduct three tests to observe whether there is evidence
of private equity investors alleviating financial constraints. First, in Table 10 we split
our sample into our four different deal types (private-to-private buyouts, public-to-
private buyouts, secondary buyouts and divisional buyouts). Prior studies docu-
ment heterogeneity in the firm-level effects of different buyout types. In particular,
private-to-private transactions are associated with greater post-buyout growth rela-
tive to public-to-private buyouts (Boucly et al. (2011), Amess et al. (2016), Fracassi
et al. (2018), Lerner et al. (2019)).
In Panel A of Table 10, we find strong evidence of post-buyout growth in export value
and exporting intensity in private-to-private targets, with all coefficients significant
at the 1% confidence level. The value of exports grows by just under 40% relative to
matched control firms in private-to-private targets, while the coefficient on exporting
intensity implies that the ratio of export sales-to-total sales increase by around 3%
post-buyout in private-to-private targets. Immediately, it appears that private-to-
private buyouts may be driving our main results.
Where take-private deals are concerned (Panel B), the coefficients on export value
are statistically insignificant. The estimates on exporting intensity imply there may
be a negative effect on the ratio of export sales-to-total sales post-buyout in public-
to-private deals. Likewise, the coefficients for divisional buyouts are negative and
insignificant in Panel D, suggesting that these target firms may downsize post-
transaction (Kaplan (1989), Chung (2011))30. More similar in nature to private-
to-private transactions, the coefficients on secondary buyouts (Panel C) are positive
but remain statistically insignificant. Overall, our results parallel prior work which
has noted heterogeneity in post-transaction growth across various deal types, in
particular private-to-private deals leading to positive firm growth relative to public-
to-private deals (Boucly et al. (2011), Fracassi et al. (2018), Lerner et al. (2019)).
We provide further evidence of private equity investors alleviating constraints in
portfolio companies. In Table 11, we partition the sample based on the median size
in the pre-buyout year, while in Table 12 we split based on the median pre-deal
leverage of firms. Prior literature shows that smaller, and more indebted companies
are more vulnerable to credit market downturns and shocks to the availability of
30Consistent with Boucly et al. (2011) and Chung (2011), in unreported regressions we find
that private-to-private target firms experience significant increases in sales, earnings, employment
and capex investment, while public-to-private deals lead to deals lead to declines in sales and
employment.
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bank financing (Cingano et al. (2016), Bottero et al. (2020)). The results are in line
with the findings of Table 9. Indeed, the magnitude of the coefficient on export sales
in columns 1 and 2 of Table 11 is considerably greater (around 15-20 percentage
points greater) for smaller firms. When we consider firms’ exporting intensity in
columns 3 and 4, the coefficients are positive and significant at the 1% level for
smaller firms and suggest that the ratio of export-to-total sales rises by over 3% in
smaller targets post-buyout. However, the same coefficients on larger target firms
are substantially smaller in magnitude and are statistically insignificant. Previous
papers which find only slight improvements in operating performance, such as Guo
et al. (2011) and Cohn et al. (2014), tend to focus on larger deals involving larger
targets, which may help in understanding the results.
Finally, in Table 12 we split our sample based on pre-transaction leverage, as mea-
sured by the ratio of debt-to-assets. The results presented in Table 12 echo those
in Table 10: companies which had higher pre-deal leverage and were therefore more
likely to be financially constrained, exhibit considerably higher post-transaction
growth in exporting activity relative to firms which had lower pre-deal leverage.
Specifically, the coefficients in columns 1 and 2 concerning the value of exports im-
ply that the magnitude of the post-buyout increase in export value is almost twice
as high for more leveraged firms. The magnitude of these coefficients are comparable
to Table 11, where the sample is split based on pre-buyout size. Likewise consistent
with the results when the sample was partitioned based on pre-deal size, the coef-
ficients on exporting intensity in columns 3 and 4 imply that the effect of buyouts
on post-transaction exporting intensity is only statistically significant for companies
which were ex-ante more likely to be constrained - those which were more leveraged.
Similarly, the coefficients indicate that the magnitude of the effect is almost four
times greater on target companies which had higher pre-deal leverage.
In summary, our results provide strong empirical support for H2 since we find that
private-to-private deals and financially constrained firms are more sensitive to buy-
out transactions. Thus, availability of outside capital through private equity invest-
ment plays an important role when markets face higher trade costs and exporters
require more external finance to meet these costs.
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Table 10: Deal types
The following analyses the effects of private equity ownership on exporting and other firm vari-
ables for different types of buyout transaction: private-to-private buyouts , public-to-private deals,
secondary buyouts and divisional buyouts. PE is a dummy taking the value one for buyout target
firms and zero otherwise and Post takes the value one after the transaction and zero before. Stan-
dard errors are clustered at the firm-level. *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, **
at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level.
LogExport Exports/sales
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Private-to-private
PE*Post 0.390*** 0.380*** 0.031*** 0.030***
(0.090) (0.089) (0.012) (0.012)
Post -0.043 -0.036 -0.005 -0.030
(0.044) (0.325) (0.006) (0.040)
Observations 11,631 11,631 11,631 11,631
Panel B: Public-to-private
PE*Post 0.139 -0.111 -0.072 -0.081*
(0.354) (0.412) (0.062) (0.046)
Post 0.086 0.303 0.026 -0.123
(0.219) (1.936) (0.032) (0.195)
Observations 678 678 678 678
Panel C: Secondary buyout
PE*Post 0.213 0.197 0.010 0.007
(0.186) (0.192) (0.023) (0.024)
Post 0.123 -0.676 -0.002 -0.069*
(0.084) (0.660) (0.010) (0.058)
Observations 2,994 2,994 2,994 2,994
Panel C: Divisional buyout
PE*Post -0.043 -0.096 0.031 0.035
(0.178) (0.185) (0.024) (0.025)
Post 0.057 -0.087 -0.044 -0.100
(0.125) (0.863) (0.019) (0.091)
Observations 1,625 1,625 1,625 1,625
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm controls No Yes No Yes
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Table 11: Financial constraints: Size
The following analyses the effects on firms which were below and above the median level of firm
sales in the pre-buyout year, and hence more or less likely to be financially constrained. PE is a
dummy taking the value one for buyout target firms and zero otherwise and Post takes the value
one after the transaction and zero before. Standard errors are clustered at the firm-level. ***
denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level.
LogExport Exports/sales
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Smaller firms
PE*Post 0.394*** 0.361*** 0.036** 0.034**
(0.111) (0.109) (0.016) (0.016)
Post -0.095* 0.392 -0.014* 0.088
(0.048) (0.968) (0.008) (0.155)
Observations 7,087 7,087 7,087 7,087
Panel B: Larger firms
PE*Post 0.239** 0.234** 0.014 0.015
(0.097) (0.098) (0.011) (0.12)
Post 0.041 -0.232 -0.004 -0.039
(0.052) (0.652) (0.006) (0.069)
Observations 9,445 9,445 9,445 9,445
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm controls No Yes No Yes
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Table 12: Financial constraints: Leverage
The following analyses the effects on firms which were above and below the median level of firm
leverage (the ratio of total debt-to-assets) in the pre-buyout year, and hence more or less likely to
be financially constrained. PE is a dummy taking the value one for buyout target firms and zero
otherwise and Post takes the value one after the transaction and zero before. Standard errors are
clustered at the firm-level. *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level,
and * at the 10% level.
LogExport Exports/sales
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: High leverage firms
PE*Post 0.412*** 0.393*** 0.041*** 0.041***
(0.109) (0.112) (0.013) (0.014)
Post -0.004 0.455 -0.010 -0.014
(0.060) (0.416) (0.007) (0.039)
Observations 7,304 7,304 7,304 7,304
Panel B: Low leverage firms
PE*Post 0.227** 0.206** 0.010 0.012
(0.098) (0.097) (0.013) (0.013)
Post 0.002 -0.875** -0.005 -0.055
(0.045) (0.362) (0.007) (0.046)
Observations 9,666 9,666 9,666 9,666
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm controls No Yes No Yes
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5.6.5 Private equity, exporting & the crisis
We then turn our attention to examine the role of private equity investors on firm-
level exporting during the recent global financial crisis. The profound impact the
financial crisis had on international exporting is well-documented: from September
2008 to January 2009, world trade contracted by 30%. To put this into perspective,
global GDP fell by only 3% over the same period (Bricongne et al. (2012)). Within
the UK, from 2008 to 2009, exports fell by 22.1%31. This collapse in international
trade has been attributed to various factors: a decline in demand, a rise in protec-
tionism, and a restricted access to finance for exporters (Bricongne et al. (2012),
Görg and Spaliara (2014a)).
More constrained firms tend to suffer more as a result of economic shocks (Cingano
et al. (2016), Bottero et al. (2020)). Specific to exporting, empirical evidence indi-
cates that more constrained firms were left worse off during the financial crisis. In
particular, Görg and Spaliara (2018) show that more constrained firms and those
operating in more vulnerable industries were more likely to exit the export market
during the crisis. Furthermore, Bricongne et al. (2012) find that smaller export-
ing firms reduced the range of destinations served or stopped exporting altogether.
Coupled with the aforementioned evidence of private equity investors softening the
impact of the crisis on their portfolio companies (Bernstein et al. (2019)) and gener-
ally mitigating financial constraints facing companies (Boucly et al. (2011), Amess
et al. (2016), Fracassi et al. (2018)), we can plausibly speculate that private equity-
backed firms’ exporting was more resilient to the negative effects of the crisis relative
to that of non-sponsored firms.
Our data set and sample period encompass the financial crisis and, as such, provide
fertile grounds for investigating whether or not private equity investors were able
to soften the impact of the crisis on the exporting of portfolio companies. Recent
work by Bernstein et al. (2019) has shown that private equity investors helped
their portfolio companies in the UK outperform similar non-sponsored firms during
the crisis by relaxing credit constraints. In particular, private equity-backed firms
reduced their investment rate and equity and debt issuance by significantly less
relative to other firms at the onset of the crisis. Consequently, they were able to
increase their asset base and market share.
5.6.5.1 Data, descriptive statistics & model In order to assess impact of
private equity ownership on firms’ exporting around the crisis, we follow the sample
31As measured in USD. This equates to a decline of 8.6% in sterling due to exchange rates.
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construction of Bernstein et al. (2019). Specifically, for our treated sample of private
equity-backed firms, we keep all those who had received private equity investment
before the end of 2007. We then keep those which had not experienced some form
of exit before the end of 2008. This leaves us with an initial 387 private-equity
backed firms who received private equity investment from 2004 to 2007. The data
set includes data from 2004 to 2011, a symmetrical window around the crisis.
Our matching technique is the same as in our earlier analysis. The only noteworthy
difference is that whereas we previously matched on firms’ characteristics in the pre-
deal year, we now match on firm’s size, profitability and leverage in 2007 - the year
before the onset of the crisis. As such, we select up to 5 companies for each portfolio
company which: 1) operate in the same 2-digit SIC code; 2) have total assets within
50% of the private equity-backed firm in 2007; 3) have return on assets within a
50% bracket of the target company, and 4) have leverage (total debt/assets) within
50% of the target in 2007. Using this method, we are able to match 199 private
equity-backed firms to adequate control firms.
In order to ensure our matching is sufficiently appropriate, we show some brief
summary statistics of key variables in 2007 for both the treated and control samples
in Table 13. The two groups of firms are very similar across all variables in 2007, prior
to the crisis. As expected, profitability and leverage are almost identical given that
they formed part of the matching process, as is firm’s cash flow. Size, as measured by
total assets or sales, is not significantly different between the two groups. The only
difference is that private equity-backed firms have higher earnings scaled by assets.
The exporting variables are similar in both sub-samples. Each of the logarithm of
total export value, the ratio of export sales to total sales and the 1- and 2-year
growth rate in exports in 2007 are not statistically significantly different between
each group.
Figure 3 offers the first insight into the potential cushioning impact private equity
sponsorship may provide to firm’s exporting in the midst of the crisis. The graph
presents the median growth rate of the logarithm of exports for each year for both
private equity-backed and control firms. A comparison of pre-crisis export growth
trends in buyout targets and control firms reveals no obvious differences, suggesting
that the parallel trends assumption required for difference-in-differences estimation
is largely satisfied. Once the crisis ensues, the median export growth of control
firms drops considerably from 14% to 2%, while that of private equity-backed targets
remains relatively stable, experiencing only a modest decline relative to the control
firms.
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Table 13: Pre-crisis descriptive statistics
The below table details summary statistics of sample firms in 2007 across treated (PE-backed
companies) and control firms (non-PE-backed companies) PE-backed refers to all PE-backed com-
panies; Control refers to a sample of control firms, matched on their 2 digit SIC code, ROA (net
income/total assets) (within a 50% bracket) and total assets (size) (within a 50% bracket) in the
pre-crisis year, 2007. Log(export) is the log of the value of export sales. Cash flow is defined as a
firm’s net income plus depreciation and is scaled by total assets, earnings is EBITDA normalized
by total assets, while ROA is net income divided by total assets. Leverage is calculated as a firm’s
ratio of debt to total assets. Other variables are self-explanatory.
PE Control
Variable N Mean Median SD N Mean Median SD t-test
Exporting
Log(export) 67 8.48 8.59 1.74 219 8.67 8.76 1.82 -0.19
Export/total sales 67 0.28 0.18 0.27 219 0.34 0.23 0.31 -0.05
1-year export growth 67 0.10 0.09 0.28 172 0.14 0.13 0.30 -0.04
2-year export growth 54 0.19 0.18 0.44 164 0.25 0.21 0.47 -0.06
Firm Variables
Total assets 189 175,151 26,545 738.588 773 125,329 20,961 568.266 49,822
Sales 181 159,784 36,097 815.920 652 95,923 30,933 269.300 63,860
Profitability (ROA) 189 0.13 0.11 0.12 773 0.12 0.10 0.10 0.01
Leverage 189 0.61 0.62 0.24 773 0.62 0.62 0.23 -0.01
Earnings 189 0.19 0.16 0.13 767 0.13 0.15 0.28 0.06***
Cash flow 186 0.16 0.14 0.13 713 0.16 0.14 0.11 0.00
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Figure 3: Export growth over the crisis
This figure graphs the median one-year growth rate of the logarithm of export value for both
private equity-backed firms and control firms around the crisis.




















5.6.5.2 Empirical model & results In a more formal examination of private
equity ownership and exporting around the crisis, we adopt a standard difference-
in-differences model where we estimate the following equation:
(yit) = αt + αi + αc + β1(Postt) + β2(PEi ∗ Postt) + θXit + εit (6)
Where the dependent variable is the one- and two-year growth rate in export value.
As in previous sections, we include firm and year fixed effects, denoted by α. Industry
fixed effects are also included to control for any unobserved time-invariant industry
factors. The covariate of firm-level controls is the same as before and includes firm
sales, earnings, leverage, cash flow, earnings and profitability, taken in 2007 and
interacted with the Post variable. PE takes the value one for all private equity-
backed companies and zero for controls. Post is equal one after 2007 and zero
otherwise. Standard errors are clustered at the firm-level.
The regression results of Equation 7 are displayed in Table 14. In columns 1 and 2,
we find that buyout target companies’ export growth fell by less than non-private
equity-backed companies during the financial crisis. The effect of private equity
ownership is both statistically significant and large in economic magnitude. Target
companies’ export growth fell by around 7% less than that of control firms during
the crisis. This is consistent with the graphical plots in Figure 3. The inclusion
of firm-level control variables has no impact on the coefficients. When we consider
the two-year growth rate in export value in columns 3 and 4, our results remain
significant and increase in magnitude. The two-year growth rate in exports falls
by around 15% less for target companies relative to control firms at the onset of
the crisis. Again, the coefficient is robust in statistical significance and economic
magnitude to the inclusion of a host of firm-level covariates and fixed effects.
As in section 6.3, and to further validate the parallel trends assumption, we extend
the analysis to gain an insight into how firm’s export growth evolves over time
around the crisis. We explore how export growth evolves over time around the
crisis in more detail by estimating the following equation, which shows year-by-year
private equity effects:
(yit) = αt + αi + αc + Σβk(PEi) + θXit + εit (7)
Where we estimate a different βk for each year between 2004 and 2011, using the
pre-crisis year, 2007, as the reference year. If βk is correctly capturing the causal
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effect of the financial crisis on firms’ exporting then we would expect the effect
of private equity ownership to appear at the onset of the crisis. The results are
presented in Table 15. The pattern is consistent with that in Figure 3. There is
a lack of consistent, significant patterns between the two groups of firms in the
pre-crisis period. However, the positive impact of private equity ownership becomes
clear during the crisis years. Again, this is consistent with the trend in Figure 2,
where there is a substantial decline in the median export growth of control firms,
and a far modest change in buyout targets’ export growth which remains more stable
during the crisis. Consistent with Bernstein et al. (2019), the results suggest that
private equity investors were able to soften the impact of the crisis on their portfolio
companies.
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Table 14: Exporting & the crisis
This table investigates the effect of private equity buyouts on the firms’ exporting growth during
the global financial crisis. The dependent variables are the one- and two-year growth rate of export
value. PE is a dummy taking the value one for buyout target firms and zero otherwise, Post takes
the value one for years 2008 to 2011. Standard errors are clustered at the firm-level. *** denotes
statistical significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level.
1-year export growth rate 2-year export growth rate
PE*Post 0.068** 0.069** 0.153** 0.157**
(0.029) (0.030) (0.062) (0.061)
Post 0.016 0.147 0.010 0.496**
(0.062) (0.116) (0.101) (0.241)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm controls No Yes No Yes
Observations 1,780 1,780 1,511 1,511
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Table 15: Evolution of exports over time around the crisis
This table reports the estimates from a time-varying fixed effects model. Specifically, the table
reports βk of Equation 8. Even-numbered columns augment the baseline model with a set of firm-
level controls measured in 2007 and interacted with the Post dummy. In Columns 1 and 2 the
dependent variable is the one-year growth of export value and in Columns 3 and 4 the dependent
variable is the two-year growth of export value. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
*** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5%, and * at the 10%
1-year export growth rate 2-year export growth rate
PE*2004 -0.304** 0.315* -0.277 -0.285
(0.131) (130) (0.206) (0.202)
PE*2005 0.037 0.029 -0.379* -0.391*
(0.065) (0.066) (0.189) (0.185)
PE*2006 0.070 0.064 0.067 0.057
(0.064) (0.065) (0.080) (0.078)
PE*2008 0.011 0.001 -0.014 -0.016
(0.055) (0.054) (0.082) (0.081)
PE*2009 0.145** 0.136** 0.093 0.087
(0.066) (0.067) (0.090) (0.089)
PE*2010 0.132** 0.122* 0.273*** 0.272***
(0.065) (0.063) (0.093) (0.091)
PE*2011 0.024 0.014 0.115 0.111
(0.063) (0.061) (0.091) (0.088)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm controls No Yes No Yes
Observations 1,789 1,789 1,519 1,519
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5.6.6 Working capital mechanism
In Table 16 we outline various measures of firms’ working capital management for
both private equity-backed and matched control firms in the pre- and post-deal pe-
riods. We include the ratio of net working capital to sales, the cash conversion cycle,
net working capital, trade debtors, trade creditors and their logarithms32. In the
pre-deal period, both net working capital (in sterling pounds) and its logarithm are
significantly lower in private equity-backed companies relative to control firms. The
change in the post-deal period is dramatic, as net working capital is considerably
higher in buyout firms and the difference is strongly statistically significant. Simi-
larly, the NWC-sales ratio is significantly less in the pre-deal years for target firms,
but rises dramatically and converges on that of the control firms after the transac-
tion, as the ratio improves considerably for private equity targets, but by far less
so for control firms. Finally, while the cash conversion cycle is already significantly
lower for target firms pre-transaction, the gap between the two sets of firms widens
considerably by 8 percentage points post-transaction.
These summary statistics give us an initial idea as to the positive impact private
equity investors may be exerting on portfolio companies’ financial control and work-
ing capital management. In Figures 4 and 5 we plot the year effects estimates (see
Equation 1) around the transaction year separately for the private equity-backed
companies and matched control companies on the logarithm of net working capi-
tal and the ratio of net working capital-to-sales. The divergence in both variables
occurring around the year of the deal is clear. In both cases the two sub-samples
of firms follow similar paths prior to the transaction. Once the transaction occurs,
the buyout firms’ working capital increases significantly more during the post-deal
years relative to similar non-sponsored firms.
We then turn to a formal estimation of the effect of private equity buyouts on
portfolio companies working capital. Our model is a DiD estimation, the same
as in Equation 4 and the results are tabulated in Table 17. We use a variety of
dependent variables to capture firms’ working capital management: the ratio of net
working capital (NWC) to sales, the cash conversion cycle, the logarithm of NWC,
the logarithm of trade debtors and creditors, the ratio of NWC to total assets and
lastly, the ratio of current assets to total assets. The results show an overwhelming
improvement in the working capital management of private equity targets relative
to control firms post-buyout transaction, suggesting that private equity buyouts are
32The cash conversion cycle is calculated as CCC = 365*[(inventory/cost of sales) + (receiv-
ables/sales) - (payables/cost of sales)]
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followed by a marked enhancement in target companies’ working capital structure.
For instance, buyouts are followed by a 1.5 percentage point increase in the ratio of
net working capital-to-sales. This represents a meaningful economic magnitude, as
the standard deviation of the sample NWC-sales ratio is 0.24, implying that buy-
outs are followed by a 6% standard deviation increase in the ratio of NWC-to-sales.
When we scale NWC by total assets, the magnitude of the effect is similar, however
it loses statistical significance when we augment the model with firm controls. The
other proxies of working capital are likewise positively associated with private equity
sponsorship. In particular, we find that the cash conversion cycle decreases by 8% in
buyout targets relative to control firms, post-transaction, while net working capital
rises by around 50%. We also find post-transaction rises in both trade debtors and
trade creditors. Lastly, the ratio of current assets to total assets rises by around 1.3-
1.8% post-buyout. Overall, the results show that private equity-backed companies
are strongly associated with improvements in working capital management, which
we believe represents an increased ability to finance greater participation in inter-
national export markets. Given that the cross-border transporting and delivery of
goods can take significantly longer than domestic delivery, exporters working capital
is strained relative to that of a domestic producer and have greater working capital
needs.
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Table 16: Working capital summary statistics
The below table details summary statistics of private equity-backed and non-private equity-backed firms’ working capital in the pre- and post-deal periods.
The table describes the mean and median values of the ratio of net working capital-to-sales, the cash conversion cycle, working capital, trade debtors
and trade creditors (£000s) and the natural logarithm of working capital, trade debtors and trade creditors values in the pre-deal period (Post=0) and
in the post-deal period (Post=1) for the private equity-backed sample (PE) and the control sample (Control). The ’diff’ columns represent t-tests for the
difference in means between the PE-backed sample and the control sample in each period. *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5%
level, and * at the 10% level.
Post=0 Post=1
PE Control PE Control
Variable N Mean Median N Mean Median diff N Mean Median N Mean Median diff
NWC-Sales (%) 6,233 0.16 0.09 26,200 0.20 0.12 -0.04*** 7,136 0.26 0.20 26,391 0.26 0.20 0.00
CCC (days) 3,776 48 40 14,636 64 50 -16*** 4,254 43 34 14,176 67 54 -24***
Working Capital (£000) 8,115 5,774 803 35,721 6,343 1,227 -568 7,325 21,076 6,864 31,112 13,561 4,311 7,514***
Log WC 6,054 7.33 7.48 27,298 7.56 7.76 -0.23*** 6,005 9.24 9.23 25,746 8.71 8.75 0.53***
Trade Debtors (£000) 6,450 5,969 2,157 25,630 5,285 1,934 684*** 6,823 10,059 4,003 23,567 8,805 2,899 1,254***
Log TD 6,450 7.55 7.67 25,630 7.33 7.57 0.22*** 6,823 8.17 8.29 23,567 7.72 7.97 0.45***
Trade Creditors (£000) 6,574 4,391 1,239 26,551 3,533 939 857*** 6,973 8,056 2,440 24,950 5,670 1,271 2,385***
Log TC 6,574 7.11 7.12 26,551 6.70 6.85 0.41*** 6,973 7.81 7.79 24,950 7.04 7.14 0.76***
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Figure 4: Effect of being PE-backed on working capital
The below figure illustrates the change in firms’ working capital for both PE-backed companies and
control companies in our sample around the transaction, where year 0 is equal to the year of the
transaction. Specifically, the figure reports the αt of the following equation: (yit) = αt + αi + εit.
Where αt captures year fixed effects and αi captures company fixed effects. The year precedent to
the transaction is used as the base period and its corresponding coefficient is normalized to zero.
The equation is estimated separately for both the PE-backed and control samples, with standard
errors being clustered at the company level.













Figure 5: Effect of being PE-backed on NWC-sales ratio
The below figure illustrates the change in firms’ net working capital-to-sales ratio for both PE-
backed companies and control companies in our sample around the transaction, where year 0 is
equal to the year of the transaction. Specifically, the figure reports the αt of the following equation:
(yit) = αt + αi + εit. Where αt captures year fixed effects and αi captures company fixed effects.
The year precedent to the transaction is used as the base period and its corresponding coefficient
is normalized to zero. The equation is estimated separately for both the PE-backed and control
samples, with standard errors being clustered at the company level.














Table 17: Working capital mechanism
This table formally investigates the working capital mechanism behind the growth in firms’ exporting and growth in operating performance. The model is
the standard DiD equation (see Equation 3). The firm-level controls are the same as before and standard errors are clustered at the firm-level. *** denotes
statistical significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level.
NWC-Sales CCC LogNWC LogTradeDebtors LogTradeCreditors NWC/TA CA/TA
PE*Post 0.015** 0.016** -0.083** -0.082** 0.590*** 0.496*** 0.284*** 0.266*** 0.394*** 0.369*** 0.014** 0.007 0.018*** 0.013**
(0.060) (0.059) (0.014) (0.041) (0.038) (0.039) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Post 0.022*** 0.046** 0.029 0.190* 0.018 -0.405*** -0.035* -0.144** -0.073*** -0.198*** 0.019*** -0.015* 0.002 -0.004
(0.025) (0.095) (0.019) (0.069) (0.019) (0.070) (0.003) (0.010) (0.003) (0.010)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 65,663 65,663 30,545 30,545 64,736 64,736 62,630 63,630 64,809 64,809 81,784 81,784 81,357 81,357
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5.7 Robustness tests
5.7.1 Pre-buyout growth patterns
One potential concern regarding the results presented thus far, is that private equity
investors may simply be selecting to invest in companies that were already growing
faster than other firms in the pre-transaction period (Boucly et al. (2011)). Indeed,
Table 5 illustrates that private equity-equity backed firms have higher growth rates
of sales in the pre-deal years, and it may be that this is driving our results. In order
to control for pre-buyout growth, we include an interaction term between the three




Where SalesGrowth is the 3 year growth in sales prior to the transaction year. We
report the results in Table 18. While we find the growth in pre-buyout sales to have
a positive effect on the post-buyout growth in the value of exports and exporting
intensity, its inclusion does not have a material impact on our estimates of private
equity buyouts on firms’ exporting activity. In other words, we find that it does not
diminish the effect of private equity ownership and our results remain intact after
controlling for pre-buyout growth trends.
5.7.2 Additional control variables
Table 13 offers a further robustness check, where we include controls which have
been widely used in the firm-level exporting literature to date. Typically it has
been found that larger, more productive firms which export (Bernard and Jensen
(2004), Greenaway and Kneller (2004), Bernard et al 2007). To test whether these
firm-level variables may be driving our results, and not the change in firm ownership,
we augment our models in Equations 3 and 4 with further controls, including the
size of the firm, as measured by the number of employees, the wage bill of the firm
and the productivity of the firm, measured by the amount of profit generated per
employee. As before, these controls are taken in the pre-deal year and are interacted
with the post variable. The results in Table 19 are consistent with our baseline
results. In columns 1 to 4 we find that our results regarding firms’ exporting at the
extensive margin are unaffected by the inclusion of these further controls. Similarly,
at the intensive margin, the coefficients still imply that private equity sponsorship is
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associated with an increase in over 30 percentage points in the value of firm’s export
sales. Where the exporting intensity of firms is concerned, the coefficients imply
a similar economic magnitude as our baseline results. In summary, we conclude
that our main results are robust to including additional firm-level characteristics,
typically associated with exporting firms.
5.7.3 Attrition bias
In order to account for any potential attrition bias from firms exiting via an ac-
quisition or liquidation, we reduce our sample to include only those deals which
have experienced an exit. The results are tabulated in Table 20. This process of
elimination reduces our sample of private equity-backed firms from 733 to 459. Nev-
ertheless, the significance of our results concerning both the extensive and intensive
margins of exporting remain intact. The magnitudes actually increase in size: the
coefficients indicate that private equity-backed firms which have experience an exit
increase the value of their exports by around 35% relative to control firms, while
their export intensity increases by around 2.5%.
5.7.4 Alternative matching methodologies
Lastly, in unreported regressions, we adjust our matching technique to test whether
doing so alters our primary findings. Firstly, we follow Bernstein et al. (2019) and
tighten our matching bandwidths from 50% to 30%. While this reduces our sample
to 651 sponsored firms and 2,184 control firms, our results are upheld. Secondly, we
use the matching technique adopted by Boucly et al. (2011) and drop leverage from
the matching procedure thereby allowing the two groups of firms to have different
leverage ratios in the pre-buyout year. This increases our number of PE-backed
firms to 935. Again, our results are unaffected. We continue to find that private
equity ownership positively affects firm-level exporting at both the extensive margin
and the intensive margin.
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Table 18: Robustness: accounting for pre-buyout growth
This table investigates the same as Tables 6 and 7 but also includes an interaction term of the three-year pre-buyout growth in sales interacted with the
Post variable. Columns 1 and 2 estimate linear probability models and columns 3 and 4 estimate probit models based on Equation 3. Columns 5 to 8
estimate Equation 4. *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level. The other firm controls are the same
as before.
Extensive margin Intensive margin
Exporting dummy LogExport Export/sales
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
PE*Post 0.046*** 0.042*** 0.224*** 0.217*** 0.301*** 0.291*** 0.024** 0.023**
(0.012) (0.013) (0.083) (0.083) (071) (0.073) (0.009) (0.010)
Post -0.005 0.010 -0.025 0.220 -0.044 -0.032 -0.010 -0.031
(0.06) (0.023) (0.045) (0.202) (0.037) (0.031) (0.005) (0.032)
SalesGr*Post -0.001* -0.001* -0.004 -0.003 0.075*** 0.074*** 0.004** 0.004**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004) (0.021) (0.021) (0.002) (0.002)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 72,219 72,219 70,699 70,699 16,970 16,970 16,970 16,970
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Table 19: Robustness: export literature controls
This table investigates the same as Tables 7 and 8 but also includes controls typically used in exporting literature. These controls are the log of employees
(firm size), the log of profits per employee (productivity) and the log of the firm’s wages. The controls are taken in the pre-deal year and are interacted
with the Post variable. Columns 1 and 2 estimate linear probability models and columns 3 and 4 estimate probit models based on Equation 3. Columns 5
to 8 estimate Equation 4. *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level. The other firm controls are the
same as before.
Extensive margin Intensive margin
Exporting dummy LogExport Export/sales
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
PE*Post 0.046*** 0.042*** 0.246*** 0.211** 0.283*** 0.271*** 0.022** 0.023**
(0.012) (0.013) (0.083) (0.083) (0.073) (0.075) (0.010) (0.009)
Post -0.021** 0.004 0.055 0.325 -0.499 -0.704** -0.024 -0.052
(0.010) (0.022) (0.122) (0.207) (0.197) (0.301) (0.028) (0.039)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Export controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 72,219 72,219 70,699 70,699 16,970 16,970 16,970 16,970
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Table 20: Robustness: exited deals only
The following repeats the main estimation on the sub-sample of firms which have experienced an exit. Columns 1 and 2 estimate linear probability models
and columns 3 and 4 estimate probit models based on Equation 3. Columns 5 to 8 estimate Equation 4. *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level,
** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level. The other firm controls are the same as before.
Extensive margin Intensive margin
Exporting dummy LogExport Export/sales
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
PE*Post 0.040*** 0.039** 0.217** 0.223** 0.362*** 0.343*** 0.026** 0.025**
(0.015) (0.016) (0.099) (0.100) (0.093) (0.095) (0.012) (0.013)
Post 0.007 0.030 0.069 0.413* 0.007 -0.048 -0.007 -0.021
(0.008) (0.027) (0.056) (0.232) (0.047) (0.334) (0.006) (0.039)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 43,966 43,966 42,712 42,712 10,936 10,936 10,936 10,936
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5.8 Concluding Remarks
Recent literature on corporate finance has sought to measure the gains from pri-
vate equity investment in firm performance. Our study builds on these foundations,
focusing on PE investment and its effect on firms’ export performance. Our re-
sults from a panel of 733 private equity-backed firms and 3,104 control firms over
the period 2004 to 2017 shows that private equity investors are able to relax credit
constraints and allow their portfolio companies to improve their exporting infras-
tructure. This effect holds for both the intensive and the extensive margin of export.
When we split our sample into different deal types and groups of firms, we uncover
significant heterogeneity. In particular, the positive effect of private equity is more
potent for targets in private-to-private deals and firms which are ex-ante more likely
to be financially constrained in the pre-buyout period. This implies that availability
of outside capital through private equity investment plays an important role when
markets face higher trade costs and exporters require more external finance to meet
these costs. Furthermore, we offer evidence that private equity-backed firms’ export-
ing was significantly more resilient amid the global financial crisis. Finally, we show
that as expected, the net working capital ratio increases hand-in-hand with exports.
This signals a mechanism through which credit constraints are alleviated: private
equity firms help target firms to finance the costly working capital needs associated
with exporting. Our results are robust to re-specifications and alternative matching
methodologies.
Exporting provides many benefits to firms, including higher survival likelihood amid
economic crises. By helping their portfolio companies to increase their exports, pri-
vate equity firms help them to shield against crises. This is of particular pertinence
today as the global Covid-19 pandemic has had a profound impact on the corporate
sector.
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6 Chapter - Bank-affiliated private equity buy-
outs and shocks to the banking sector
6.1 Background
While a rich literature to date has considered how banks can transmit banking sector
shocks onto the real economy via their commercial lending arms (see for example
Khwaja and Mian (2008); Chava and Purnanandam (2011); Cingano et al. (2016);
Fraisse et al. (2020); Acharya et al. (2018); Gropp et al. (2018); Farinha et al.
(2019)), there is not yet any empirical evidence on the effect of an exogenous shock
to a bank and the consequent impact on its private equity arm and the portfolio
companies in which this invests.
Banks have become increasingly important players in private equity markets, as both
institutional investors into private equity funds (LPs) and as private equity investors
themselves, actively raising and managing funds (GPs). In terms of the latter, from
1990 to 2018, 12% of European private equity deals were made by bank-affiliated
investors (see Figure 6)33. This is conservative relative to US market figures reported
in Fang et al. (2013) who reveal that almost 30% of US deals completed between
1983 and 2009 were sponsored by the private equity arm of a bank. Nevertheless,
banks maintain an important role in European private equity markets.









Figure 6: European buyouts 1990 - 2018 by investor type
The above chart shows a breakdown of all private equity deals (excluding venture capital and
growth deals) from January 1990 to December 2018, by investor type. ’Independent’ deals are
those executed by a private/public limited partnership; ’bank-affiliated’ are undertaken by the
private equity division or subsidiary of a bank; ’corporate’ accounts for deals of private equity
arms of large corporate organizations; Finally, ’other’ accounts for all other deals. Data comes
from S&P Capital IQ.
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The firm-level benefits of being backed by a private equity investor are well docu-
mented in the literature, including improvements in operating performance (Kaplan
(1989), Lichtenberg and Siegel (1990), Guo et al. (2011)), employment and job cre-
ation (Boucly et al. (2011), Davis et al. (2014), Lerner et al. (2019) Biesinger et al.
(2018)), profitability (Cressy et al. (2007), Boucly et al. (2011), Cohn et al. (2014)),
productivity (Harris et al. (2005), Davis et al. (2014), Biesinger et al. (2018), Lerner
et al. (2019)), operational efficiency (Bernstein and Sheen (2016), Cohn et al. (2019))
and distress risk (Tykvová and Borell (2012), Hotchkiss et al. (2014)). Moreover,
empirical work suggests that private equity-backed companies are more recession-
resistant than comparable non-sponsored firms (Wilson et al. (2012), Bernstein et al.
(2019)).
With the diverse firm-level benefits of private equity investment in mind, and given
that bank-affiliated deals have accounted for a sizeable portion of private equity
deal activity in Europe in recent years, we look to understand how bank-affiliated
private equity-backed companies respond to an exogenous shock to their parent
bank. In order to do so, we exploit the Capital Exercise conducted by the European
Banking Authority (EBA) in 2011, where selected banks had to increase their core
tier 1 capital (CT1) ratios to 9% of their risk-weighted assets by June 2012. The
regulatory exercise was unexpected not only in its magnitude (Financial Times,
2011), but also in its timing 34.
In Figure 7, we graph the deal activity of the European private equity market, fo-
cusing on independent and bank-affiliated deals. In terms of the number of deals
executed, both deal types follow a similar pattern in early years, rising during the
initial LBO boom of the 1980s and early 1990s, dipping slightly in the aftermath
of the dot com bubble before dropping considerably after the recent global financial
crisis and, to a lesser extent, after the sovereign debt crisis. Thereafter, and ap-
pearing to coincide with the EBA capital exercise, while independent private equity
deal activity recovers, bank-affiliated deals drop slightly more around the time of
the capital exercise, leading to a divergence and further motivating our study.
34The EBA had carried out stress tests across European banks less than 5 months prior to the
EBA capital exercise.
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Figure 7: Bank-affiliated vs independent buyouts in Europe 1990-2018
This graph shows the number of bank-affiliated private equity buyouts in Europe (right axis)
and the number of independent private equity buyouts in Europe (left axis) from 1990 to 2015.
A bank-affiliated deal is a transaction in which the equity sponsor is a bank-affiliated private
equity firm. An independent deal is one in which the equity sponsor is an independent limited
partnership, unaffiliated with any other organization. Private equity transaction information is
from S&P Capital IQ.




















Recent work by Bernstein et al. (2019) shows that private equity-backed companies
outperformed non-private equity-backed companies during the recent financial cri-
sis. Moving a step further, using a sample of bank-affiliated private equity buyouts,
we investigate whether the impact of an exogenous banking sector shock affects the
portfolio companies of all bank-affiliated private equity investors in the same man-
ner. Specifically, we investigate the differential impact the EBA capital exercise had
on the portfolio companies of affiliated investors of affected and unaffected banks,
with regards to their investment activity, financing policies and their performance
in the aftermath of the shock. Recent work by Gropp et al. (2018) provides evidence
that affected banks increased their CT1 ratios relative to unaffected banks by re-
ducing their risk-weighted assets, with the authors initially suggesting that the EBA
exercise appeared to be an effective policy instrument to strengthen and stabilise
the banking sector. Nevertheless, in parallel with Hanson et al. (2011), their results
imply that the exercise may have induced negative real effects, as companies borrow-
ing from these banks through their commercial lending arms consequently suffered
weaker asset, investment and employment growth. Further evidence from Fraisse
et al. (2020) reveals that a sample of French banks affected by increased capital
requirements cut their lending activities which consequently dampened firms’ cor-
porate investment35. Along similar lines, we extend this analysis and also find that
increasing banks’ capital requirements may be costly to the real economy. However
while prior studies consider the real impact of bank regulation through banks’ com-
mercial lending channels, we examine the impact on affected banks’ private equity
portfolio companies and find that they likewise suffered as result of the increased
capital requirements on their parent bank.
Of importance in the understanding of our results is the distinction between the
fund structure of a bank-affiliated private equity fund and an independent fund.
Given that the parent bank is normally the largest and most important (and often
the only) LP in its own PE fund, the economic structure of bank-affiliated funds
typically differs from that of an independent fund, where the GP-LP relationship
is governed by a Limited Partner Agreement (LPA). Where bank-affiliated funds
are concerned, there is unlikely to be a formal LPA structure between the GP and
LP, but the parent bank will typically set aside an amount of capital each year
designated to its private equity arm. However, unlike capital commitments into an
independent PE fund, this capital is not ring-fenced and the amount set aside can
35Other work has also investigated the credit supply implications of increasing capital require-
ments. See for example Aiyar et al. (2014), De Marco and Wieladek (2015), Juelsrud and Wold
(2018). De Jonghe et al. (2019)
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be adjusted36. The unconventional fundraising structure of bank-affiliated funds is
highlighted in a note on Lloyd Development Capital’s website (the private equity
arm of Lloyds Banking Group):
“LDC has a unique funding structure compared to other private equity firms, who
generate capital through funds and large institutional investors ... As part of Lloyds
Banking Group, LDC does not need to fundraise due to ‘evergreen’ funding from
the bank. This allows the firm to deploy ‘patient’ capital, working to their portfolio
businesses’ timetable and investing for as long as necessary.”
As such, the parent bank, as an LP into its own PE fund, can simply pull the funding
and there is no legal restriction on them doing so given that the bank is the ultimate
owner of the private equity fund37. Consequently, if a shock hits the parent bank
of a bank-affiliated investor, there can be repercussions for the private equity arm
as the bank may adjust downward the amount of funding available for its private
equity activities.
Our analysis focuses on a sample of over three hundred companies backed by the
private equity arms of European banks. In a difference-in-differences setting, we
examine how the financing and performance of these companies was affected at the
onset of the EBA shock. Our sub-samples of affected and unaffected banks’ port-
folio companies share similar characteristics and pre-shock growth trends regarding
their profitability, size, earnings and leverage. Moreover, we show that the buyout
characteristics, deal exits and the industries in which the target companies operate
are also very similar.
We start by considering the investment and financing behaviour of these compa-
nies around the shock and find that portfolio companies of private equity arms of
affected banks reduced their levels of investment relative to portfolio companies of
unaffected banks from the onset of the shock. We show that companies affiliated to
affected banks reduced their investment by between 5% to 8% relative to companies
receiving investment from private equity arms of unaffected banks; a result that is
strongly significant when controlling for various fixed effects and firm-level covari-
ates. Moreover, when we look at the timing of the effects, the two sub-samples of
companies’ investment levels did not significantly differ in the pre-shock period, but
36The economic structure of the typical bank affiliated fund and the access to committed capital
of the bank’s private equity arm was confirmed in conversations with experienced bank-affiliated
private equity practitioners.
37An institutional LP (such as a pension fund or insurance company) in a standard private equity
fund cannot do this as they commit a fixed amount of capital to the fund to which the GP (the PE
fund) has a legal right to call down for investment purposes. This committed capital is typically
called down gradually over the course of the fund’s investment period.
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diverged from 2011, the year of the shock.
We then consider the financing of the portfolio companies and show that equity
issuance was 1% to 2% lower for companies of affected banks, while debt issuance
was between 2% to 4% lower. Again, these results hold with the inclusion of several
fixed effects and firm controls. The results suggest that there is a knock-on effect of
the shock to the parent bank to the portfolio companies of its private equity arm.
The performance of the portfolio companies of affected banks is also found to be
weaker. Specifically, we find that they experienced poorer growth in their assets and
employment in the aftermath of the shock, consistent with the weaker investment
and financing outlined above. All of these results are robust to a battery of checks.
In addition, we include firm, country and (bank x year) fixed effects in all models
and the results are unaffected by the addition of company controls.
In further analyses, where we exclude certain deal types, such as management buy-
outs (MBOs), public-to-private transactions, club deals or deals transacted in the
UK (which has the most active PE market of our sample countries), the results are
upheld. Importantly, we also reduce our sample to include only the years 2010 and
2011 to test for any attrition bias and, again, the results are shown to be robust.
Finally, the results are unchanged when we include time-varying industry fixed ef-
fects around the shock to control for any contemporaneous changes in demand or
any other time-varying industry characteristics.
The second part of the chapter expands this analysis by accounting for heterogeneity
across the portfolio companies in the sample. We find that the negative impact
of the shock on affected banks’ portfolio companies’ performance is stronger for
companies who were ex-ante more likely to be financially constrained at the onset
of the shock. This is consistent for various measures of financial constraints, such as
dependence on bank finance, size and leverage. In addition, we also find the effect
to be stronger for portfolio companies located in countries which were most affected
by the European sovereign debt crisis38, which was ongoing at the time of the EBA
exercise.
Finally, we exploit heterogeneity at the private equity firm level. We find that the
negative effect on the performance of portfolio companies was weaker for companies
of more reputable and experienced private equity investors. Specifically, we look at
the number of deals completed by the investor and the number and the value of
funds raised prior to entry and find that companies receiving investment from more
38Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain
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experienced private equity groups fared better. This is consistent with prior litera-
ture which has found that PE investor reputation can lead to improved performance
post-investment, better deal outcomes and stronger financial health (Nahata (2008);
Demiroglu and James (2010); Tykvová and Borell (2012); Hotchkiss et al. (2014)).
This also complements the recent work of Bernstein et al. (2019) who find that
private equity firms can help soften the negative effects of crises on their portfolio
companies.
This chapter contributes to the body of literature examining the impact of bank-
affiliated private equity activity on deal outcomes and firm performance (e.g., Fang
et al. (2013); Wang (2017)). Our findings extend the work of these studies with
regards to bank-affiliated investment by showing that a shock to the parent bank of
the PE investor weakens the financial position of its portfolio companies39.
We also relate to an extensive literature investigating the impact of private equity
investment on firm outcomes (e.g., Bernstein and Sheen (2016); Bernstein et al.
(2019); Boucly et al. (2011); Davis et al. (2014); Acharya et al. (2012); Guo et al.
(2011); Lerner et al. (2011); Lichtenberg and Siegel (1990); Kaplan (1989)). Re-
search to date has typically found that buyouts are a source of value creation for
portfolio companies. We extend this line of work by focusing on the specific role of
bank-affiliated investors, and the impact of an external shock to the parent bank on
the financing policies and performance of its portfolio companies.
Finally, we also contribute to research concerning banking sector shocks and asso-
ciated outcomes of firms linked to affected banks (Khwaja and Mian (2008); Chava
and Purnanandam (2011); Chodorow-Reich (2013); Cingano et al. (2016); Acharya
et al. (2018); De Marco (2019); Farinha et al. (2019)). Specifically, we build on
recent work considering the impact of bank capital regulation on the real economy
by Hanson et al. (2011), Aiyar et al. (2014), De Marco and Wieladek (2015), Fraisse
et al. (2020), Gropp et al. (2018), Juelsrud and Wold (2018) and De Jonghe et al.
(2019) who investigate the real impact of increasing banks’ capital requirements,
and show that doing so may come at a cost to the real economy.
The chapter is structured as follows: Section 2 overviews related literature, Section
3 details the EBA capital exercise, Sections 4 and 5 describe our data set and our
empirical methodology, Section 6 presents our results and finally Section 7 offers
39While we are interested in the role of banks as GPs, Lerner et al. (2007) examine the role
of banks as LPs investing in private equity funds and find that banks’ selection of private equity
funds is poorer relative to other types of LPs (such as endowments, pension funds) and they invest
in poorer-performing funds. They show that banks under-perform other classes of LPs across both




6.2.1 Banks and Private Equity (theoretical literature)
Theoretical work has examined the choice made by companies between bank debt
and private equity financing. Ueda (2004) develops a model whereby the choice
between bank debt or a venture capitalist depends on the relative importance of
more accurate screening and the level of intellectual property rights protection. She
assumes VCs are more competent at screening companies, but involve the risk of
expropriation ie. they may ’steal’ the entrepreneur’s business idea and undertake it
themselves. The model shows that more sophisticated and risky projects are financed
by VCs rather than banks. De Bettignies and Brander (2007) show that there is
a two-sided moral hazard problem, as both the entrepreneur and the investor offer
unverifiable support. Their model finds that when the venture capitalist provides
stronger management support, entrepreneurs prefer this form of financing to bank
debt. Finally, Winton and Yerramilli (2008) model the choice between bank capital
and VC as influenced by the risk and return of the company’s cash flows. Similar to
Ueda (2004), they find VC financing is optimal over bank debt for riskier ventures
and when the expected liquidation value if the venture fails is low.
Of greater pertinence to this study is Hellmann (2002) who models an entrepreneurs
choice between an independent venture capitalist, who seeks a financial return, and
a ’strategic’ corporate investor (ie the investment arm of a large corporation, such
as Intel Capital, the venture capital arm of Intel), who looks to invest in companies
to achieve synergies with their core business. Consistent with other work, such
as Bottazzi et al. (2007) and Andrieu and Groh (2012), independent investors are
assumed to offer greater support. The model shows that the choice between an
independent and corporate private equity investor is contingent upon the expected
synergies between the venture and the corporate investor’s core business. If the
venture is a complement to the strategic investor’s core business, it is more likely
to be financed by the strategic investor, but if it is a substitute, the entrepreneur
prefers an independent venture capitalist. In a third setting, if the venture is a
significant threat to the strategic investor’s core business, a syndication is optimal,
where the independent VC is the lead investor and the strategic investor is a passive
investor, holding an equity stake so as to reduce the independent VC’s support for
the ’threatening’ venture. Finally, the model also predicts that strategic investors
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will be more willing to pay a higher valuation40.
More recently, and of yet greater relevance to this study, Andrieu and Groh (2012)
expand this work and develop a unique model examining an entrepreneur’s choice
between an independent investor and a bank-affiliated investor. Their model as-
sumes that independent investors offer higher quality support 41 but bank-affiliated
investors are less financially constrained with respect to refinancings and subsequent
financing rounds, consistent with Gompers and Lerner (2000a) and Hellmann (2002).
The entrepreneur then weighs the benefits of each of these and makes a decision con-
tingent on the sophistication (riskiness) of their project, its liquidation value and
independent investors’ need for future fundraising. They find that less sophisticated
ventures with larger liquidation values opt for a bank-affiliated investor, while riskier
projects with lower liquidation values prefer contracting an independent investor.
6.2.2 Bank-affiliated vs Independent(non-theoretical)
This theoretical literature provides the foundation for empirical research investi-
gating differences between independent and affiliated private equity investors. The
models of Hellmann (2002) and Andrieu and Groh (2012) show that these two types
of investor have very different underlying motivations. Independent investors are
driven by financial returns on investments, without having any long-term strategic
goals from their portfolio companies. Under pressure to raise new funds to ensure
survival, these investors must meet performance targets to ensure they build a track
record to attract future fundraising 42. On the other hand, captive investors, such
as those affiliated to a bank or a large corporation, have different motives. Hell-
mann (2002) and Mathews (2006) argue that captive investors’ primary concern is
strategic, with the impetus being on increasing synergies and the strategic value-
added to the parent organization, rather than pure financial gain. Hellmann reasons
40Gompers and Lerner (2000a) provide empirical evidence of corporate investors investing at a
premium to independent investors
41Bottazzi et al. (2007) find that independent private equity investors are more active in their
role compared to other types of captive investors, and this increased activism leads to a higher
number of successful exits
42Independent funds typically receive capital from a wide array of institutional investors (includ-
ing banks) as well as high net worth individuals. Historically, pension funds have been the most
important investor for private equity funds and accounted for 35% of funds raised by European
funds in 2016 (InvestEurope, 2016). Captive funds, however, typically have a more concentrated
investor base, with their parent organisation generally representing the majority of funds commit-
ted into the fund. Concerning bank-affiliated funds, the bank itself typically provides at least 50%
of the fund’s capital (Fang et al. (2013)) and can often be the sole financial contributor (Andrieu
and Groh (2012)). Both the strategic perspective and access to the large capital pool of their
parent firms without the need to raise follow-on-capital can reduce the pressure on affiliated funds
to perform well.
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that strategic, affiliated investors invest in companies so as to enjoy synergies with
and future complimentarities from these companies. These investors differentiate
themselves by virtue of their complementary assets and exploit synergies between
their portfolio companies and their core business. In the case of banks, the main
complementary asset is their lending expertise, which may be of future interest to
their private equity portfolio.
With respect to strategic corporate investors, Ma (2019) tests different strategic
approaches of corporate venture capital investors, examining their activities to de-
termine whether they invest in their portfolio companies to ’fix weaknesses’ ie. the
acquiring firm’s innovation has deteriorated and they seek exposure to new tech-
nologies to regain a competitive edge, or to ’build on strengths’, ie. they use their
strong market position to identify innovative startups to strengthen their own mar-
ket share. His evidence from analysing corporate investor’s behaviour from entry
through to exit suggests that they invest to ’fix weaknesses’ and that acquirers invest
strategically due to deterioration in their key innovation areas.
As for banks acting as private equity investors, Hellmann et al. (2007) provide
an empirical interpretation of the motivation of bank-affiliated funds. They show
that their private equity investments affect loan market outcomes. Using a sample
of US data, they find that companies receiving venture capital investment from
bank-affiliated funds are significantly more likely to receive a future loan from the
lending arm of the parent bank. Additionally, these companies may also benefit from
cheaper lending. Their evidence confirms that banks use the private equity market in
order to create relationships that can then be mutually beneficial in the commercial
loans market, underlining the strategic nature of banks’ activity in private equity
investments. Along similar lines, Fang et al. (2013) present evidence that banks’
involvement in private equity generates significant cross-selling opportunities for
them as it significantly increases the bank’s chance of winning future investment
banking business (as a future lender, M&A advisor or equity underwriter) from the
target firm. Finally, Ivashina and Kovner (2011) find that banks syndicating loans
for LBOs price loans cheaper to repeated customers as they want to cross-sell other
fee-generating services43.
Funds of different organizational structures also vary in terms of the policy and
governance of the fund itself. Gompers and Lerner (2000a) reason that a parent-
subsidiary structure in private equity investing may be sub-optimal due to creating
43Aside from their involvement in private equity, Drucker and Puri (2005) show that banks
cross-sell investment banking services to their commercial banking clients
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distortions in incentives and objectives. These lead to issues in selecting investments,
such as promoting cross-selling opportunities and distributing their own risky debt,
and issues in managing investments, such as inefficient incentive structures and
differing exit incentives. Wang (2017) builds on the idea of distorted incentives
and provides some evidence that bank-affiliated LBOs may under perform indepen-
dent LBOs due to problems arising from their investment selection44. In terms of
compensation schemes, bank-affiliated funds generally keep the same autonomous
partnership structure as independent funds, albeit with a lower share of the carried
interest (the share of the fund’s profits kept by the GPs) accruing to the investment
partners (Gompers and Lerner (2000a)). Dushnitsky and Shapira (2010) note that
the limited earnings potential of investment managers is one of the key reasons why
affiliated private equity managers often spin-off from their parent company to set
up their own independent fund45.
Given that the structure of affiliated and independent funds differs, as do the mo-
tivations behind their respective investing, we would expect that their portfolio
companies differ too. On a theoretical note, Andrieu and Groh (2012)’s model
finds that bank-affiliated investors are more likely to finance less risky, sophisticated
companies with larger liquidation values. Likewise, Ueda (2004) and Winton and
Yerramilli (2008) show that riskier companies are financed by venture capital in-
vestors, and not banks. Empirical evidence supports this. Hellmann et al. (2007)
find that bank-affiliated investors favour less risky, later-stage transactions relative
to independent funds, while Mayer et al. (2005) use the European market and reach
a similar conclusion, also recognizing that affiliated investors prefer to operate closer
to home. On a similar note, Johan and Murtinu (2018) find bank-affiliated venture
capital deals are more likely to occur in ’safer’ countries with better developed mar-
kets, more stringent accounting disclosures and stronger creditor rights. Consistent
with banks being more risk-averse investors, Wang (2017) examines UK buyouts and
finds bank-affiliated targets to enjoy higher pre-buyout profitability. Risk, as mea-
sured by earnings volatility, is correlated with a lower probability of a bank-affiliated
buyout. Finally, and in line with banks being strategic private equity investors inter-
ested in securing future lending complimentarities, Hellmann et al. (2007) show that
bank-affiliated investors target companies with a greater debt capacity, compared
to independent funds.
44Wang (2017) does not find evidence that bank-affiliated deals under perform a matched sample
of independent deals, only that a sample of bank-affiliated deals and similar independent deals
under perform other independent deals
45A prominent UK example being Montagu Private Equity spinning off from HSBC
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There is a substantial amount of research illustrating the firm-level benefits of private
equity buyouts, generally showing evidence of value creation and operational effi-
ciency improvements as a result of LBO transactions (Kaplan (1989); Smith (1990);
Lichtenberg and Siegel (1990); Lerner et al. (2011); Boucly et al. (2011); Guo et al.
(2011); Acharya et al. (2012); Davis et al. (2014); Paglia and Harjoto (2014); Cohn
et al. (2014); Hotchkiss et al. (2014); Bloom et al. (2015); Bernstein and Sheen
(2016); Bernstein et al. (2019); Cohn et al. (2019)). Moreover, the extant literature
on corporate private equity (generally corporate venture capital - CVC) investors
generally details firm-level benefits, noting strategic value added (Ma (2019)) and
increases in innovation (Dushnitsky and Lenox (2005); Chemmanur et al. (2014);
Wadhwa et al. (2016)) and firm value (Dushnitsky and Lenox (2006)).
A small body of research has investigated the firm-level effects of bank-affiliated
private equity investment. Bottazzi et al. (2007) examine the level of activism of
different types of private equity investors and find that bank-affiliated investors are
significantly less active in their role compared to independent investors, in terms of
the level of interaction between themselves and their portfolio companies and their
contribution to helping with recruitment and fundraising. They then establish a
positive link between levels of activism and exit performance, with a positive exit
being an IPO or acquisition. Hence, bank-affiliated deals are less likely to enjoy a
better exit. Fang et al. (2013) show that bank-affiliated deals tend to have poorer
financing terms than independent deals and likewise have worse ex-post outcomes,
particularly those executed during credit market peaks, albeit the difference is slight.
However, the authors make the distinction between bank-affiliated deals , where the
bank provides only equity, and parent-financed deals, where the bank provides both
the debt and equity. Parent-financed deals enjoy better financing terms relative to
independent deals, particularly during credit market peaks and enjoy similar out-
comes, as measured by debt downgrades/upgrades and the likelihood of bankruptcy.
They conclude that these deals enjoy better financing terms due to banks successful
timing of the credit market when financing in-house deals, rather than improved
deal quality. Focusing on the post-transaction firm-level operating performance and
profitability of the portfolio companies, Wang (2017) find no statistically significant
difference between the performance of a sample of UK bank-affiliated deals and a
matched sample of independent deals. Moreover, the bank affiliated deals actually
exhibit a higher profit margin on average, albeit the result is only significant at the
10% level. Johan and Murtinu (2018) consider venture capital investment and find
that syndicates involving bank-affiliated investors have a large, positive impact on
the likelihood of an IPO or acquisition. As for the effect on investee companies op-
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erating performance, they find only a small, positive effect. Finally, Meuleman et al.
(2020) investigate the relationship between private equity investors as agents and
their investors, including LPs and banks, as principals, and how this relationship
impacts the ultimate outcome of buyout transactions. In this regard, they uncover
significant evidence that bank-affiliated PE investors are more effective in resolv-
ing financial distress, implying that bank-affiliated investors are better aligned with
their creditors to resolve distress.
6.2.3 Bank shocks literature
A rich body of literature has investigated the transmission of banking shocks to the
real economy via the credit channel. Earlier work investigated the impact on large,
listed companies (Peek and Rosengren (2000); Ongena et al. (2003)). More recently,
the proliferation and availability of data on matched firm-bank relationships has
fostered an in-depth analysis of banking shocks and their effects on firm’s corporate
policies.
At the firm-level, Khwaja and Mian (2008) examine liquidity shocks to banks caused
by unexpected nuclear tests. They show that affected banks tightened lending and
transmitted liquidity shocks onto firms, and smaller firms suffered as they were
unable to secure alternative credit. De Jonghe et al. (2018) show a moderate drop
in investment and asset growth for firms in Belgium that borrow from banks affected
by an external funding shock. Moreover, Popov and Rocholl (2018) and Dwenger
et al. (2018) show that exogenous funding shocks affect firm’s employment decisions.
Both papers use German data and conclude that firms associated with banks affected
by the subprime mortgage crisis experienced a significant decline in employment.
In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) doc-
ument that banks’ lending activities were greatly reduced, particularly banks who
had previously co-syndicated credit lines with Lehman Brothers. Chodorow-Reich
(2013) shows that U.S. bank exposure to the Lehman bankruptcy had a substantial
impact on employment for SMEs that had pre-crisis relationships with more ex-
posed lenders. Cingano et al. (2016) exploit the 2007 liquidity drought in interbank
markets and show that the ensuing credit shock dampened Italian firms’ investment
and employment, particularly that of those who were more likely to be constrained.
Bucă and Vermeulen (2017) report that firms operating in more bank-dependent in-
dustries reduced their level of investment after banks restricted their lending in the
aftermath of the crisis. Bentolila et al. (2017) show that Spanish firms attached to
weaker banks that were eventually bailed out by the government suffered a greater
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fall in employment. On a similar note, Chava and Purnanandam (2011) exploit the
Russian crisis of 1998 and document that affected banks reduced their lending and
increased interest rates. Consequently, bank-reliant firms suffered a greater decline
in their capital expenditures and profitability, relative to firms who were better able
to access debt markets. Finally, Balduzzi et al. (2018) study the effects of banks’
financial market valuations on corporate policies, such as investment and employ-
ment. They use both the financial and sovereign debt crises and report significant,
negative credit-channel effects of the two crises.
In the context of the sovereign debt crisis, De Marco (2019) reveals that smaller,
younger firms experienced reduced investment and asset growth after affected banks
cut lending and increased interest rates. Larger firms who were ex-ante less likely to
be financially constrained, performed better. Acharya et al. (2018) use syndicated
loan data to investigate the effect of the sovereign debt crisis on firm’s decisions.
Their findings imply that borrowers with a strong relationship with a GIIPS bank
suffered from reduced investment, sales growth and job creation. Moreover, Far-
inha et al. (2019) use Portuguese data on firm-bank relationships to examine the
real effects of bank shocks on firms’ survival prospects. They document that firms
borrowing from banks which were affected by a funding outflow, and consequently
reduced their credit supply, are more likely to fail. Finally, Bottero et al. (2015)
reveal that in the aftermath of the Greek bailout in 2010, financial intermediaries
exposed to government securities reduced credit, which in turn caused smaller firms
to curtail investment and employment.
6.2.4 Impact of bank capital regulation on the real economy
Higher capital requirements for banks can be met by adjusting one of two mecha-
nisms: by increasing regulatory capital or by reducing risk-weighted assets. Juel-
srud and Wold (2018) and Gropp et al. (2018) provide evidence that in recent years,
European banks have fulfilled stricter requirements by means of contracting their
risk-weighted assets and both studies document negative real effects on the econ-
omy. Banks appear reluctant to raise capital in the short run, so an increase in
equity requirements forces them to delever, which can have real consequences on
firms (Fraisse et al. (2020); Juelsrud and Wold (2018)). On the other hand, stress
tests in the US in 2009 specifically stated banks were to issue new equity, which
appears to have mitigated such negative effects (Hanson et al. (2011).
In recent years, literature has began to analyze the credit supply implications and
the consequent real effects of adjusting banks’ capital regulation. Aiyar et al. (2014)
90
shows that UK banks reduced their cross-border lending by 5.5 percentage points in
response to a 100 basis point increase in capital requirements. The negative effect is
found to be weaker is found to be weaker in banks’ ’core’ countries, revealing that
banks tend to favour their most important lending relationships. De Marco and
Wieladek (2015) examine the effects of tighter bank-specific capital regulation on
UK SMEs and show that SME’s asset growth and investment are negatively affected
by stronger requirements. The impact is greater where the affected bank has tighter
capital buffers, but the real effects are found to diminish over time.
Fraisse et al. (2020) use a sample of French banks and show that increasing capital
requirements by 1% (under the Basel II framework) leads to a reduction in lending
of 10%. In turn, this negatively affects firms’ corporate investment policies. Also
taking advantage of the 2011 EBA capital exercise, Gropp et al. (2018) show that
European banks responded to capital requirements by reducing their risk-weighted
assets, as opposed to issuing new equity capital. Firms which obtained more of
their bank credit from affected banks suffered a consequent decline in asset and
investment growth. Degryse et al. (2019) also relate to the EBA capital exercise
and underline the impact stricter capital requirements has on the collateral of bank
lending in the aftermath of the shock. Affected banks are more likely to demand
collateral from the same company compared to unaffected banks, but less so for long-
term relationship borrowers. They also show that the risk-weighted structure of the
collateral differs between affected and unaffected banks after the shock. Consistent
with banks reducing their risk-weighted assets in response to tighter regulation,
Juelsrud and Wold (2018) show that there is a substantial decline in credit supply
to the corporate sector relative to the household sector in Norway after a country-
specific policy reform. The credit supply effect is greater on smaller firms, and
leads to a deterioration in firms’ employment growth. They also note that affected
banks raised interest rates in the aftermath of the shock. Using Pillar 2 capital
requirements, De Jonghe et al. (2019) also note that banks cut lending in response
to stricter capital requirements. They document variation in their results across
banks: smaller, less profitable banks reduce credit the most. Finally, Blattner et al.
(2019) expose that not only did Portuguese banks cut lending after the EBA capital
exercise, but they reallocated credit to distressed firms whose loan losses had been
underreported by banks prior to the shock. They show that this contributed to a
substantial decline in productivity in Portugal at the time.
While the above research provides a rigorous examination of the transmission of
banking shocks to firms and the real economy via the commercial credit channel, we
complement this literature by considering the transmission of a banking shock to
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the real economy via a bank’s private equity arm. We show that companies receiv-
ing private equity investment from banks affected by an external capital shock (ie
increased capital requirements) significantly reduce their investment and financing
and suffer weaker growth relative to private equity portfolio companies of unaffected
banks. In addition, we exploit heterogeneity at the investor- and company-level to
enrich our understanding of the results.
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6.3 2011 EBA Capital Exercise
In October 2011, in a bid to restore confidence in the European banking sector, the
EBA required certain banks to set aside additional, temporary capital buffers, while
leaving requirements unchanged for all other banks. Specifically, selected banks
were deemed to have large exposures to sovereign debt and were required to increase
their core tier one (CT1) ratios to 9% of their risk-weighted assets by the end of
June 2012, in order to mitigate risks related to exposure to sovereign bonds and
increase confidence across the banking sector. In order to meet the new regulatory
requirement, banks could increase their CT1 ratios by either issuing more capital,
or reducing their risk-weighted assets. In a recent study, Gropp et al. (2018) provide
evidence that European banks achieved this target by reducing their risk-weighted
assets rather than by issuing new equity in response to the requirements46.
Just as the magnitude of the shock was unexpected, as it exceeded market expecta-
tions (Financial Times, 2011), so was the timing. Less than 5 months prior, the EBA
had carried out stress tests across European banks. As a result, it is safe to assume
that the new capital requirements plausibly came as a surprise to the participating
banks. The previous stress tests, however, were not without criticism. The integrity
of these tests was questioned after the Belgian bank, Dexia, failed only a few months
later. The tests had previously revealed that Dexia was one of the healthiest banks
in Europe. Furthermore, the difference in magnitude of the shortfall reported by
each of these regulatory actions was striking. The stress tests in June 2011 revealed
the banks to be riding a 2.5 billion Euro deficit, while the capital exercise of October
2011 documented a shortfall of 215 billion Euros.
Banks were selected based on their total assets as of year end 2010, ensuring that
selection was not based on bank-specific events in the months prior to the capital
exercise. In each country, the EBA sorted banks in descending order of their market
share by total assets, such that the exercise then covered at least 50% of the national
banking sector. The June 2011 stress tests had followed a similar selection criteria.
The country-specific selection threshold lead to a considerable size overlap between
banks selected and those not selected for the exercise. For example, the smallest
bank included in the exercise, Slovenian bank Nova Kreditna banka Maribor, re-
ported 6 billion euro in total assets in 2010, while the largest bank not included,
Credit Mutuel, had 591 billion euro in total assets in the same year (Gropp et al.
(2018)). This capital regulation shock has been exploited by recent research and has
46Juelsrud and Wold (2018) find that Norwegian banks responded in a similar manner to a 2013
Norwegian policy reform, reducing their risk-weighted assets to achieve the new capital requirement
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been used as a quasi-natural experiment to examine how banks responded to these
new regulatory requirements (Gropp et al. (2018); Degryse et al. (2019); Blattner
et al. (2019)). We likewise take advantage of this exogenous banking sector shock
to study the differential effect of the shock on the portfolio companies of affected
and unaffected banks’ private equity arms.
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6.4 Hypothesis Development
6.4.1 Portfolio company investment and financing
We underline four testable hypotheses on the back of the discussion thus far. First,
we consider the investment and financing of companies and look to identify whether
companies linked to banks affected by the EBA shock suffered more relative to com-
panies attached to unaffected banks. Gropp et al. (2018) show that banks achieved
the targets set out by the EBA by reducing their assets and not by issuing fresh
equity. In their subsequent empirical analysis, they illustrate the effects this had
on the real economy: firms borrowing from affected banks are found to experience
significantly weaker investment rates and asset and sales growth in the aftermath of
the shock. In light of this, we speculate that private equity portfolio companies of
affected banks will suffer more in terms of their investment and financing relative
to portfolio companies of unaffected banks:
H1: Portfolio companies of the private equity arms of EBA-affected banks will suffer
from weaker investment and financing at the onset of the shock
6.4.2 Portfolio company growth
Our second hypothesis follows on naturally from the first. If firms attached to af-
fected banks suffer from lower investment and financing as a result of banks restruc-
turing their balance sheets in order to comply with the new capital requirements,
we would expect these firms to experience weaker subsequent growth. In particular,
we investigate the effect on their growth in assets and employment. Prior research
has found evidence implying that firm-level growth of firms borrowing from banks
affected by capital requirements can be hampered. Specifically, Gropp et al. (2018)
show that firms borrowing from banks affected by the EBA capital exercise suffered
weaker asset and sales growth, while De Marco and Wieladek (2015) show that
SME’s asset growth and investment falls after their lender bank’s capital require-
ments increasing. Lastly, Juelsrud and Wold (2018) identify a fall in employment
growth for firms borrowing from low-capitalized banks affected by reformed capital
requirements.
As such, our second hypothesis is as follows:
H2: Portfolio companies of the private equity arms of EBA-affected banks will
consequently suffer from weaker growth in their assets and employment
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6.4.3 Portfolio companies & financial constraints
We then turn our attention to heterogeneity in our sample of portfolio companies.
We distinguish between more- and less-constrained firms by virtue of their size,
leverage, dependence on bank finance and their location in Europe in relation to the
sovereign debt crisis. Smaller firms have been shown to be more vulnerable to credit
market downturns (Chodorow-Reich (2013)) and to bank capital policy regulation
adjustments (Juelsrud and Wold (2018)). Likewise, more leveraged companies are
more sensitive to credit shocks (Tsoukas (2011)) and firms which are more dependent
on bank finance are typically riskier, lower-credit firms (Guariglia et al. (2016)).
Finally, the GIIPS countries which were the most severely affected by the European
sovereign debt crisis experienced a reduction in their supply of credit available to
firms and loan interest rates rose relative to other countries in Europe (Popov and
Van Horen (2014), De Marco (2019)). Taken together, we would therefore expect
the effects of the EBA shock to be stronger on portfolio companies which were more
likely to be in a constrained position at the time of the shock.
H3: The effect of the EBA shock will be stronger on portfolio companies which are
more likely to be financially constrained
6.4.4 Private equity investor experience
Lastly, we consider heterogeneity amongst our sample of private equity investors.
We focus on the experience and reputation of investors. Prior work has noted in-
vestor experience to be important in a multitude of settings, such as fundraising
(Barber and Yasuda (2017)), deal structure (Demiroglu and James (2010)), exit
(Jenkinson and Sousa (2015)) and portfolio company distress (Tykvová and Borell
(2012), Hotchkiss et al. (2014)). Particularly pertinent to our analysis, Hotchkiss
et al. (2014) find that portfolio companies of more experienced investors are asso-
ciated with a higher likelihood of survival, implying they are less likely to fall into
distress relative to portfolio companies of inexperienced investors. More reputable
or experienced investors may be better placed to support their portfolio companies
in times of distress as they are able to obtain external financing at more favourable
rates (Demiroglu and James (2010)). We therefore hypothesize that the EBA shock
will have a stronger impact on the portfolio companies of less experienced private
equity investors.
H4: The effect of the EBA shock will be stronger on portfolio companies of less
experienced private equity investors
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6.5 Data and Descriptive Statistics
6.5.1 Data
Given our study utilises the 2011 EBA capital exercise as an external shock to the
banking sector, it is natural we focus on bank-affiliated private equity investors
attached to European banks. Specifically, we also only consider deals where the
target company is located in Europe, as European companies are required to file
annual accounting information in the public domain. There is no reason to believe
that restricting our sample to all-European deals (ie both the investor and the target
being based in Europe) should bias our results in any way. Indeed, from 1990 to
2016, 95% of all private equity investments made by European bank-affiliated private
equity investors were in European companies47. Our sample , which encompasses
16 European countries, should therefore be representative of the European market
for bank-affiliated private equity buyouts48.
Following a broad line of literature (For example, Bernstein et al. (2019); Jenkinson
and Sousa (2015); Bernstein and Sheen (2016); Fang et al. (2013); Davis et al. (2014);
Faccio and Hsu (2017)), we use Capital IQ to identify private equity transactions
executed by bank-affiliated investors prior to the 2011 EBA capital exercise. This
then allows us to recognize whether the parent bank of the private equity sponsor
in each deal was affected by the EBA capital exercise or not49. We extract all pri-
vate equity transactions, excluding growth equity and venture capital deals, where
investors typically acquire a minority stake and use little or no leverage to finance
the deal. As such, and in line with prior literature, we select transactions labelled as
“leveraged buyout”, “management buyout”, “going private”, “platform”, or a simi-
lar term, excluding deals classified as “expansion capital” and “growth buyout” (see
for example: Davis et al. (2014), Faccio and Hsu (2017), Bernstein et al. (2019)). We
select transactions based on the following criteria, given that we are examining the
effects of the 2011 EBA capital exercise: We select deals where the target company
is headquartered in Europe at the time of the transaction; the company had received
private equity investment by the end of 2010; the bank-affiliated investor had not
exited by the end of 2011. Moreover, we exclude cases where only a minority stake is
acquired and we exclude divisional buyouts, where accurate accounting information
distinguishing the division from the parent company is often unavailable. Where
47Based on data from Capital IQ
48Our sample includes transactions executed in the following countries: Austria, Belgium, Den-
mark, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland and the UK.
49We also supplement our sample using Thomson Reuters Eikon database (formerly VenturEx-
pert)
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club deals are concerned, where two or more PE firms jointly sponsor a deal, we
drop all cases (55) which involve both the PE arm of an EBA-affected bank and an
unaffected bank. Finally, we exclude deals of sponsors involved in any merger or
acquisition during the sample period. We extract all relevant transaction informa-
tion, such as the entry date, the private equity sponsor, the transaction type, the
locations of the target and the acquirer, the number of investors and the transaction
value.
We apply further filters to our sample. First, we include only companies whose full
accounts are available in Amadeus, a Bureau van Dijk database of European com-
panies. In doing so, we exclude companies who file abbreviated accounts. Following
prior literature, we exclude companies operating in the financial and utility sectors
(Michaely and Roberts (2011); Bernstein et al. (2019)). We extract full accounting
information of relevant firms from Amadeus, and occasionally Capital IQ. To iden-
tify exits, we use Capital IQ to search for corporate events related to the target firm
in each transaction, such as bankruptcies, trade sales, secondary buyouts and IPOs
of the above transactions and use relevant news articles (Prior research has used
similar methods to identify deal exits: Arcot et al. (2015); Bernstein et al. (2019)).
This allows us to note the date and type of exit for each deal, where an exit has
been experienced. We also use Amadeus to establish whether any companies went
into liquidation during the period. Amadeus categorises companies as being active,
dissolved, dormant or in liquidation.
Furthermore, we gather data on the bank-affiliated private equity investors and
their funds. In particular, Capital IQ and Thomson Reuters Eikon are used to
gather firm and fund-level information, such as the private equity firm’s year of
incorporation, their fund names and vintage years, the number and value of funds
raised by each investor and the number and dates of all individual investments made
by the firm. Following Jenkinson and Sousa (2015), where more than one private
equity firm is identified in the same transaction, if one of the private equity firms
led the transaction (received a higher percentage of shares) only the information
about the leader and their deals and funds is used. If none of the private equity
firms receive more shares than the other(s) or no information on this is available,
information on all private equity firms and funds is obtained and the data on firm
and fund characteristics is averaged. Finally, in line with previous research, if the
private equity firm was founded before 1970, we use 1970 as the founding year, as
there was very little activity in European private equity markets prior to that date
(Jenkinson and Sousa (2015); Krishnan et al. (2011)).
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6.5.2 Descriptive Statistics
Before preliminary analysis of our data, we introduce our sample distribution of
transactions and banks. Table 21 presents the private equity transactions in our
study by the year of execution of the deal. As expected, given that the holding period
of leveraged buyouts is typically 5 to 7 years, most of the deals are concentrated in
the 7 years prior to 2011, the year of the shock. Unsurprisingly, the pre-crisis years
of 2006 and 2007, when markets were buoyant, are the most active years for deal
execution, and deal activity then drops significantly once the repercussions of the
crisis take effect in 2009.
Table 21: Deal time series distribution
This table shows the time series distribution of the private equity transactions in our study

















We then look at the country distribution of our deals, based on the location of the
portfolio company receiving the investment. Table 22 confirms that France and the
UK are the most advanced markets in our sample, consistent with Bernstein et al.
(2019), who show that based on the value and the number of transactions over the
period of 2002 to 2013, these two countries’ markets were the most active in Europe.
Incidentally, the largest bank by asset size in Europe not to be affected by the EBA
capital exercise was the French bank, Credit Mutuel.
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Table 22: Deal country distribution
This table shows the country distribution of the private equity transactions in our study

















Finally, in Table 23 we consider the country distribution of the banks. In total,
there are 39 banks in the sample. Consistent with expectations, the larger, more
advanced economies have more active banks in private equity markets during our
sample period. Germany, traditionally a bank-based economy, has the most banks
(8) with other larger economies such as the UK, France and Italy also having several
entries.
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Table 23: Banks country distribution
This table shows the country distribution of the parent banks in our study












To allow us to appreciate that our two sub-samples of EBA-affected bank-affiliated
deals and unaffected bank-affiliated deals are similar in nature, Tables 24 and 25
report the industry distribution of the target companies and the transaction char-
acteristics of the deals.
Table 24: Industry distribution
This table shows the industry distribution at the broad industry level (1-digit SIC) for the EBA
and non-EBA sample of private equity-backed companies, but excludes financial and utility sectors
Industry distribution EBA non-EBA
Agriculture, Forestry & Fishing 1% 0%
Construction 5% 6%
Manufacturing 42% 36%
Retail Trade 4% 13%
Services 25% 19%
Transport, Communication, Electric & Gas 9% 9%
Wholesale Trade 12% 17%
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Table 25: Sample statistics
This table provides sample statistics on the deal types, characteristics and exits of each of our
two sub-samples of transactions. Private-to-private is private-to-private buyouts, Public-to-private
denotes public to private transactions and Secondary buyout deals are secondary buyouts from one
private equity investor to another. In Panel B, management participation relates to the manage-
ment team of the target company taking an equity stake and a club deal occurs where two or more
PE firms jointly sponsor a transaction. In Panel C, sale and secondary buyout relate to a sale to a
strategic acquirer and to another private equity firm respectively. Write-off refers to investments
which went into liquidation and not yet exited shows deals which have not experienced an exit as
of 2016.
EBA (n=251) non-EBA (n=53)
Panel A: Deal Type
Private-to-private 87.6% 84.9%
Public-to-private 4.4% 1.9%
Secondary buyout 6.8% 13.2%
Unknown 1.2% 0.0%
Panel B: Deal Characteristics
Management participation 44.6% 37.7%
Club deal 28.2% 22.6%
Number of investors (mean) 1.39 1.26
Holding period (mean) 7.25 7.45
Panel C: Exits
Sale 25.5% 26.4%




Not yet exited 40.6% 33.9%
Table 24 shows the industry distribution of the portfolio companies of both the
affected (EBA) and unaffected (non-EBA) banks’ private equity arms in the sample
at the broad industry level (1-digit SIC). The two samples exhibit similar properties.
The majority of the firms in each sub-sample are concentrated in manufacturing and,
to a lesser extent, services. Other important industries include wholesale trade,
construction, and retail. The industry distribution is also comparable with other
recent studies examining European private equity transactions (Tykvová and Borell
(2012); Jenkinson and Sousa (2015); Bernstein et al. (2019)).
Table 25 continues the descriptive analysis by examining the breakdown of transac-
tions between the two samples. Panel A illustrates types of deal across the sample.
Both the EBA and non-EBA samples are predominantly characterized by private-
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to-private buyouts with a smaller sample of secondary buyouts between different
private equity groups. Only a minority of deals are classified as public-to-private
transactions, consistent with Strömberg (2008), Boucly et al. (2011) and Bernstein
et al. (2019). Later in our robustness section, we show that our results are not
driven certain deal types. Likewise, the deal characteristics are comparable across
both sub-samples. Management participation (ie where the target companies’ man-
agement team take an equity stake in the company) is only slightly higher in the
EBA sample, while around a quarter of deals in each sample are club deals, where
more than one PE investor sponsors the deal50. As previously noted, in order to
isolate EBA-bank sponsored deals from non-EBA bank-sponsored deals, we drop all
deals (55 in total) which are club deals involving the PE arms of both EBA-affected
and unaffected banks. The holding period of the investment is approximately 7
years in both cases. Finally, the distribution of exits in the sample is similar to that
found in the literature. Consistent with recent work, the majority of deals in both of
our sub-samples are exited via a sale to a corporate acquirer or a secondary buyout
by another private equity group (Strömberg (2008); Jenkinson and Sousa (2015);
Wang (2017)). Far fewer deals are taken public via an IPO or go into liquidation
and roughly one third of the deals in each sub-sample are yet to experience an exit.
6.6 Empirical methodology
6.6.1 Difference-in-difference approach
We use a difference-in-differences setting where we compare portfolio companies of
private equity groups affiliated to banks which were affected by the EBA capital ex-
ercise to portfolio companies of private equity groups affiliated to unaffected banks.
Tables 24 and 25 have already shown that the private equity transactions which af-
fected and unaffected banks were undertaking during the sample period were similar
in terms of their deal type, their exits and various deal characteristics. Moreover,
the industry distribution of their target companies is very similar, and consistent
with prior research.
Following previous firm-level studies such as Brav (2009), Michaely and Roberts
(2011) and Bernstein et al. (2019), we construct several measures of firm activ-
ity, using data from Amadeus. Specifically, we calculate capital investments as the
change in assets plus depreciation. Equity issuance is defined as the change in eq-
uity minus profit and debt issuance is measured as the change in total liabilities.
50Colla et al. (2012) notes a similar distribution of club deals and of management participation
in a global sample of 238 LBOs, as does Guo et al. (2011) in a sample of large US LBOs.
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Each of these variables are scaled by total assets. The underlying assumption of a
difference-in-differences estimator requires that companies receiving private equity
investment from the affected banks and companies receiving investment from unaf-
fected banks would follow a similar trend in absence of the EBA capital exercise.
Figure 8 graphically illustrates the evolution of the levels of investment and the
financing policies of the two sub-samples. In particular, the graphs present the αt
of the following regression equation:
(yit) = αt + αi + εit (9)
Where αt captures year fixed effects and αi captures company fixed effects. The
year precedent to the shock, 2010, is used as the base period and its corresponding
coefficient is normalized to zero. The equation is estimated separately for both the
EBA and non-EBA samples, with standard errors being clustered at the company
level. The two groups of companies present relatively similar growth paths before
the shock in terms of their levels of investment and their financing policies, which
alleviates concerns that either group was substantially outperforming the other in
the run up to the EBA capital exercise. Thereafter, at the onset of the shock, there
is a divergence between the two groups, particularly in terms of levels of investment
and equity issuance.
Furthermore, in Tables 26 and 27, we compare the characteristics and growth rates
of the two groups of firms in 2010 in the pre-shock period. Across both groups, firms
are very similar in terms of profitability (ROA), revenue, earnings, cash flow, leverage
and working capital. The differences in these variables between the two sub-samples
are small in magnitude and statistically insignificant. These preliminary sample
statistics are comparable in size and profitability to the bank-affiliated sample of
UK LBOs used by Wang (2017). We enrich this analysis by examining companies’
growth rates in the aforementioned characteristics, in Table 27. Again, we find
that the two sub-samples share similar pre-shock trends in revenue, leverage, cash
flow, earnings etc. This supplements Figure 8, which illustrates the investment and
financing policy of firms in the lead up to the shock, and the subsequent divergence
at the onset of the EBA exercise.
Overall, these analyses suggest that companies receiving PE investment from EBA-
affected banks were similar in nature and characteristic in the pre-shock period to
companies receiving investment from unaffected banks. They also share similar pre-
shock growth rates and time-series trends in investment and funding. Finally, as
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illustrated in Table 24 and 25, the industry distribution is comparable between the
two sub-samples, as are the various deal characteristics relating to the PE transac-
tions. Taken together, this underlines that there is no reason to doubt that there
were any significant differences between the two sub-samples in the run up to the
EBA capital exercise. In the next section, we further show that our empirical re-
sults hold when we include firm-level controls taken from the pre-shock year, 2010,
which should absorb any residual differences in observables across the two groups
(Bernstein et al. (2019)).
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Figure 8: Effect of EBA-affected bank PE-backed companies on firm behaviour
over time
This figure illustrates the change in investment, equity issuance and debt issuance separately for
both EBA and non-EBA companies in our sample. Investment is defined as the change in assets
over the past year, plus depreciation. Equity issuance is calculated as the change in equity minus
profit while debt issuance is measured as the change in total liabilities. Specifically, the figure
reports the αt of the following equation: (yit) = αt +αi + εit. Where αt captures year fixed effects
and αi captures company fixed effects. The year precedent to the shock, 2010, is used as the base
period and its corresponding coefficient is normalized to zero. The equation is estimated separately
for both the EBA and non-EBA samples, with standard errors being clustered at the company
level.
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Table 26: Portfolio company characteristics in 2010
The below table reports descriptive statistics of sample firms in the last pre-shock year (2010)
across treated (EBA companies) and untreated firms (non-EBA companies). ROA shows return
on assets, as measured by net income over assets; EBITDA is earnings before interest, taxes,
depreciation and amortization; Cash flow (CF) is net profit (loss) for the period less minority
interest plus depreciation and amortization; Cost of debt is measured as the ratio of total interest
expenses to total debt; Leverage is defined as total debt over total assets; Current ratio is the ratio
of current assets to current liabilities. The last column reports the mean difference across the two
groups where ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels respectively.
All ratios are winsorized at 1%.
EBA non-EBA
Variable N Mean Median SD N Mean Median SD t-test
ROA 243 0.02 0.04 0.20 51 0.03 0.05 0.15 -0.01
Total assets 248 108.91 27.23 247.57 52 101.72 24.77 219.74 7.19
Revenue 246 82.14 31.06 167.80 52 67.58 13.51 118.19 14.56
Log(rev) 246 1.39 1.49 0.81 52 1.27 1.13 0.76 0.12
EBITDA 224 9.96 9.25 16.37 50 13.14 8.16 24.85 -3.18
EBITDA/revenue 224 1.44 0.20 12.45 50 1.76 0.31 16.96 -0.32
EBITDA/assets 236 0.10 0.10 0.17 51 0.10 0.09 0.11 -0.01
CF/assets 232 0.06 0.07 0.18 50 0.06 0.07 0.15 0.01
Cost of debt 205 0.08 0.02 0.27 50 0.16 0.03 0.59 -0.08
Leverage 247 0.66 0.67 0.32 52 0.63 0.63 0.22 0.03
Current ratio 245 1.75 1.42 1.26 52 1.69 1.41 1.33 0.06
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Table 27: Portfolio company growth rates in 2010
The below table reports the 1-year growth as a percentage increase in the characteristics in 2010.
ROA shows return on assets, as measured by net income over assets; EBITDA is earnings before
interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization; Cash flow (CF) is net profit (loss) for the period
less minority interest plus depreciation and amortization; Cost of debt is measured as the ratio of
total interest expenses to total debt; Leverage is defined as total debt over total assets; Current
ratio is the ratio of current assets to current liabilities. The last column reports the mean difference
across the two groups where ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10%
levels respectively.
EBA non-EBA
Variable N Mean Median SD N Mean Median SD t-test
ROA 234 0.15 0.07 5.19 51 0.66 0.24 6.25 -0.51
Total assets 242 0.05 0.05 0.24 52 -0.02 -0.01 0.19 0.07**
Revenue 235 0.06 0.06 0.22 52 0.06 0.03 0.26 0.01
Log(rev) 232 0.03 0.01 0.17 52 0.07 0.01 0.29 -0.04
EBITDA 211 0.06 0.06 2.08 49 0.18 0.01 1.60 -0.12
EBITDA/revenue 213 -0.48 -0.01 4.40 50 0.17 0.02 1.58 -0.65
EBITDA/assets 222 -0.14 0.06 2.60 49 -0.28 0.05 3.74 -0.14
CF/assets 201 -0.35 0.08 3.70 45 0.14 0.02 1.32 0.49
Cost of debt 174 -1.07 -0.24 2.98 45 -0.56 med 1.23 0.51
Leverage 241 -0.02 -0.13 0.23 52 0.01 med 0.15 -0.03
Current ratio 238 -0.03 0.01 0.41 52 -0.20 -0.03 0.67 0.17**
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6.6.2 Empirical model
We estimate our model using a panel data set from 2008 to 2014, a symmetric
window around the 2011 EBA capital exercise. We estimate the following equation:
(yit) = αt + αi + αc + β1(EBAi ∗ Postt) + θXit + εit (10)
where yit is an outcome variable for company i at time t and αi, αt and αc are sets
of firm, (bank x year) and country fixed effects. EBA takes the value one where
a company receives private equity investment from a bank-affiliated investor of an
affected bank, and zero where the bank is unaffected by the EBA capital exercise.
Post is a dummy variable for years 2011 onwards, while X it represents a set of
company-level covariates. Finally, standard errors are clustered at the company
level.
Throughout the analysis, we control for firm fixed effects, therefore removing time-
invariant characteristics of the EBA and non-EBA companies. Moreover, we show
that our findings are not affected by the inclusion of company controls. We augment
our specifications with controls that capture the heterogeneity across firms prior to
the EBA capital exercise. In particular, we control for firm size, revenue growth,
cash flow normalized by total assets, profitability (ROA), and leverage. To avoid
concerns regarding the endogeneity of these variables, they are measured in the pre-
shock period (2010) and then interacted with the Post dummy to allow them to
have a differential impact around the shock (Gormley and Matsa (2013); Bernstein
et al. (2019)). Finally, as a robustness test for our main results, we also add a full
set of time-varying industry fixed effects, which can account for contemporaneous
changes in industry demand and other industry characteristics around the time of
the shock. In particular, we interact two-digit industry fixed effects with the Post
dummy. All robustness checks used are detailed in the next section.
As discussed in the previous section, the main identification concern regarding a
difference-in-differences approach is that of the parallel trends assumption, ie. that
in the absence of the EBA capital exercise, both sub-samples of companies would
have continued behaving in similar manners and we would not see any of the diver-
gence that is visible in Figure 8. Figure 8 and Tables 24 - 27 have shown that our
two sub-samples of firms shared similar industry distribution, deal characteristics,
accounting data (profitability, size, leverage, earnings, cash flow) prior to the capital
exercise and similar pre-shock growth trends in these variables.
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We formally develop this analysis by empirically examining the time-varying be-
haviour of the effect of being attached to an EBA bank for the main outcome
variables in our analysis by estimating the following equation:
(yit) = αt + αi + αc + Σβk(EBAi) + θXit + εit (11)
Where we estimate a different βk for every year between 2008 and 2014, using the
last year before the EBA shock, 2010, as a reference year. If our parameter βk is
correctly capturing the causal effect of the EBA capital exercise, then we expect the
effect to appear only at the onset of the shock. The results in the following section
illustrate this.
6.7 Results
6.7.1 Investment and financing policies
We start by considering whether companies backed by PE groups affiliated to EBA-
affected banks were more affected after the EBA capital exercise required these
banks to increase their CT1 ratios, relative to companies backed by the PE arms of
unaffected banks. Gropp et al. (2018) show that banks achieved these target ratios
by reducing their risky assets, as opposed to issuing new equity. They subsequently
show that companies borrowing from these banks experienced lower investment and
weaker asset and sales growth in the aftermath of the exercise. We extend this
analysis by examining whether the capital exercise had an impact on the investment
and financing decisions of their private equity portfolio companies.
Firstly we examine the relative change in investment policies of EBA and non-EBA
portfolio companies. In Columns 1 and 2 of Table 28, we find that companies receiv-
ing investment from PE firms affiliated to EBA shock-affected banks reduced their
levels of investment relative to those receiving investment from unaffected banks.
The effect is strong in statistical significance and in economic magnitude. Specif-
ically, EBA companies lowered their investment (normalized by total assets) by
between 5% and 8% after the shock relative to unaffected banks’ portfolio compa-
nies. Moreover, in column 2, the effect remains significant and actually strengthens
in magnitude when we control for a host of firm-level covariates. The coefficients are
consistent with Figure 8, which plots the year effects estimates around the shock,
separately for our EBA and non-EBA samples. Both groups follow relatively similar
paths in the lead up to the shock, but at the onset of the shock, there is a substantial
divergence, as EBA affected companies decreased their levels of investment signifi-
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cantly more after the shock. This is in line with the estimates in Table 28. In Table
29, we estimate Equation 11 to capture year-by-year EBA effects. The coefficients
confirm the lack of statistical significance prior to the EBA capital exercise and that
the divergence occurs from 2011 onwards. Furthermore, the results are likewise ro-
bust to the inclusion of a host of firm-level controls and fixed effects. These results
are consistent with those of Gropp et al. (2018) who show that companies who ob-
tained a larger share of their bank credit from EBA-affected banks suffered weaker
relative investment. Moreover, our results are of a similar economic magnitude:
Gropp et al. find that companies borrowing from affected banks suffered a relative
decrease in investment of around 6 percentage points.51 The key difference between
our respective analyses is that while Gropp et al. (2018) analyse the impact on the
real economy via the bank’s commercial lending arm, we consider the effect coming
through the bank’s private equity investments.
We then investigate the financing decisions of the portfolio companies, firstly con-
sidering their level of equity issuance. The results in columns 3 and 4 of Table 28
show that equity issuance decreased at the onset of the shock for EBA portfolio
companies relative to portfolio companies receiving PE investment from unaffected
banks. Specifically, EBA-affected portfolio companies experienced a relative fall in
equity issuance of between 1% to 2%, normalized by total assets. The magnitude of
our result is in parallel with Bernstein et al. (2019) who find that non-PE-backed
companies’ equity issuance dropped by around 2% relative to PE-backed companies
during the global financial crisis. Our finding is robust in statistical significance
and in magnitude to the inclusion of several firm level covariates and various fixed
effects. Figure 8 graphically illustrates this, showing that at the onset of the EBA
capital exercise, EBA affected companies suffered a decline in equity issuance, while
our control group, portfolio companies of unaffected banks, increased their equity
issuance. Similar conclusions arise from columns 3 and 4 of Table 29, where we esti-
mate Equation 3 to capture year-by-year EBA effects (we add company controls in
Column 4). The findings confirm the lack of statistically significant patterns before
the shock. The results imply that banks which were unaffected by the EBA exercise
were better able to support the financing of their PE portfolio companies around
the EBA shock.
Finally, we examine the debt financing of the portfolio companies. While the nega-
51The magnitude of our result also echoes that of Bernstein et al. (2019) who find that non-
PE-backed companies’ level of investment dropped by around 5% to 6% relative to PE-backed
companies during the global financial crisis. Moreover, Acharya et al. (2018) report that firms with
a high exposure to banks most affected by the sovereign debt crisis reduced capital investments by
5.9% relative to comparable firms affiliated to less affected banks.
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tive coefficient implies that unaffected portfolio companies were better able to access
debt markets at the onset of the shock, the coefficient is insignificant. When we con-
trol for firm-level controls, the coefficient is significant, but only at the 10% level.
We find similar results when estimating debt issuance on a yearly basis in Table 29,
albeit the effect is less significant. Nevertheless, taken together, the results suggest
that the portfolio companies of EBA-affected banks had weaker financing around
the shock and poorer access to capital markets.
The results so far suggest that EBA-affected banks were less able to support their
PE portfolio companies around the EBA capital exercise, which required them to
increase their CT1 ratios. On the contrary, portfolio companies of unaffected banks
were able to increase their financing, and increase their levels of investment relative
to EBA-affected companies. In the next section, we examine whether or not this
affected the relative performance of our two groups of EBA-affected and unaffected
companies.
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Table 28: Investment and financing
This table reports the estimates of a difference-in-differences fixed effects model on the investment
and financing variables. All specifications include firm, country and (bank*year) fixed effects. The
main parameter of interest is the interaction between the Post dummy, which takes the value one
in years 2011 onward, and the EBA company dummy variable, which takes the value one where
the company is backed by the PE arm of an EBA-affected bank. Odd-numbered columns contain
the baseline regression (see Equation 2), and even-numbered columns augment the baseline model
with a set of firm-level controls measured before the EBA shock in 2010 and interacted with the
Post dummy. These variables include firm size (log of revenue), growth in revenue, cash flow over
assets, ROA, and leverage. In Columns 1 and 2 the dependent variable is investment scaled by
assets; in Columns 3 and 4 it is equity issuance over assets; in Columns 5 and 6 it is debt issuance
scaled by assets. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. *** denotes statistical significance
at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level.
Investment Equity issuance Debt issuance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
EBA*Post -0.051** -0.085*** -0.011* -0.023** -0.017 -0.042*
(0.021) (0.028) (0.007) (0.011) (0.018) (0.025)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank*Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 2,252 2,058 2,532 2,245 2,337 2,037
R-squared 0.020 0.031 0.006 0.032 0.013 0.023
Companies 297 266 300 275 302 266
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Table 29: Investment and financing over time
This table reports the estimates from a time-varying fixed effects model. All specifications include
firm, country and (bank*year) fixed effects. Specifically, the table reports the βt of the following
equation: (yit) = αt + αi + αc + Σβt(EBA) + θXit + εit. Odd-numbered columns contain the
baseline regression (see Equation 2), and even-numbered columns augment the baseline model
with a set of firm-level controls measured before the EBA shock in 2010 and interacted with the
Post dummy. These variables include firm size (log of revenue), growth in revenue, cash flow over
assets, ROA, and leverage. In Columns 1 and 2 the dependent variable is investment scaled by
assets; in Columns 3 and 4 it is equity issuance over assets; in Columns 5 and 6 it is debt issuance
scaled by assets. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. *** denotes statistical significance
at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level.
Investment Equity issuance Debt issuance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
EBA*2008 0.086 0.087 -0.142 -0.056 0.039 0.044
(0.074) (0.073) (0.266) (0.291) (0.068) (0.073)
EBA*2009 -0.014 -0.028 -0.234 -0.229 0.032 0.041
(0.052) (0.053) (0.192) (0.197) (0.045) (0.047)
EBA*2011 -0.092** -0.099** -0.217** -0.302*** -0.044 -0.050
(0.040) (0.042) (0.101) (0.114) (0.033) (0.035)
EBA*2012 -0.043 -0.058 -0.009 -0.091 0.009 0.012
(0.037) (0.038) (0.080) (0.094) (0.033) (0.035)
EBA*2013 -0.208*** -0.119*** -0.016 -0.087 -0.063* -0.056*
(0.039) (0.040) (0.103) (0.122) (0.033) (0.033)
EBA*2014 -0.053 -0.069* -0.142 -0.228* 0.008 -0.002
(0.039) (0.042) (0.114) (0.128) (0.030) (0.031)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank*Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 2252 2058 2532 2245 2337 2037
R-squared 0.022 0.031 0.015 0.040 0.019 0.040
Companies 297 266 300 275 302 266
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6.7.2 Company Performance
We then look at company performance, as measured by asset growth and employ-
ment growth, in Tables 30 and 31. We find that companies receiving PE investment
from unaffected banks’ assets and employment grew faster than those of EBA-bank-
sponsored companies. This pattern is consistent with prior findings that EBA-
affected companies decreased their investment relative to unaffected companies at
the onset of the shock. The coefficients in columns 1 and 2 of Table 30 imply that
PE portfolio companies of the private equity arms of EBA-affected banks suffered
weaker asset growth relative to non-EBA bank backed companies. The coefficients
are strongly significant and robust to the inclusion of firm-level control variables
and a multitude of fixed effects. Consistent with our previous analysis, in Table
31, we estimate the variables on a yearly basis to capture year-by-year EBA effects
allowing us to examine the effect of being a EBA bank-backed company in every
year of our panel (see Equation 3). On this note, we reach similar conclusions as
before in columns 5 and 6 of Table 31. This formally estimates the significance of
the differences between the two groups, confirming the lack of statistically signifi-
cant patterns before the shock, and a divergence in performance at the onset of the
EBA capital exercise. These findings are consistent with Gropp et al. (2018) who
find that firms who were dependent on credit funding from capital exercise-affected
banks experienced a significant relative reduction in investment and asset growth,
and with De Marco and Wieladek (2015), who show that SME’s asset growth and in-
vestment declines in response to their lender bank’s capital requirements increasing.
The economic magnitude of our results is meaningful. We find that EBA-affected
companies’ asset growth fell by 6%-9% relative to non-EBA bank-backed companies.
Similarly, Gropp et al. (2018) report a 4% difference between companies borrowing
from EBA-affected and unaffected banks, while De Marco and Wieladek (2015)
highlight a 3.5-7% decline in asset growth of SMEs borrowing from UK banks which
were faced with stricter capital requirements.52
We then turn our attention to the employment growth of our two groups of firms
where our results are in line with our previous findings. The coefficients in columns
3 and 4 of Table 30 underline the negative impact of being sponsored by the PE
arm of an EBA-affected bank around the time of the capital exercise. In particu-
lar, portfolio companies of EBA-affected banks suffered 2%-4% weaker employment
growth relative to portfolio companies of unaffected banks. Again, our findings are
52Our results are also of a similar economic magnitude to Acharya et al. (2018) who find that
firms with a high exposure to banks most affected by the sovereign debt crisis suffered a fall in
employment growth of 4.7% relative to comparable firms affiliated to less affected banks.
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of a comparable magnitude to the literature. Juelsrud and Wold (2018) document
a 3% fall in employment growth for firms borrowing from low-capitalized banks
affected by reformed capital requirements. Finally, column 4 confirms the finding
is unaffected by the inclusion of firm-level controls, and we find similar results as
before when estimating employment growth on a yearly basis in Columns 7 and 8
of Table 31.
Finally, as a means of preliminary robustness, in columns 1 to 4 of Table 31, we
estimate the standard model but using only data from 2008 to 2012 to capture the
effect in the earliest post-shock years. We find that during the immediate shock
period, EBA-backed companies experienced an larger drop in performance relative
to the control group.
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Table 30: Company Performance
This Table reports a difference-in-differences fixed effects model exploring company performance
measures. All specifications include firm, country and (bank*year) fixed effects. The main param-
eter of interest is the interaction between the Post dummy, which takes the value one in years 2011
onward, and the EBA company dummy variable, which takes the value one where the company
is backed by the PE arm of an EBA-affected bank. Odd-numbered columns contain the baseline
regression (see Equation 2), and even-numbered columns augment the baseline model with a set of
firm-level controls measured before the EBA shock in 2010 and interacted with the Post dummy.
These variables include firm size (log of revenue), growth in revenue, cash flow over assets, ROA,
and leverage. In Columns 1 and 2 the dependent variable is 1-year assets growth and in Columns 3
and 4 it is 1-year employment growth. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. *** denotes
statistical significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level
Asset growth Employment growth
(1) (2) (3) (4)
EBA*Post -0.058** -0.097*** -0.049** -0.054**
(0.025) (0.033) (0.022) (0.023)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank*Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm controls No Yes No Yes
Observations 1713 1512 1699 1512
R-squared 0.010 0.030 0.004 0.015
Companies 303 266 302 266
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Table 31: Company performance over time
This table investigates the effects of being backed by the PE arm of an EBA-affected bank over time.
Columns 1 to 4 show estimates from the standard DiD model but using a restricted sample with only
years 2008 to 2012. Columns 5 to 8 report the estimates from a time-varying fixed effects model for
the full sample. All specifications include firm, country and (bank*year) fixed effects. Specifically,
the table reports the βt of the following equation: (yit) = αt+αi+αc+Σβt(EBA)+θXit+εit. Odd-
numbered columns contain the baseline regression (see Equation 2), and even-numbered columns
augment the baseline model with a set of firm-level controls measured before the EBA shock in 2010
and interacted with the Post dummy. These variables include firm size (log of revenue), growth in
revenue, cash flow over assets, ROA, and leverage. In Columns 1, 2, 5 and 6 the dependent variable
is 1-year assets growth and in Columns 3, 4, 7 and 8 it is 1-year employment growth. Standard
errors are clustered at the firm level. *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, ** at the
5% level, and * at the 10% level.
Asset Growth Employment Growth Asset Growth Employment Growth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
EBA*Post -0.046 -0.100** -0.082** -0.101***
(0.029) (0.040) (0.037) (0.051)
EBA*2009 -0.030 -0.035 -0.050 -0.044
(0.067) (0.071) (0.044) (0.045)
EBA*2011 -0.119** -0.144** -0.108** -0.085*
(0.053) (0.057) (0.047) (0.049)
EBA*2012 -0.048 -0.088** -0.033 -0.013
(0.039) (0.043) (0.036) (0.036)
EBA*2013 -0.132** -0.139*** -0.017 -0.024
(0.053) (0.050) (0.038) (0.037)
EBA*2014 -0.049 -0.076* -0.056 -0.044
(0.039) (0.043) (0.047) (0.048)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank*Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 1129 1001 731 656 2252 2058 2532 2245
R-squared 0.009 0.027 0.014 0.129 0.016 0.040 0.026 0.079
Companies 303 266 228 204 297 266 300 275
Our findings so far suggest that in the face of stringent balance sheet requirements
such as those laid out in the EBA capital exercise, the PE portfolio companies of the
PE subsidiaries of affected banks suffered weaker investment and poorer access to
external financing and poorer performance relative to the PE portfolio companies of
unaffected banks. Intuitively, the above findings makes sense. As capital is restricted
while banks make efforts to increase their CT1 ratios, they have less funds available
for other activities such as their commercial lending and private equity portfolios.
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Given that the parent bank is normally the largest and most important (and often
the only) LP in its own PE fund, the economic structure of bank-affiliated funds
typically differs from that of an independent fund, where the GP-LP relationship
is governed by a LPA. Where bank-affiliated funds are concerned, there is unlikely
to be an LPA, but the parent bank will typically set aside an amount of capital
each year designated to its private equity arm, but this capital is not ring-fenced as
is committed capital from institutional LPs under an independent fund structure.
Should an external shock hit the bank, such as increased capital requirements, they
can simply pull this funding and there is no legal restriction on them doing so
given that the bank is the ultimate owner of the private equity fund. Consequently,
their portfolio companies’ investment and financing are adversely affected by the
reduction in capital available to their parent banks. Therefore, while the EBA
capital exercise may have helped to shape a more resilient banking sector in Europe
as banks had to reinforce their tier one capital, as suggested by Gropp et al. (2018),
our results so far imply that this strengthening of banks’ balance sheets may have
come at a cost to the real economy. It resulted in banks’ private equity portfolio
companies suffering from weaker investment and financing, and subsequently poorer
performance compared to portfolio companies of banks which were unaffected by
the EBA capital exercise. This is consistent with the findings of De Marco and
Wieladek (2015), Fraisse et al. (2020), Gropp et al. (2018) and Juelsrud and Wold
(2018) who recognize that companies borrowing from capital requirement-affected
banks consequently suffered negative real effects.
As a result of the requirements, EBA-affected banks may have had less capital
available to deploy and to support their PE portfolio companies with additional
financing and to help refinance any debt. Given that banks are the primary source
of capital in bank-affiliated funds, and sometimes the sole investor in the case of
captive funds, the EBA requirements may have restricted the fund’s access to addi-
tional capital and the bank’s ability to financially support their portfolio companies.
Consequently, the investment activity and performance of their portfolio companies
suffered.
Finally, Bottazzi et al. (2007) show that banks are less active investors and spend less
time supporting their portfolio companies relative to independent investors. Hence,
when faced with demanding requirements of the EBA capital exercise, they may
have devoted even less time to their PE arm as restructuring their balance sheet




In the following section, we detail a number of robustness measures. Firstly, we
exclude all UK deals. The UK has the most advanced and most active private
equity market in Europe (Colla et al. (2012); Wang (2012); Jenkinson and Sousa
(2015); Wang (2017)). In order to see whether the large size of the UK market is
driving our results, we remove all UK transactions from our sample and re-estimate
our baseline specifications. The results, presented in Tables 32 and 33, show that is
not the case and that our main findings are upheld and similar in magnitude to our
baseline model53. Moreover, in unreported analysis, these results are robust to the
inclusion of time-varying industry fixed effects.
Next, we drop management buyouts from the main sample. MBOs have been char-
acterized by lower engagement by PE firms (Bernstein et al. (2019)). To explore
whether their inclusion generated the results found, we drop MBOs from the sam-
ple and repeat the main analysis. As we show in Table 34 and ??, we find similar
results across investment, financing policies and company performance. In Tables
36 & 37, we drop all secondary buyouts from our sample and rerun our regressions.
Recent research has found the rationale for secondary buyouts to differ from pri-
mary LBOs. Arcot et al. (2015) develop pressure indexes and find that SBOs are
evidence of PE fund managers acting under pressure. They find that buying pres-
sure increases the likelihood of a purchase being made via an SBO more likely and
that selling pressure makes an exit via an SBO more likely. Similarly, Wang (2012)
shows that secondary buyouts are more likely to occur when private equity firms’
liquidity demand changes and they are then under more pressure to exit. As such,
we repeat our analysis excluding all secondary buyout transactions and, as before,
the main results are upheld. We then examine whether our results are driven by
public-to-private (PTP) transactions in Tables 38 and 39. Again, the main results
are upheld and the results are of a similar economic magnitude. This is no surprise
given the small portion of sample which PTP transactions account for.
Finally, we exclude all club deals (where two or more PE firms jointly sponsor a
transaction) which reduces our sample by roughly one third. Club deals may be
motivated by a need to improve the certification of deal quality or to facilitate and
improve the financing of deals by attaching multiple investor’s names to the deal,
given that LBOs are highly levered transactions (Officer et al. (2010)). Syndication
literature has found club deals to outperform sole-sponsored deals in both LBOs
53We also exclude all deals executed in France, as France is the most active country in our
sample, accounting for around 40% of transactions. The main findings are again upheld.
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(Guo et al. (2011)) and in VC investments (Brander et al. (2002)). When we drop
these deals, our results concerning both the financing and performance of firms are
upheld, as presented in Tables 40 and 41. Similarly, the economic magnitude of the
coefficients resembles that of the baseline specification. Additionally, in unreported
analysis, these findings are also robust to the inclusion of time-varying industry fixed
effects.
We then control for any attrition bias which may be present in our results as en-
dogenous exit through acquisition or bankruptcy may bias the results. First, in
Tables 29 and 31 where we estimate the effect of being back by an EBA-affected
bank on a yearly basis, the significant change in investment and financing policies
occurs from 2011. We can also illustrate this pattern more directly by estimating
our standard model using data from 2010 and 2011 only. Tables 42 and 43 capture
this model and the main results remain unchanged. This shows that much of the
change in our outcome variables policy occurred soon after the onset of the shock,
alleviating any concern of bias by attrition in our sample. In unreported analysis,
as a supplementary check for attrition bias, we rerun the baseline models using the
sample of firms which did not experience an exit before 2014 and the main findings
are intact.
Finally, we provide evidence that our results are robust to the inclusion of time-
varying industry fixed effects. This strengthens our findings as a concern may be
that companies backed by EBA-affected banks may be more or less susceptible to
any change in demand around the time of the shock. Accordingly, we supplement
our main specification with a full set of (2 digit) industry fixed effects which we in-
teract with our Post dummy variable, to control for time-varying industry variables,
such as a change in demand. Tables 44 and 45 report the results and our primary
results remain intact. The coefficients remain statistically significant and similar in
economic magnitude to our baseline specification coefficients.
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Table 32: Excluding UK deals: Investment & financing
This Table reports a robustness test, where we estimate the standard difference-in-differences fixed
effects model on the main outcome variables dropping UK-based transactions. Every specifica-
tion contains firm, country and (bank*year) fixed effects. The main parameter of interest is the
interaction between the Post dummy and the EBA dummy identifying PE-backed companies of
EBA-affected banks. Odd-numbered columns contain the baseline regression and even-numbered
columns augment the baseline model with a set of firm-level controls measured before the shock
and interacted with the Post dummy. These variables are firm size (log of revenue), growth in
revenue, cash flow over assets, ROA, and leverage. In Columns 1 and 2 the outcome is investment
scaled by assets; in Columns 3 and 4 the outcome is equity issuance; in Columns 5 and 6 the out-
come is the debt issuance. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. *** denotes statistical
significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level
Investment Equity Debt
(1) (2) (3) (4)
EBA*Post -0.048** -0.081** -0.024** -0.032*** -0.021 -0.054
(0.022) (0.029) (0.010) (0.012) (0.022) (0.028)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank*Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 1115 1030 1249 1142 1139 1032
R-squared 0.015 0.031 0.018 0.055 0.006 0.037
Companies 188 172 187 171 189 172
Table 33: Excluding UK deals: Company performance
This Table reports a robustness test, where we estimate the standard DiD fixed effects model on the
company performance variables dropping UK-based transactions. All specifications contain firm,
country and (bank*year) fixed effects. The main parameter of interest is the interaction between
the Post dummy and the EBA dummy. Odd-numbered columns contain the baseline regression
and even-numbered columns augment the baseline model with a set of firm-level controls measured
before the shock and interacted with the Post dummy. These variables are firm size (log of revenue),
growth in revenue, cash flow over assets, ROA, and leverage. In Columns 1 and 2 the independent
variable is the 1-year growth rate in assets and in columns 3 and 4 it is the 1-year growth rate in
employment. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. *** denotes statistical significance at
the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level
Asset growth Employment growth
(1) (2) (3) (4)
EBA*Post -0.074** -0.120*** -0.072** -0.026
(0.033) (0.039) (0.030) (0.030)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank*Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm controls No Yes No Yes
Observations 1084 981 613 543
R-squared 0.013 0.044 0.021 0.069
Companies 190 172 152 136
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Table 34: Excluding MBOs: Investment & financing
This Table reports a robustness test, where we estimate the standard difference-in-differences
fixed effects model on the main outcome variables dropping management buyouts (MBOs). Every
specification contains firm, country and (bank*year) fixed effects. The main parameter of interest
is the interaction between the Post dummy and the EBA dummy identifying PE-backed companies
of EBA-affected banks. Odd-numbered columns contain the baseline regression and even-numbered
columns augment the baseline model with a set of firm-level controls measured before the shock and
interacted with the Post dummy. These variables are firm size (log of revenue), growth in revenue,
cash flow over assets, ROA, and leverage. In Columns 1 and 2 the outcome is investment scaled by
assets; in Columns 3 and 4 the outcome is equity issuance; in Columns 5 and 6 the outcome is the
debt issuance. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. *** denotes statistical significance
at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level
Investment Equity Debt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
EBA*Post -0.072** -0.109** -0.020** -0.025*** -0.022 -0.036
(0.030) (0.043) (0.010) (0.008) (0.027) (0.035)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank*Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 972 895 1122 1004 1012 898
R-squared 0.021 0.038 0.023 0.048 0.015 0.040
Companies 166 151 169 151 170 151
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Table 35: Target size and investor experience
This Table reports the mean total assets and sales of portfolio companies in the pre-buyout year based on PE investor’s prior experience at acquisition. EXP
is a dummy variable taking the value one where the investor involved in the deal is in the top quartile based on its level of experience, and zero otherwise.
The p-value is the difference in means of targets’ assets and sales between more and less-experienced investors. *** denotes statistical significance at the
1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level
PE firm age Number of funds raised Value of funds raised Number of deals made
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
EXP=1 EXP=0 P-value EXP=1 EXP=0 P-value EXP=1 EXP=0 P-value EXP=1 EXP=0 P-value
Total assets 103,283 93,339 9,944 158,268 68,745 89,523*** 229,858 45,825 184,573*** 113,781 94,452 19,329
Sales 77,586 73,727 3,859 55,575 15,438 40,137*** 178,746 46,678 132,068*** 98,817 69,755 29,062*
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Table 36: Excluding SBOs: Investment & financing
This Table reports a robustness test, where we estimate the standard difference-in-differences
fixed effects model on the main outcome variables dropping secondary buyouts (SBOs). Every
specification contains firm, country and (bank*year) fixed effects. The main parameter of interest
is the interaction between the Post dummy and the EBA dummy identifying PE-backed companies
of EBA-affected banks. Odd-numbered columns contain the baseline regression and even-numbered
columns augment the baseline model with a set of firm-level controls measured before the shock and
interacted with the Post dummy. These variables are firm size (log of revenue), growth in revenue,
cash flow over assets, ROA, and leverage. In Columns 1 and 2 the outcome is investment scaled by
assets; in Columns 3 and 4 the outcome is equity issuance; in Columns 5 and 6 the outcome is the
debt issuance. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. *** denotes statistical significance
at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level
Investment Equity Debt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
EBA*Post -0.052** -0.095*** -0.014** -0.031*** -0.017 -0.048*
(0.022) (0.034) (0.007) (0.011) (0.019) (0.029)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank*Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 1584 1442 1826 1614 1639 1445
R-squared 0.014 0.033 0.009 0.049 0.013 0.033
Companies 272 244 276 243 278 244
Table 37: Excluding SBOs: Company performance
This Table reports a robustness test, where we estimate the standard DiD fixed effects model on
the company performance variables dropping secondary buyouts (SBOs). All specifications contain
firm, country and (bank*year) fixed effects. The main parameter of interest is the interaction
between the Post dummy and the EBA dummy. Odd-numbered columns contain the baseline
regression and even-numbered columns augment the baseline model with a set of firm-level controls
measured before the shock and interacted with the Post dummy. These variables are firm size (log
of revenue), growth in revenue, cash flow over assets, ROA, and leverage. In Columns 1 and 2 the
independent variable is the 1-year growth rate in assets and in columns 3 and 4 it is the 1-year
growth rate in employment. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. *** denotes statistical
significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level
Asset growth Employment growth
(1) (2) (3) (4)
EBA*Post -0.062** -0.102*** -0.059** -0.061**
(0.028) (0.039) (0.026) (0.027)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank*Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm controls No Yes No Yes
Observations 1572 1383 1054 927
R-squared 0.010 0.030 0.017 0.077
Companies 279 244 236 207
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Table 38: Excluding PTPs: Investment & financing
This Table reports a robustness test, where we estimate the standard difference-in-differences
fixed effects model on the main outcome variables dropping public-to-private (PTPs). Every
specification contains firm, country and (bank*year) fixed effects. The main parameter of interest
is the interaction between the Post dummy and the EBA dummy identifying PE-backed companies
of EBA-affected banks. Odd-numbered columns contain the baseline regression and even-numbered
columns augment the baseline model with a set of firm-level controls measured before the shock and
interacted with the Post dummy. These variables are firm size (log of revenue), growth in revenue,
cash flow over assets, ROA, and leverage. In Columns 1 and 2 the outcome is investment scaled by
assets; in Columns 3 and 4 the outcome is equity issuance; in Columns 5 and 6 the outcome is the
debt issuance. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. *** denotes statistical significance
at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level
Investment Equity Debt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
EBA*Post -0.053*** -0.086*** -0.012* -0.023** -0.019 -0.045*
(0.020) (0.030) (0.007) (0.010) (0.018) (0.025)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank*Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 1671 1522 1920 1700 1721 1526
R-squared 0.015 0.032 0.008 0.041 0.011 0.031
Companies 285 256 289 255 290 256
Table 39: Excluding PTPs: Company performance
This Table reports a robustness test, where we estimate the standard DiD fixed effects model on
the company performance variables excluding public-to-private transactions (PTPs). All specifi-
cations contain firm, country and (bank*year) fixed effects. The main parameter of interest is the
interaction between the Post dummy and the EBA dummy. Odd-numbered columns contain the
baseline regression and even-numbered columns augment the baseline model with a set of firm-level
controls measured before the shock and interacted with the Post dummy. These variables are firm
size (log of revenue), growth in revenue, cash flow over assets, ROA, and leverage. In Columns 1
and 2 the independent variable is the 1-year growth rate in assets and in columns 3 and 4 it is the
1-year growth rate in employment. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. *** denotes
statistical significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level
Asset growth Employment growth
(1) (2) (3) (4)
EBA*Post -0.064** -0.102*** -0.038* -0.048*
(0.027) (0.035) (0.020) (0.026)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank*Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm controls No Yes No Yes
Observations 1647 1457 1076 952
R-squared 0.010 0.031 0.014 0.026
Companies 291 256 242 213
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Table 40: Excluding club deals: Investment & financing
This Table reports a robustness test, where we estimate the standard difference-in-differences fixed
effects model on the main outcome variables dropping club deals. Every specification contains firm,
country and (bank*year) fixed effects. The main parameter of interest is the interaction between
the Post dummy and the EBA dummy identifying PE-backed companies of EBA-affected banks.
Odd-numbered columns contain the baseline regression and even-numbered columns augment the
baseline model with a set of firm-level controls measured before the shock and interacted with the
Post dummy. These variables are firm size (log of revenue), growth in revenue, cash flow over
assets, ROA, and leverage. In Columns 1 and 2 the outcome is investment scaled by assets; in
Columns 3 and 4 the outcome is equity issuance; in Columns 5 and 6 the outcome is the debt
issuance. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. *** denotes statistical significance at the
1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level
Investment Equity Debt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
EBA*Post -0.055** -0.096** -0.011* -0.025** -0.013 -0.034
(0.024) (0.037) (0.006) (0.011) (0.020) (0.031)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank*Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 1238 1119 1436 1251 1293 1123
R-squared 0.017 0.045 0.011 0.059 0.016 0.042
Companies 213 189 217 188 219 189
Table 41: Excluding club deals: Company performance
This Table reports a robustness test, where we estimate the standard DiD fixed effects model on
the company performance variables excluding club deals. All specifications contain firm, country
and (bank*year) fixed effects. The main parameter of interest is the interaction between the Post
dummy and the EBA dummy. Odd-numbered columns contain the baseline regression and even-
numbered columns augment the baseline model with a set of firm-level controls measured before
the shock and interacted with the Post dummy. These variables are firm size (log of revenue),
growth in revenue, cash flow over assets, ROA, and leverage. In Columns 1 and 2 the independent
variable is the 1-year growth rate in assets and in columns 3 and 4 it is the 1-year growth rate in
employment. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. *** denotes statistical significance at
the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level
Asset growth Employment growth
(1) (2) (3) (4)
EBA*Post -0.060** -0.086** -0.046** -0.058**
(0.026) (0.037) (0.021) (0.026)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank*Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm controls No Yes No Yes
Observations 1241 1075 874 763
R-squared 0.014 0.042 0.018 0.072
Companies 220 189 186 161
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Table 42: Only 2010-2011: Investment & financing
Here we estimate the standard DiD model using only data from 2010 and 2011. This corresponds
to the last year before the shock and the first year of the shock. Every specification contains
firm, country and (bank*year) fixed effects. The main parameter of interest is the interaction
between the Post dummy and the EBA-bank dummy. Odd-numbered columns contain the baseline
regression and even-numbered columns augment the baseline model with a set of firm-level controls
measured before the shock and interacted with the Post dummy. In Columns 1 and 2 the outcome
is investment scaled by assets; in Columns 3 and 4 the outcome is equity issuance; in Columns
5 and 6 the outcome is the debt issuance. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. ***
denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level
Investment Equity Debt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
EBA*Post -0.060* -0.103** -0.048** -0.050** -0.001 -0.031
(0.032) (0.043) (0.014) (0.019) (0.026) (0.036)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank*Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 568 524 578 524 589 524
R-squared 0.017 0.033 0.047 0.196 0.010 0.020
Companies 292 266 297 266 293 259
Table 43: Only 2010-2011: Company performance
Here we estimate the standard DiD fixed effects model using only data from 2010 and 2011. This
corresponds to the last year before the shock and the first year of the shock. All specifications
contain firm, country and (bank*year) fixed effects. The main parameter of interest is the interac-
tion between the Post dummy and the EBA dummy. Odd-numbered columns contain the baseline
regression and even-numbered columns augment the baseline model with a set of firm-level controls
measured before the shock and interacted with the Post dummy. These variables are firm size (log
of revenue), growth in revenue, cash flow over assets, ROA, and leverage. In Columns 1 and 2 the
independent variable is the 1-year growth rate in assets and in columns 3 and 4 it is the 1-year
growth rate in employment. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. *** denotes statistical
significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level
Asset growth Employment growth
(1) (2) (3) (4)
EBA*Post -0.074* -0.128*** -0.019 -0.102*
(0.040) (0.059) (0.032) (0.058)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank*Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm controls No Yes No Yes
Observations 590 523 388 348
R-squared 0.019 0.035 0.020 0.239
Companies 303 266 212 188
128
Table 44: Time-varying industry fixed effects: Investment & financing
Here we estimate the standard DiD fixed effects model on the main outcome variables augmented
with a set of fixed effects generated as the product of industry (two-digit SIC) and the Post dummy.
Every specification contains firm, country and (bank*year) fixed effects. The main parameter of
interest is the interaction between the Post dummy and the EBA dummy. Odd-numbered columns
contain the baseline regression and even-numbered columns augment the baseline model with the
same firm-level controls measured before the shock and interacted with the Post dummy. In
Columns 1 and 2 the outcome is investment scaled by assets; in Columns 3 and 4 the outcome
is equity issuance; in Columns 5 and 6 the outcome is the debt issuance. Standard errors are
clustered at the firm level. *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level,
and * at the 10% level
Investment Equity Debt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
EBA*Post -0.075** -0.025** -0.024** -0.050** -0.034 -0.036
(0.032) (0.043) (0.011) (0.011) (0.027) (0.026)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank*Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 1728 1579 1991 1765 1790 1583
R-squared 0.027 0.045 0.020 0.047 0.021 0.043
Companies 295 266 300 265 302 266
Table 45: Time-varying industry fixed effects: Company performance
This Table reports a robustness test, where we estimate the standard DiD fixed effects model on
the company performance variables augmented with a set of fixed effects generated as the product
of industry (two-digit SIC) and the Post dummy. All specifications contain firm, country and
(bank*year) fixed effects. The main parameter of interest is the interaction between the Post
dummy and the EBA dummy. Odd-numbered columns contain the baseline regression and even-
numbered columns augment the baseline model with a set of firm-level controls measured before
the shock and interacted with the Post dummy. These variables are firm size (log of revenue),
growth in revenue, cash flow over assets, ROA, and leverage. In Columns 1 and 2 the independent
variable is the 1-year growth rate in assets and in columns 3 and 4 it is the 1-year growth rate in
employment. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. *** denotes statistical significance at
the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level
Asset growth Employment growth
(1) (2) (3) (4)
EBA*Post -0.068* -0.090*** -0.077*** -0.056*
(0.036) (0.036) (0.028) (0.030)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank*Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm controls No Yes No Yes
Observations 1713 1512 1136 1001
R-squared 0.024 0.043 0.028 0.076
Companies 303 266 254 223
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6.8 Portfolio companies and financial constraints
In order to enrich our understanding of our main findings, we now exploit hetero-
geneity at the portfolio company-level. Specifically, we look to determine whether
the negative effect on company performance of being sponsored by an EBA-affected
bank is stronger for portfolio companies which were ex-ante more likely to be finan-
cially constrained in 2010.
In order to do so, we estimate the following model:
(yit) = αt + αi + αc + β1(EBAi ∗ Postt) + β2(Constrained ∗ Postt)
+β3(Constrained ∗ EBAi ∗ Postt) + θXit + εit
Where Constrained is a dummy taking the value one where the company is more
likely to be constrained in the pre-shock year, 2010. We adopt four measures of
financially constrained. First, we use firm size as measured by their total revenue.
Prior literature has shown that smaller companies are more vulnerable to credit
market downturns (Chodorow-Reich (2013); Bottero et al. (2015); Cingano et al.
(2016)). Closely associated to our own work, Juelsrud and Wold (2018) document
that smaller firms were more vulnerable to the negative employment effects of a
Norwegian bank capital regulation policy reform. Likewise, Bernstein et al. (2019)
find smaller private equity-backed firms to experience a more pronounced rise in
investment and financing relative to non-PE-backed firms at the onset of the financial
crisis. In our sample, we identify small firms by looking at those with below median
revenue in 2010, the last year prior to the EBA capital exercise.
Second, we consider the leverage of companies, as defined as the ratio of debt to to-
tal assets. More indebted firms typically have weaker balance sheets, higher interest
payment burdens and therefore have greater difficulty in obtaining external financ-
ing, particularly when credit markets freeze. Consistent with this, literature has
shown that firms with higher leverage are more sensitive to external credit shocks
(Zingales (1998); Bougheas et al. (2006); Tsoukas (2011)).
Third, we identify constrained firms as those more dependent on bank finance, as it
is typically riskier and lower-credit firms which rely more heavily on bank finance
(Cingano et al. (2016); Guariglia et al. (2016)). These firms are more likely to
encounter rising interest rates and experience difficulties in rolling over debt (Preve
et al. (2005). Consistent with previous work, we define dependence on bank credit
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as the ratio of short-term debt to total liabilities.
Finally, we define companies located in Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain
(GIIPS) as being more financially constrained. The timing of the EBA shock was
parallel with the sovereign debt crisis, which lead to severe credit shortages in the
aforementioned countries. During the period of 2010 to 2012, the growth rate of
bank credit available to firms in the GIIPS countries declined rapidly, and loan
interest rate spreads increased relative to those in other European countries, such as
Germany and France, implying that the sovereign debt crisis had a negative impact
on the supply of credit in these countries (Popov and Van Horen (2014); De Marco
(2019)). As such, we would expect companies operating in these countries to be
more constrained and have greater difficulty in accessing external credit.
The results are presented in Table 46. Panel A shows that the negative effect of being
backed by the PE arm of an EBA-affected bank on companies’ employment growth
is stronger for those that were more likely to ex-ante constrained, when measured
based on firm size. However, there is no statistically significant difference between
the effect on the asset growth of more and less constrained firms. In Panels B and C,
we find similar conclusions when partitioning the sample on the basis of leverage and
the dependency on bank finance. In each case, we find that more constrained firms
suffer a larger loss in terms of their employment growth. Furthermore, the economic
magnitude is very similar in each case. Employment growth falls by between 6% and
9% more in EBA-sponsored firms who were more likely to be financially constrained,
relative to firms who were less likely to be constrained. Together, these results imply
that portfolio companies of EBA-affected banks which were more likely to be in a
constrained position at the onset of the shock, subsequently suffered a greater decline
in employment growth compared to those which were more financially resilient.
Finally, in Panel D of Table 46, we investigate the impact of the sovereign debt
crisis, which occurred during the same time period as the EBA capital exercise.
The coefficients on the triple interaction term suggest that portfolio companies of
EBA-affected banks which are located in the GIIPS countries are worse off relative
to those located elsewhere in Europe. The coefficients are statistically significant
for both asset and employment growth. In particular, they suggest that portfolio
companies of EBA-affected banks located in the GIIPS countries countries suffered a
17% greater decline in asset growth and 12% greater decline in employment growth
following the EBA shock, relative to those located in other European countries. Prior
research has shown that firms borrowing from GIIPS banks suffered greater declines
in investment and sales growth relative to other firms (Acharya et al, 2018). We
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complement this by showing that PE portfolio companies of the EBA shock-affected
banks located in the GIIPS countries experienced a greater reduction in both asset
and employment growth following the shock, compared to those located elsewhere
in Europe.
Taken together, the results of this section imply that while the portfolio companies of
EBA-affected banks suffered at the onset of the shock relative to portfolio companies
of unaffected banks, the effect is not standardized across all types of companies.
Instead, we find that the negative effect on company performance is stronger for
firms which were more likely to be financially constrained.
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Table 46: Portfolio companies & financial constraints
These tables estimate the standard difference-in-differences fixed effects model on company perfor-
mance outcomes, repeating the specification of Table 7 while exploring various proxies of financing
constraints in 2010 (pre-shock). All specifications include firm, country and (bank*year) fixed
effects. In Panel A, the constrained proxy is based on firm size, and is equal to one if the firm
has below median revenue in 2010. The constrained proxy in Panel B relates to company leverage.
The variable equals one if the firm has above median leverage in 2010. The constrained proxy in
Panel C relates to companies’ dependence on bank finance, as measured by the ratio of short-term
debt to total liabilities. The constrained dummy equals one if the firm has above median bank
dependence in 2010. Finally, in Panel D, we explore the impact of the sovereign debt crisis. Here,
the constrained variable. takes the value one if the target company is located in a GIIPS country
(Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain). Even-numbered columns augment the baseline model
with a set of firm-level controls measured before in 2010 and interacted with the Post dummy.
These variables are firm size (log of revenue), growth in revenue, cash flow over assets, ROA, and
leverage. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. *** denotes significance at the 1% level,
** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level
Asset growth Employment growth
Panel A: Size
EBA*Post*Constrained 0.007 0.059 -0.080** -0.091**
(0.058) (0.071) (0.040) (0.044)
Constrained* Post 0.023 -0.022 0.067** 0.079**
(0.046) (0.059) (0.027) (0.033)
EBA*Post -0.075* -0.144** -0.030 0.003
(0.039) (0.058) (0.032) (0.033)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank*Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm controls No Yes No Yes
Observations 1713 1512 1136 1001
R-squared 0.011 0.031 0.017 0.066
Companies 303 266 254 223
Panel B: Leverage
EBA*Post*Constrained 0.020 0.056 -0.080** -0.071**
(0.063) (0.061) (0.036) (0.040)
Constrained* Post -0.026 -0.087 0.066** 0.056
(0.057) (0.056) (0.031) (0.036)
EBA*Post -0.059** -0.117*** -0.033 0.024
(0.029) (0.038) (0.024) (0.025)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank*Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm controls No Yes No Yes
Observations 1713 1512 1136 1001
R-squared 0.010 0.033 0.016 0.066
Companies 303 266 254 223
Continued on next page
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Table 46 – Continued from previous page
Asset growth Employment growth
Panel C: Bank dependency
EBA*Post*Constrained -0.033 -0.037 -0.070** -0.066*
(0.045) (0.041) (0.034) (0.037)
Constrained* Post -0.013 -0.033 0.044* 0.029
(0.039) (0.036) (0.026) (0.028)
EBA*Post -0.045* -0.082** -0.035 -0.028
(0.027) (0.036) (0.025) (0.026)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank*Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm controls No Yes No Yes
Observations 1713 1512 1136 1001
R-squared 0.013 0.036 0.017 0.067
Companies 303 266 254 223
Panel D: Located in GIIPS countries
EBA*Post*GIIPS -0.181** -0.163* -0.144* -0.110*
(0.084) (0.095) (0.080) (0.079)
GIIPS* Post 0.015 -0.032 0.065 0.049
(0.060) (0.073) (0.057) (0.061)
EBA*Post -0.036 -0.079** -0.028 -0.029
(0.024) (0.037) (0.023) (0.021)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank*Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm controls No Yes No Yes
Observations 1713 1512 1136 1001
R-squared 0.020 0.045 0.019 0.067
Companies 303 266 254 223
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6.9 Private equity group reputation
In the final section, we turn our attention to heterogeneity at the private equity
firm-level, where we consider the impact of the reputation and experience of the
private equity investor at entry to the investment.
We estimate the same DiD estimator as before:
(yit) = αt + αi + αc + β1(EBAi ∗ Postt) + β2(Reputation ∗ Postt)
+β3(Reputation ∗ EBAi ∗ Postt) + θXit + εit
Where Reputation is a dummy variable taking the value one where the PE investor
is more likely to be inexperienced 54.
Prior literature has found private equity investor reputation to be important in
a multitude of settings, including (but not limited to) fundraising (Barber and
Yasuda (2017)), deal sourcing (Hsu (2004)), deal structure and financing terms
(Demiroglu and James (2010); Ivashina and Kovner (2011); Achleitner et al. (2011);
Colla et al. (2012)), syndication (Plagmann and Lutz (2019)), exit (Jenkinson and
Sousa (2015)), investment outcomes (Sørensen (2007); Nahata (2008); Krishnan
et al. (2011)) and financial distress (Tykvová and Borell (2012); Hotchkiss et al.
(2014)).
Of particular relevance is the study by Hotchkiss et al. (2014), who find that portfolio
companies sponsored by older and more reputable investors are associated with a
higher likelihood of survival. This implies that portfolio companies of PE investors
with more reputational capital are less likely to fall into distress and more likely
to perform better than those backed by less experienced investors. Furthermore,
Tykvová and Borell (2012) show that more experienced PE investors are better able
to manage distress risks than their less experienced counterparts, and that their
portfolio companies exhibit lower bankruptcy rates. From a theoretical perspective,
a more reputable investor may be better placed to support their portfolio in times
of distress as they are able to obtain external financing at more favourable rates
(Demiroglu and James (2010); Ivashina and Kovner (2011)). They are also more
likely to have more reputational capital at stake to protect with regards to their LPs
and any intermediary debt providers, making them yet more determined to avoid any
54The dummy takes the value one for inexperienced investors as opposed to experienced, to allow
for consistency across the signs of coefficients in all empirical models
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failures. Finally, under the ’grandstanding’ hypothesis of Gompers (1996), investors
who need to establish a reputation are more willing to bring smaller, younger, and
riskier companies to the public market. Consistent with this, less reputable investors
may have a higher likelihood of investing in riskier companies in order to ’make a
name for themselves’. These companies are more likely to have higher failure rates,
but, with a low probability, they may turn into an impressive success story.
Consequently, we would expect the effect of a shock to be stronger on portfolio
companies of less experienced and less reputable investors. Presumably, those with
more reputational capital would be better placed to engage their portfolio and help
them to maintain their level of performance relative to those sponsored by less
experienced investors.
It is worth noting that several measures have been used in research to date to proxy
for PE investors’ level of experience and reputation. Early work used the age of
the private equity firm. Despite presumably capturing an investor’s staying power
in the market, age is a less attractive proxy of experience and reputation as it
fails to distinguish between active and inactive investors (Sørensen (2007)). The
size of funds raised may purely reflect the success of fundraising, and could favour
funds who pursue larger deals. Lastly, the number of recently completed deals may
fluctuate depending on the overall pattern of buyout activity, so reputation could
increase during credit market booms, when the total number of deals executed rises
(Demiroglu and James (2010)). As such, we use several proxies in our analysis.
First, we use the number of investments made by the PE firm prior to entry (Lin and
Smith (1998); Sørensen (2007); Demiroglu and James (2010); Atanasov et al. (2012);
Tykvová and Borell (2012); Plagmann and Lutz (2019))55. The reputation and
prominence of an investor are intrinsically linked to its level of activity, and in turn,
the success of its investments (Sørensen (2007); Nahata (2008)). By participating
in more deals and engaging with more companies, investors can not only learn more
about the selection and the monitoring of companies, but also expand their network
of deal flow suppliers, customers and other intermediaries. Following Demiroglu and
James (2010), we calculate reputation as one plus the logarithm of the number of
previous deals executed. Second, we use the number of funds raised prior to entry.
For any private equity firm, survival depends on the ability to continually raise new
funds. In order to do so, they must be able to present a track record to prospective
LPs when marketing a new fund. Hence, experience and reputation is synonymous
55In unreported robustness checks, we also use the number of investments made, the number of
funds raised and the value of funds raised in the 5 years prior to entry, and the main results are
unchanged
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with a clear indication of prior fundraising (Hotchkiss et al. (2014); Barber and
Yasuda (2017); Plagmann and Lutz (2019)). Finally, we consider the value of funds
raised prior to entry. While the number of funds raised indicates the ability to
raise funds over time, the size of funds can reflect the success of each fundraising
(Demiroglu and James (2010)). Larger organizations are therefore more likely to
have established reputations (Gompers and Lerner (2000a)).
The regression results are displayed in Table 47. When we proxy for investor repu-
tation by the number of investments made (Panel A) or the number of funds raised
(Panel B), we find evidence that the negative effect of the EBA shock on the asset
growth of companies receiving investment from less experienced investors is stronger.
The coefficients in Panel A and Panel B imply that the effect is approximately 14%
stronger on companies sponsored by less experienced PE firms compared to those
sponsored by more experienced firms. The finding is robust to the inclusion of a
host of fixed effects and firm-level control variables. When we use the value of funds
raised, the coefficients on asset growth remain negative but are statistically insignif-
icant. We do, however, find evidence of a stronger effect on employment growth
of companies backed by less experienced investors. The coefficients in columns 3
and 4 of Panel C of Table 47 are of a similar economic magnitude, suggesting that
the negative effect is around 10% stronger on less experienced investor’s portfolio
companies.
Taken together, the results imply that portfolio companies of EBA-affected banks
sponsored by less experienced investors were more susceptible to a drop in per-
formance at the onset of the shock. Our results echo somewhat the findings of
Hotchkiss et al. (2014), who find companies backed by less experienced PE investors
are more likely to default than those backed by experienced investors. We find ev-
idence that PE investors with less experience and reputational capital are less able
to help their portfolio companies sustain their levels of performance when hit by
an external shock. Their portfolio companies suffer a greater relative fall in perfor-
mance. Consistent with Hotchkiss et al. (2014) we find evidence of a link between
private equity investor reputation and portfolio company outcomes.
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Table 47: Private equity group reputation
These tables estimate the standard difference-in-differences fixed effects model on company per-
formance outcomes, repeating the specification of Table 7 while examining the impact of the
experience and reputation of the private equity investor sponsoring the deal. All specifications
include firm, country and (bank*year) fixed effects. In Panel A, the reputation proxy is based
on the number of investments made by the PE firm prior to entry, calculated as 1+log(number of
deals made prior to entry). The dummy variable takes the value one where this is below the sample
median and the PE firm is more likely to be inexperienced and have less reputational capital. The
reputation proxy in Panel B relates to the number of funds raised prior to entry. The reputation
proxy in Panel C relates to the value of funds raised by the PE firm prior to deal entry. Where more
than one private equity firm is identified as a sponsor in the same transaction, if one of the private
equity firms led the transaction (received a higher percentage of shares) only the information about
the leader and their deals and funds is used. If none of the private equity firms receive more shares
than the other(s) or no information on this is available, information on all private equity firms
and funds is obtained and the data on firm and fund characteristics is averaged. Even-numbered
columns augment the baseline model with a set of firm-level controls measured before in 2010 and
interacted with the Post dummy. These variables are firm size (log of revenue), growth in revenue,
cash flow over assets, ROA, and leverage. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. ***
denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level
Asset growth Employment growth
Panel A: Number of investments made prior to entry
EBA*Post*Reputation -0.153** -0.144* 0.028 0.032
(0.071) (0.078) (0.032) (0.039)
Reputation* Post 0.124* 0.100 0.005 0.005
(0.065) (0.070) (0.012) (0.023)
EBA*Post -0.041* -0.065* -0.061* 0.069*
(0.028) (0.037) (0.024) (0.027)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank*Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm controls No Yes No Yes
Observations 1713 1512 1136 1001
R-squared 0.013 0.032 0.015 0.066
Companies 303 266 254 223
Panel B: Number of funds raised prior to entry
EBA*Post*Reputation -0.124*** -0.136** -0.055 -0.047
(0.046) (0.068) (0.043) (0.045)
Reputation* Post 0.084** 0.110* 0.062* 0.049
(0.038) (0.057) (0.033) (0.036)
EBA*Post -0.027 -0.017 -0.042 0.029
(0.028) (0.053) (0.025) (0.025)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank*Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm controls No Yes No Yes
Observations 1713 1512 1136 1001
Continued on next page
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Table 47 – Continued from previous page
Asset growth Employment growth
R-squared 0.015 0.033 0.016 0.064
Companies 303 266 254 223
Panel C: Value of funds raised prior to entry
EBA*Post*Reputation -0.037 -0.036 -0.093* -0.119**
(0.064) (0.074) (0.050) (0.053)
Reputation* Post -0.022 -0.053 0.063* 0.068
(0.055) (0.064) (0.037) (0.042)
EBA*Post -0.032 -0.076* -0.028 -0.003
(0.029) (0.044) (0.026) (0.024)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank*Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm controls No Yes No Yes
Observations 1713 1512 1136 1001
R-squared 0.013 0.038 0.016 0.068
Companies 303 266 254 223
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6.10 Concluding Remarks
We use the 2011 EBA Capital Exercise as an exogenous regulatory shock to the
banking sector in Europe to show the differential impact a bank shock can have
on the portfolio companies of private equity subsidiaries of affected and unaffected
banks. In a difference-in-differences setting, we examine the effect of the shock on
portfolio companies’ investment, financing and performance in the aftermath of the
shock. Portfolio companies of affected banks are found to be significantly worse off,
implying that increasing capital requirements for banks may come at a cost to the
real economy (De Marco and Wieladek (2015); Fraisse et al. (2020); Gropp et al.
(2018); Juelsrud and Wold (2018)).
Portfolio companies of the PE arms affiliated with affected banks are shown to ex-
hibit weaker investment and financing levels at the onset of the shock. We then show
that these companies also under performed portfolio companies of unaffected banks
concerning their asset and employment growth. In the latter part of the chapter, we
exploit heterogeneity across portfolio companies and across PE investors and show
that companies’ financial constraints and PE investor’s reputation matter. First,
we show that the significant, negative effect on company performance is stronger
for companies that were more likely to be financially constrained when the shock
occurred. Second, the effect is also stronger on companies whose PE sponsor is less
experienced and reputable.
The findings of this chapter echo the risks associated with bank capital regulation
highlighted by Hanson et al. (2011), who criticize the targeting of the tier one
capital ratio. As shown in Gropp et al. (2018), when offered the choice between
raising new equity capital or reducing risk-weighted assets to increase their capital
ratio, European banks opted for the latter. In turn, recent evidence suggests that
adjusting capital requirements in this way can be costly to the real economy (Fraisse
et al. (2020); Gropp et al. (2018)). On the other hand, stress tests in the US in 2009
specifically asked banks to issue new equity, which appears to have mitigated the
issue Hanson et al. (2011).
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7 Chapter - The role of capital market develop-
ment in international buyout markets
Private equity investment has evolved since the 1980s to play an important role in
the functioning of enterprises and of financial markets. Benefits of private equity
ownership have been well-documented to date. For example, it has been shown that
private equity investment can spur increases in innovation (Amess et al. (2016),
Lerner et al. (2011)), employment and job creation (Boucly et al. (2011), Lerner
et al. (2019)) and productivity (Harris et al. (2005), Davis et al. (2014), Lerner et al.
(2019)). There is also evidence that private equity investment can enhance firms’
operating performance (Kaplan (1989), Chung (2011), Boucly et al. (2011), Guo
et al. (2011), Cohn et al. (2014)) and, more recently, Cohn et al. (2019) and Bern-
stein and Sheen (2016) reveal that workplace safety, cleanliness and maintenance
can increase following private equity financing. Moreover, research has illustrated
that private equity-sponsored companies exhibit lower levels of distress risk than
comparable unsponsored firms and that they restructure faster when they do fall
into distress (Thomas (2010), Tykvová and Borell (2012), Hotchkiss et al. (2014))
and that they are more resilient in the face of economic downturns (Wilson et al.
(2012), Bernstein et al. (2019)). Finally, Bloom et al. (2015) find private equity-
backed companies to have better management practices and Bellon (2020) concludes
that they are environmentally cleaner.
In spite of the diverse range of potential benefits of a well-developed private equity
buyout market, the literature to date has yet to determine significant drivers of an
active buyout market. Jeng and Wells (2000) investigate the determinants of ven-
ture capital activity using a panel data set of 21 countries. More recently, Bonini
and Alkan (2012) and Félix et al. (2013) investigate the macroeconomic and insti-
tutional drivers of venture capital investment across countries. Finally, Schertler
and Tykvová (2012) examine what drives cross-border venture capital investment
and Nahata et al. (2014) ask whether cultural and institutional differences mat-
ter for venture capital success. The only research to date which examines buyout
investment at the country level is a recent study by Aldatmaz et al. (2020) who in-
vestigate the determinants of buyout capital invested across 61 countries from 1990
to 2017. They find better macroeconomic conditions, more active stock markets and
regulatory reforms to positively impact buyout markets. We build on this study to
examine the role of both stock and debt markets in buyout activity and we extend
the analysis to study how this effect varies over time between crisis and tranquil
periods, and how countries’ level of political risk affects our understanding of the
141
results.
This chapter aims to extend the analysis of previous research by examining the role
of capital market development on private equity buyout investment using a sample
of 34 European countries from 2007 to 2019. Capital market development is an ex-
ample of a factor that influences both the demand for and supply of private equity
investment. A deep, liquid stock market positively affects demand for private equity
financing from private companies as it gives management the opportunity to enter
into an implicit contract on control with private equity investors. While manage-
ment’s control is diluted after a trade sale, going public offers them the chance to
partially reacquire control, as they can obtain leading management positions in listed
companies (Black and Gilson (1998), Bascha and Walz (2001)). A well-developed
stock market also generates supply as it allows private equity investors to enhance
their reputation by successfully exiting from their portfolio companies via an IPO.
They can then profit from this reputation by raising funds from limited partners at
more favourable conditions in the future Gompers and Lerner (1999). Black and
Gilson (1998) reason that a well-developed stock market provides an important exit
opportunity for venture capital thereby increasing supply. They provide evidence
that risk capital, such as private equity, flourishes in countries with well-developed
capital markets and argue that the comparative advantage of the US venture mar-
ket can be explained by its strong IPO market. Jeng and Wells (2000) confirm the
finding of Black Gilson, finding the level of IPOs to be the main determinant of
venture activity in 21 countries over a period of 10 years. Similarly, Schertler and
Tykvová (2012) find stock market capitalization to significantly impact cross-border
venture flows in European and North American countries from 2000 to 2008. How-
ever, not all firms go public at exit due to liquidity conditions so many are sold
to a strategic acquirer (Cumming et al., 2005). Nahata et al. (2014) reason that a
stronger stock market also allows strategic acquirers to raise cash and to issue stock
for acquisitions and find an active stock market to be an important catalyst for
venture capital success. Finally, it is worth noting that the effect of capital market
liquidity may be stronger on buyout investment than on venture capital, since it can
also be used to gauge financial depth and the availability of leverage, which is vital
in structuring buyout transactions. Accordingly, we consider the role of syndicated
loans markets as well as stock market development. Syndicated loans are a primary
source of debt for buyouts (Poors (2016)). We look to add to this body of literature
by investigating the role of both stock and debt market activity in the European
buyout market.
The contribution of the chapter is threefold. First, while prior research in this area
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focuses solely on venture capital activity, with the exception of Aldatmaz et al.
(2020), we consider buyout investment. This is of importance given the heterogene-
ity across different types of private equity (venture capital versus buyouts) which
differ greatly in terms of the purpose, the structure and the associated risks of each
investment. Moreover, according to data from the leading European industry body
for private equity & venture capital, Invest Europe56, venture capital investment
accounted for around 11% of all European private equity investment in 2019, while
buyout investment comprised almost 70%. The literature to date in this field has
therefore only considered a fraction of this asset class. Using two different measures
(stock market capitalization and syndicated debt issuance), we find capital market
development to play an important role in buyout investment markets, in line with
previous literature concerning venture capital investment.
The second contribution of this chapter relates to the role played by the recent fi-
nancial crisis. It is well-documented that the crisis had a profound effect on private
equity investment (see for example Shivdasani and Wang (2011), Bernstein et al.
(2019)) and we therefore broaden our study to account for the role played by the cri-
sis. The cyclical nature of private equity markets is well-documented throughout the
literature (Gompers and Lerner (2000b); Kaplan and Schoar (2005); Acharya et al.
(2007); Strömberg (2008); Kaplan and Stromberg (2009); Axelson et al. (2013)).
In the case of buyouts, the freezing of credit markets during the crisis reduced the
ability of private equity managers to be able to structure leveraged buyouts as they
were unable to access the required debt. The impact of the crisis on private equity
activity and fundraising in Europe is illustrated in Figure 9. It is clear from the
data presented that the crisis had a profound impact on buyout markets.
Initial evidence of this cyclicality shows valuations and the amount of leverage at-
tached to deals rising during market peaks in the 1980s Kaplan and Stein (1993).
This is due to more abundant fundraising leading to increased competition amongst
private equity investors and increasing amounts of uninvested capital (known as dry
powder) held by firms. As a result, with intense competition for deals, valuations
rise, while readily available credit allows investors to easily lever-up deals.This pat-
tern has continued in the 1990s and 2000s (Kaplan and Stromberg (2009)). In recent
work, Axelson et al. (2013) show that during boom periods, there is overinvestment
and investors accelerate their investment rates when interest rates are low, whereas
during downturns, there is underinvestment, as some good deals get passed up. They
argue that this then leads to countercyclical investment performance: lower aver-
56Formerly the European Venture Capital Association (EVCA)
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age returns are made in boom periods and more successful deals are made during
downturns. The authors consider what drives the amount of leverage in LBOs, and
find that the amount of leverage is not correlated with any underlying, idiosyncratic
characteristics of the target companies themselves, but with the current state of the
credit market. They find periods of high leverage to coincide with high valuations
and lower subsequent returns, implying that buyout investors overleverage and over-
pay when the credit market is hot and debt is cheap. On the other hand, returns rise
when valuations fall during downturns. Kaplan and Stromberg (2009) and Brown et
al. (2018) provide similar evidence that fund returns are counter-cyclical and decline
in fundraising peaks when capital commitments and valuations are both high. Given
the intensely cyclical nature of the private equity industry, we test to see if the effect
of capital market development on buyouts is similarly cyclical. We find that, under
each measure, the effect of capital market development is positive and significant
during non-crisis periods. Moreover, the difference between the effect during crisis
and non-crisis periods is statistically significant, underlining the cyclical nature of
the effect.
Finally, we extend the analysis by splitting our sample based on measures relating to
a country’s level of political and legal risk to identify whether the impact of capital
market development on buyout investment varies between different sub-samples of
countries depending on their political and institutional landscape. Given that our
sample includes a wide array of European countries which vary in terms of their
institutional setting, it offers fertile grounds for investigating the role of political
and legal risk with regard to buyout activity.
The extant literature has acknowledged the importance of a robust legal and politi-
cal environment in a private equity setting. On a broad perspective, the institutional
environment must offer sufficient protection, yet not deter firm creation. The legal
environment in a country affects the market for private equity, as it influences in-
vestor and shareholder protection. Mauro (1995) detects a significant relationship
between property rights and investment, and Desai et al. (2003) extend this analysis,
finding a significant link between property rights and venture capital investments.
La Porta et al. (1997) and Porta et al. (1998) underline the importance of the legal
environment, arguing that it determines the size and depth of the country’s capital
market and plays an important role in determining firms’ ability to receive external
finance. Specifically, they find that common law countries, such as the US and UK,
tend to provide greater investor protection than civil law countries. This is con-
firmed empirically by Bonini and Alkan (2012), who find early stage financing and
new ventures to be greater in the UK than in French, German and Scandinavian law
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countries. Moreover, La Porta et al. (2000) find countries with improved investor
protection to have a lower cost of capital for companies. Jeng and Wells (2000)
includes a measure of accounting standards in their venture capital model, claiming
that since new ventures are risky, investors demand a higher risk premium if they
have limited information on the company. Such information is cheaper and more
accessible in a country with strict accounting standards, so should lead to increased
private equity activity. On a more general basis, the more investors and sharehold-
ers are protected, the more they are willing to invest, encouraging increased private
investment activity, of all types.
Cumming et al. (2006) find that a country’s strength of legal institutions is asso-
ciated with a higher likelihood of exiting via an IPO. This model is extended by
Cumming et al. (2010), who find that cross-country differences in legal systems
and accounting standards significantly affect the governance of private equity in-
vestments, as better laws facilitate investor’s board representations, improving the
screening of deals. Bottazzi et al. (2009) develop a model showing that optimal
contracts in financial intermediaries, such as private equity firms, are dependent
upon an efficient and high quality legal system. Lerner and Schoar (2005) reveal
that venture capital investments in countries with inefficient legal frameworks have
lower valuations while Nahata et al. (2014) show that they turn out to be less suc-
cessful than investments in countries with stronger legal frameworks and better law
enforcement. Groh et al. (2010) show that a country’s legal framework affects its
attractiveness for private equity and venture capital investments. Nahata et al.
(2014) also show that cultural differences matter in venture capital. Investing in
a country that is more culturally distant leads to more diligent screening of deals,
improving venture capital performance. Finally, Tykvova (2018) finds the effect of
legal framework on venture capital success to depend on the type of deal, with the
effect being more pronounced in domestic deals and in syndicated deals.
With regards to the political landscape of a country, Brunetti and Weder (1998) sug-
gest a positive link between political stability and private investment. In this respect,
an active, well-developed private equity market can indicate a stable political envi-
ronment. Political risk can also be defined by levels of bribery and corruption. Hain
et al. (2016) consider institutional trust in cross-border venture capital investments
in China, and find that corruption has a negative effect on venture capital inflows
into a country. Yet they note that a positive effect may also be plausible, reasoning
that market-driven corruption may have a positive effect in countries with rigid and
inefficient legal systems. Specific to buyouts, Faccio and Hsu (2017) examine the
employment consequences of leveraged buyouts and find that politically-connected
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target companies increase employment by more than non-politically-connected tar-
get companies following the buyout. To measure a country’s level of political and
legal risk, we adopt various measures from the PRS International Country Risk
Guide database, including political risk ratings, investment profile ratings, and law
and order measures.
Our results reflect the seminal work of La Porta et al. (1997) and Porta et al.
(1998) who outline the importance of a country’s institutional environment for the
size and depth of its capital markets. When partitioning our sample based on
three different measures of institutional risk, we reveal the effect of capital market
development on buyout investment to be significantly stronger in countries which
exhibit lower political and legal risk. In particular, countries with lower institutional
risk have a stronger sensitivity of buyout investment to capital market development.
Overall, our results highlight the importance of capital market development in a
buyout setting, with particular importance in countries with low institutional risk
and during non-crisis periods.
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Figure 9: European Buyout Market 2007 - 2019
The below graphs display trends in fundraising, investment and exits in the European buyout
market from 2007 to 2019. The left axis shows the aggregate amount in billions of euro and the

























































































































2,008 2,010 2,012 2,014 2,016 2,018
147
7.1 Background & Hypotheses Development
7.1.1 Capital markets and buyout activity
Prior work has provided evidence that a well-developed, liquid stock market is an
important promoter of venture capital activity. Black and Gilson (1998) argue that
a well-developed stock market provides an important exit opportunity for venture
capital thereby increasing supply. They provide evidence that risk capital, such as
venture capital, flourishes in countries with well-developed capital markets and argue
that the comparative advantage of the US venture market can be explained by its
strong and liquid stock market and IPO market. Jeng and Wells (2000) confirm this
in a cross-country panel study, finding the level of IPOs to be the main determinant
of venture capital activity in 21 countries over a period of 10 years.
While the literature to date has found an active, liquid stock market to be important
for venture capital, the effect on buyout markets is yet to be properly examined.
Aldatmaz et al. (2020) find the value of stocks traded in countries to be positively
associated with the amount of buyout capital invested, among other variables. We
extend this analysis to gauge the importance of different capital markets. We study
the importance of stock and credit markets for buyout activity. We expect active
stock and credit markets to also be important for buyout investments for several
reasons. An active, liquid stock market provides an attractive exit environment
to private equity investors, who often seek to exit deals via IPOs or by selling
to trade acquirers. With the latter, a more liquid stock market can provide a
means to acquirers of raising cash or stock for any acquisitions. More specific to
buyout investments, stronger credit markets allow investors access to leverage when
structuring leveraged buyouts, thus we would expect strong capital markets to be
particularly important for buyout investment. Specifically, syndicated loans are a
primary source of credit for buyout transactions (Poors (2016)).
As such, we predict higher levels of buyout investment to be associated with countries
with stronger and more active capital markets.
H1: Country-years with more active and developed stock and credit markets will
experience more buyout activity
7.1.2 Business cycles and buyout activity
The pro-cyclical nature of venture capital investment is confirmed by Romain (2004),
who provide evidence of the strong, significant correlation between venture capital
investment and GDP for 16 OECD countries during the 1990s and 2000s. Theoret-
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ically, a higher GDP growth should stimulate demand for and supply of all types of
private equity. Gompers and Lerner (1999) argue that a fast-growing economy will
provide more attractive opportunities to entrepreneurs, who will be more willing to
implement business idea during an economic boom. This should lead to increased
demand for venture financing. The effect on buyout investment should be similar,
as companies are more likely to expand and restructure during a period of strong
economic growth. On the supply side, a fast-growing economy should encourage
investment from domestic and foreign investors, stimulating the supply of all types
of private equity financing.
Where buyouts are concerned, Kaplan and Stein (1993) provide early evidence of
deal valuations and leverage rising during boom periods where fundraising is con-
siderably easier and (Kaplan and Stromberg (2009)) show that this pattern has
continued more recently. Axelson et al. (2013) show that during boom periods, in-
vestors overinvest and likewise, during downturns, they underinvest. They argue
that this leads to a countercyclical buyout performance where lower average returns
are made in boom periods when there is overinvestment and investors overpay and
performance is therefore stronger during downturns, when access to credit more
difficult. The authors also consider what drives the amount of leverage attached
to buyouts, and find that deal leverage is uncorrelated with any cross-sectional,
firm characteristics, but reflects the wider credit market. Periods of high leverage
coincide with high valuations and lower subsequent returns, implying that buyout
investors overlever deals and overpay for target companies when the credit market is
hot and debt is cheap. On the other hand, returns rise when valuations fall during
downturns. Kaplan and Stromberg (2009) and Jenkinson et al. (2018) provide sim-
ilar evidence that fund returns are counter-cyclical and decline in fundraising peaks
when capital flows into buyout funds and deal valuations rise.
Given the intense cyclical nature of stock and credit market movements and of
buyout markets, we would expect that the impact of capital market development on
buyout market activity is concentrated in boom periods of the business cycle.
H2: The positive effect of capital market development on buyout activity is concen-
trated in non-crisis years
7.1.3 Institutional setting and buyout activity
Previous studies have stressed the importance of a strong legal environment for
financial markets to flourish. Where private equity is concerned, law enforcement
has a direct impact on investor and shareholder protection. Mauro (1995) detects
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a significant relationship between property rights and investment, and Desai et al.
(2003) extend this analysis, finding a significant link between property rights and
venture capital investments. La Porta et al. (1997) and Porta et al. (1998) underline
the importance of the legal environment, arguing that it determines the development
of the country’s capital market and plays an important role in determining firms’
ability to access credit. Specifically, they find that common law countries, such as the
US and UK, tend to provide greater investor protection than civil law countries. On
a similar note, Levine (1998) and Levine (1999) provide evidence that countries with
stronger contract enforcement and creditor rights have a stronger banking system
and La Porta et al. (2000) find that countries with better investor protection have
a lower cost of capital thereby improving firms’ access to financing.
With regards to venture capital, Jeng and Wells (2000) reason that since new ven-
tures are risky, investors demand a higher risk premium if they have limited informa-
tion on the company. Such information is cheaper and more accessible in a country
with strict accounting standards, so should lead to increased investment activity.
Cumming et al. (2006) find that a country’s strength of legal institutions is associ-
ated with a higher likelihood of exiting venture deals via an IPO and Armour and
Cumming (2008) detect a relationship between bankruptcy laws and entrepreneur-
ship across countries. Cumming et al. (2010), find that cross-country differences in
legal systems and accounting standards significantly affect the governance of venture
investments, as better laws facilitate investor’s board representations, improving the
screening of deals, and so impact on the success of venture investments. Lerner and
Schoar (2005) show that venture capital deals in countries where legal frameworks
are less efficient have lower valuations while Nahata et al. (2014) show that they turn
out to be less successful. Finally, Tykvova (2018) finds the effect of legal framework
on venture capital success to depend on the type of deal, with the effect being more
pronounced in domestic deals and in syndicated deals.
Studies which touch upon buyout deals include Bottazzi et al. (2009), who develop
a model showing that optimal contracts in financial intermediaries, such as private
equity firms, are dependent upon an efficient and high quality legal system. Groh
et al. (2010) develop an index quantifying countries’ attractiveness for private equity
and venture capital investment and show that a country’s legal framework is an
important factor in determining its ability to attract investment.
Moving to countries’ political landscapes, Brunetti and Weder (1998) suggest a pos-
itive link between a country’s political stability and level of private investment. As
such, an active, well-developed private equity market can indicate a stable political
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environment. Political risk may also reflect levels of bribery and corruption. Hain
et al. (2016) consider institutional trust in cross-border venture capital investments
in China, and find that corruption has a negative effect on venture capital inflows
into a country. Lastly, Faccio and Hsu (2017) find that strong political connections
can improve target company outcomes. Specifically, they show that post-transaction
increases in employment in portfolio companies which have stronger political con-
nections are greater than in non-politically-connected target companies.
Building on the literature which has detected a positive relationship between coun-
tries’ legal frameworks and levels of financial development and investment activity,
we expect that capital market development would have a stronger effect on buyout
investment in countries associated with lower levels of political and institutional risk
and stronger legal environments.
H3: The positive effect of capital market development on buyout activity is greater
in country-years with lower political and legal risk
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7.2 Data & Descriptive Statistics
The cross-sectional dimension of the panel data used in the empirical analysis com-
prises 34 European countries, while the temporal dimension covers time series data
from 2007 to 2019. Our primary dependent variable is the amount of buyout invest-
ment invested at the country-year level in euros. In order to control for differences
in the size of countries, we scale the amount of buyout capital by GDP (Jeng and
Wells (2000)). As a robustness check, we repeat our main results using buyout capi-
tal invested scaled by population. The data on countries’ buyout capital investment
comes from Invest Europe (formerly the European Venture Capital Association) who
kindly provided annual yearbooks on individual countries in our sample dating back
to 2007.
The other country-level variables used in the analysis come from various sources in-
cluding the World Bank’s Development Indicators, the PRS Group’s International
Country Risk Guide (ICRG) database, and the IMF. These variables are matched to
the data on buyout investment by country name &/or country code. Our primary
measure of capital market development is countries’ stock market capitalization, nor-
malized by GDP, which is taken from the World Bank. An active and well-developed
stock market provides an important means of liquidity and exiting transactions to
buyout investors, and has been shown to be important stimulant of venture capital
markets (Jeng and Wells (2000)). Our second measure is the issuance of syndicated
debt normalized by GDP, which is also taken from the World Bank WDI database.
The syndicated loans market is one of the most popular way for issuers to access
finance to structure leveraged buyouts and is therefore an important and relevant
variable to examine (Poors (2016)). As such, we investigate the importance of cap-
ital markets development on buyout activity, and not just stock market liquidity.
In order to gauge the importance of countries’ legal and political environments, we
use three measures of institutional risk, each of which is taken from the PRS Group’s
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) database. Firstly, we use the Political
Risk Rating, where a higher risk point total indicates a lower level of risk for a
given country. This rating is constructed using 12 sub-components57. Second, we
use countries’ Investment Profile rating, where a higher value implies a lower level of
risk58. Third, we use a Law & Order variable, where the ’Law’ element assesses the
57The sub-components are Government Stability, Socioeconomic Conditions, Investment Pro-
file, Internal and External Conflict, Corruption, Religious and Ethnic Tensions, Law and Order,
Democratic Accountability, Bureaucracy Quality
58This variable is constructed based on the sum of three sub-components: Contract Viabil-
ity/Expropriation, Profits Repatriation and Payment Delays
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strength and impartiality of a country’s legal system, and the ’Order’ asses popular
compliance with the law.
In our regressions, we include a host of country-level control variables to control for
other factors which may affect international buyout markets. In order to capture
the macroeconomic environment, we control for countries’ annual GDP growth and
the unemployment rate. Aldatmaz et al. (2020) find unemployment rate to be
significantly, negatively associated with global countries’ buyout investment. We
include the amount of domestic credit provided to the private sector (scaled by GDP)
to account for the access to finance, and we include R&D expenditure normalized
by GDP to control for the level of innovation in countries. Lastly, we include the
corporate tax rate. Djankov et al. (2010) finds that corporate tax rates have a
negative effect on entrepreneurship across 85 countries, which hinders the demand
for venture capital investment. Similarly, Groh et al. (2010) also include taxation
as a component of their index gauging how attractive countries are for receiving
private equity and venture capital investment.
The data on country-year-level buyout investment is displayed at the in Table 48.
The highest country-year value is in the UK in 2007 (19.7bn euros) and the lowest
is zero, for which there are 95 country-year observations. Table 49 shows likewise
when scaling buyout investment by GDP. Luxembourg-2007 has the highest amount
of investment relative to GDP. In Table 50, we present more detailed information
on the European market, using similar data from Invest Europe. Panel A details a
breakdown in the level of buyout investment by different groups of countries across
Europe. France & Benelux have the highest reported levels of investment in terms
of the euro amount and the number of transactions over the 2007 - 2019 period. The
UK & Ireland follow closely behind with a similar percentage of the total deal value
but less transactions, suggesting larger deals occur in the UK. DACH countries, the
Nordics and Southern Europe share similar proportions, while Central and Eastern
Europe has considerably less buyout investment. Panel B shows the distribution
by industry. Similar to firm- and deal-level studies, the majority of investment
is in the services and manufacturing sectors (Bernstein et al. (2019)). Lastly, we
see the breakdown in deal size in Panel C. Unsurprisingly, small cap deals account
for the highest percentage number of transactions, but the lowest percentage of
deal value, while the opposite holds for ’mega & large deals’. Finally, Table 51
outlines descriptive statistics of the data. The average country-year level of buyout
investment in the sample is 1.19bn euros. Given that the countries vary in size, we
scale by population and GDP. The average (median) amount of annual investment as
a percentage of GDP is 0.19% (0.10%). If we exclude all country-year observations
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with zero buyout investment, this figure rises to 0.24% (0.15%).
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Table 48: Buyout investment by country-year (euro,m)
The below table shows the amount of buyout investment in each country in our sample over the
years 2007 to 2019 measured in millions of euros.
Country 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Austria 842.7 224.7 51.8 615.8 80.9 346.7 451.9 215.1 856.0 34.1 132.3 898.9 142.4
Belgium 859.7 342.2 494.4 667.5 302.4 1,066.2 451.1 610.6 1,373.9 626.4 1,352.3 1,486.0 609.7
Bosnia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Bulgaria 169.3 2.5 181.3 0.9 0.0 19.1 0.0 0.0 17.2 0.0 0.3 0.0 1.7
Croatia 0.0 6.8 13.7 12.2 14.9 9.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 27.2 0.0 72.2 75.0
Czech Rep 60.6 230.4 999.3 93.2 125.7 96.4 126.1 264.1 3.4 83.9 41.5 749.9 41.4
Denmark 1,641.6 963.4 269.2 189.6 287.1 746.3 1,618.2 1,169.3 1,566.9 1,333.0 1,537.5 2,783.6 1,213.7
Estonia 51.8 14.2 0.0 5.4 1.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 7.2 20.5 6.3 138.8 638.6
Finland 949.8 420.2 270.2 229.0 793.0 416.2 534.2 546.3 856.7 654.8 459.3 1,145.4 385.0
France 10,678.6 8,065.8 1,321.6 4,698.1 6,966.9 3,555.6 4,927.5 6,301.1 5,606.3 8,034.6 9,476.4 11,205.7 8,909.1
Germany 9,419.9 7,347.5 1,520.9 3,208.6 5,316.5 5,046.9 4,120.2 5,292.6 4,155.1 5,076.6 8,280.0 8,565.8 11,159.9
Greece 138.2 250.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 35.6 0.0 0.0 250.0 0.0 71.1 0.0 0.0
Hungary 181.6 401.8 202.4 44.5 148.9 34.5 14.4 108.9 95.0 0.3 63.3 255.9 0.05
Ireland 226.9 88.1 141.2 135.0 63.6 152.7 41.2 260.9 471.3 108.0 364.6 200.0 348.2
Italy 3,263.5 4,913.2 1,390.0 1,189.6 2,131.4 1,021.9 2,218.7 1,766.3 2,483.5 4,926.9 3,238.4 6,012.9 5,362.9
Latvia 19.0 39.3 0.5 0.0 12.6 0.0 6.0 4.9 0.0 4.0 12.8 6.2 1.6
Lithuania 146.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 13.6 0.0 6.1 4.5 3.5 151.0 1.0 2.6 208.1
Luxembourg 666.4 817.8 825.3 428.8 162.8 241.1 140.0 6.2 526.1 811.4 228.3 26.6 117.5
Macedonia 13.5 0.0 14.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Moldova 7.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.6 0.0
Montenegro 0.0 25.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Netherlands 5,240.5 2,012.6 285.5 1,473.6 2,612.3 1,060.9 1,856.1 2,288.8 2,522.6 2,861.3 3,068.3 5,100.1 5,290.7
Norway 802.9 782.5 441.0 1,418.1 707.7 678.4 1,416.9 1,999.3 1,042.4 419.3 1,477.7 681.9 2,361.5
Poland 330.0 526.3 206.9 523.6 489.5 327.4 203.2 185.9 681.1 605.7 2,294.1 493.9 382.9
Portugal 96.8 239.6 43.3 176.3 459.0 321.9 211.1 142.2 160.6 302.7 329.7 127.2 67.9
Romania 126.1 224.6 147.6 76.0 22.7 17.6 78.3 50.7 148.2 129.8 316.5 124.6 118.2
Serbia 81.9 3.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.1 12.8 328.6 228.7 47.4 0.0 30.0 413.1
Slovakia 23.5 22.7 0.0 3.1 0.0 92.5 0.0 6.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 20.5 6.0
Slovenia 4.3 0.0 76.5 0.0 6.9 2.2 0.0 11.2 7.1 53.1 19.4 0.0 0.0
Spain 2,476.3 1,131.6 533.6 2,069.2 1,739.5 1,714.2 1,522.5 1,681.7 1,335.3 2,394.0 3,674.9 4,754.0 7,006.4
Sweden 2,666.9 1,706.9 639.3 2,130.7 2,908.6 2,045.2 598.5 1,781.7 1,448.4 1,650.2 2,108.8 2,551.6 3,280.7
Switzerland 1,450.3 603.0 321.4 948.0 953.2 1,632.1 644.9 714.4 893.6 1,925.4 1,531.7 471.5 2,676.2
UK 19,715.7 11,209.4 2,988.6 9,564.8 7,769.3 8,549.9 7,479.5 7,350.5 10,275.2 6,985.4 13,125.1 12,270.5 14,097.5
Ukraine 0.0 122.1 30.8 3.1 33.2 15.6 7.5 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 4.1 0.0
Total 62,345.4 42,739.1 13,410.9 29,904.8 34,123.1 29,254.9 28,695.1 33,091.9 37,016.6 39,267.2 53,211.4 60,191.6 64,916.2
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Table 49: Buyout investment by country-year (% of GDP)
The below table shows the amount of buyout investment in each country in our sample over the
years 2007 to 2019 measured as a percentage of GDP.
Country 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Austria 0.297 0.077 0.018 0.208 0.026 0.109 0.140 0.065 0.248 0.010 0.036 0.233 0.036
Belgium 0.250 0.097 0.143 0.183 0.080 0.276 0.115 0.152 0.330 0.146 0.303 0.324 0.129
Bosnia 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Bulgaria 0.522 0.007 0.485 0.002 0.000 0.045 0.000 0.000 0.038 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003
Croatia 0.000 0.014 0.030 0.027 0.033 0.021 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.058 0.000 0.140 0.140
Czech Rep 0.044 0.142 0.668 0.059 0.076 0.059 0.079 0.167 0.002 0.047 0.021 0.356 0.018
Denmark 0.703 0.399 0.116 0.078 0.116 0.293 0.625 0.440 0.574 0.471 0.526 0.924 0.392
Estonia 0.316 0.086 0.000 0.037 0.006 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.035 0.094 0.026 0.533 2.277
Finland 0.504 0.216 0.149 0.122 0.401 0.207 0.261 0.264 0.405 0.301 0.203 0.490 0.160
France 0.550 0.405 0.68 0.235 0.338 0.170 0.233 0.293 0.255 0.360 0.413 0.475 0.367
Germany 0.377 0.289 0.062 0.125 0.197 0.184 0.147 0.181 0.137 0.162 0.254 0.255 0.324
Greece 0.059 0.104 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.019 0.000 0.000 0.141 0.000 0.039 0.000 0.000
Hungary 0.178 0.371 0.214 0.045 0.147 0.034 0.014 0.103 0.085 0.000 0.050 0.191 0.000
Ireland 0.115 0.047 0.083 0.081 0.037 0.087 0.023 0.134 0.179 0.040 0.121 0.061 0.098
Italy 0.202 0.300 0.088 0.074 0.129 0.063 0.138 0.109 0.150 0.291 0.186 0.340 0.300
Latvia 0.084 0.161 0.003 0.000 0.062 0.000 0.026 0.021 0.000 0.016 0.048 0.021 0.005
Lithuania 0.505 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.044 0.000 0.017 0.12 0.009 0.388 0.002 0.006 0.430
Luxembourg 1.793 2.145 2.232 1.067 0.377 0.547 0.301 0.013 1.010 1.479 0.402 0.044 0.185
Macedonia 0.222 0.000 0.213 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.094 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Moldova 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.109 0.000
Montenegro 0.000 0.806 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Netherlands 0.846 0.311 0.046 0.231 0.402 0.162 0.281 0.341 0.366 0.404 0.416 659 0.653
Norway 0.274 0.247 0.159 0.438 0.198 0.171 0.360 0.532 0.299 0.126 0.418 0.185 0.655
Poland 0.105 0.144 0.065 0.145 0.129 0.084 0.051 0.045 0.158 0.142 0.490 0.099 0.072
Portugal 0.055 0.134 0.025 0.098 0.260 0.191 0.124 0.082 0.089 0.162 0.168 0.062 0.032
Romania 0.099 0.153 0.118 0.061 0.017 0.013 0.054 0.034 0.092 0.076 0.169 0.061 0.053
Serbia 0.260 0.010 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.024 0.035 0.926 0.640 0.129 0.000 0.070 0.890
Slovakia 0.042 0.034 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.126 0.000 0.008 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.023 0.006
Slovenia 0.012 0.000 0.211 0.000 0.018 0.006 0.000 0.030 0.183 0.132 0.045 0.000 0.000
Spain 0.230 0.102 0.050 0.192 0.166 0.166 0.149 0.163 0.124 0.215 0.316 0.395 0.563
Sweden 0.743 0.481 0.203 0.569 0.705 0.476 0.135 0.406 0.318 0.354 0.439 0.542 0.692
Switzerland 0.414 0.159 0.082 0.215 0.189 0.314 0.124 0.134 0.146 0.317 0.254 0.079 0.426
UK 0.871 0.561 0.172 0.512 0.406 0.405 0.356 0.318 0.389 0.287 0.555 0.506 0.558
Ukraine 0.000 0.095 0.035 0.003 0.027 0.011 0.005 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.000
Total 0.452 0.306 0.102 0.217 0.239 0.200 0.195 0.218 0.232 0.245 0.322 0.353 0.371
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Table 50: Sample statistics
This table provides sample statistics on the buyout investment activity in Europe over the period
2007 to 2019. Panel A shows the geographic distribution of our sample. ’CEE’ denotes Central
& Eastern Europe; ’DACH’ is Germany, Austria & Switzerland; ’France & Benelux’ is France,
Netherlands, Belgium & Luxembourg; ’the Nordics’ are Denmark, Finland, Norway & Sweden;
’Southern Europe’ accounts for Greece, Italy, Portugal & Spain. Panel B shows the industry
distribution of buyout investment activity. Finally, Panel C shows the breakdown by deal size.
’Small’ refers to deals below 15; ’Lower mid-market’ captures deals between 15 and 50; ’Core mid-
market’ is deals between 50 and 100; ’Upper mid-market’ relates to deals between 100 and 150;
’Large’ refers to buyouts between 150 and 300; Finally, ’Mega’ is transactions above 300 in size.
Total deal value (euro bn) % of total Number of firms % of total
Panel A: Geographic Distribution
CEE 17.26 3% 540 4%
DACH 98.17 19% 2,122 15%
France & Benelux 140.66 27% 5,691 39%
Nordics 62.72 12% 1,687 12%
Southern Europe 75.37 14% 1,812 12%
UK & Ireland 133.98 25% 2,683 19%
Panel B: Industry Distribution
Agriculture 3.35 1% 102 1%
Business products & services 133.03 25% 4,479 31%
Chemicals & materials 18.75 4% 415 3%
ICT 88.57 17% 2,096 14%
Construction 15.00 3% 631 4%
Consumer goods & services 129.39 23% 3,755 26%
Energy 20.35 4% 476 3%
Financial & insurance 40.67 8% 633 4%
Real estate 3.67 1% 146 1%
Healthcare 60.06 11% 1,249 9%
Transportation 14.74 3% 410 3%
Other 1.23 1% 154 1%
Panel C: Deal Size Distribution
Small 54.14 10% 10,090 64%
Lower mid-market 108.76 21% 3,622 23%
Core mid-market 64.99 12% 890 6%
Upper mid-market 51.98 10% 404 3%
Large 110.46 21% 494 3%
Mega 138.47 26% 273 2%
Total 528.80 15,773
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Table 51: Descriptive statistics
This table provides descriptive statistics on the buyout investment activity over the period 2007 to
2019. Buyout investment* denotes only country-years with positive amounts of buyout investment.
Obs Mean Median Std Dev Min Max
Buyout investment (euro,m) 442 1,194.95 149.93 2,495.049 0.00 19,715.65
Buyout investment (% GDP) 442 0.19 0.10 0.28 0.00 2.28
Buyout investment (euro,m)* 347 1,522.11 364,575 2,726.75 0.05 19,715.65
Buyout investment (% GDP)* 347 0.24 0.15 0.30 0.01 2.28
GDP Growth 442 1.75 2.07 3.58 -14.81 25.16
Unemployment 442 9.90 7.76 6.41 2.01 34.93
Stock market capitalization 238 56.93 41.09 52.93 3.73 326.36
Syndicated debt issuance 170 4.52 4.09 3.18 0.17 22.97
Loans 422 84.37 77.72 40.94 22.76 201.26
R&D expenditure 393 1.45 1.28 0.91 0.02 3.75
Corporate tax rate 437 19.92 20.00 7.03 8.50 44.43
Political risk rating 403 76.78 77.00 8.34 57.50 94.00
Investment profile 403 9.67 10.00 1.69 5.50 12.00
Socioeconomic conditions 403 7.52 7.50 1.85 2.50 11.00
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7.3 Univariate Analysis
Moving a step further and giving us an early indication as to the relationship be-
tween buyout investment and capital market development, Table 52 presents some
univariate analysis, making comparisons between countries with different levels of
buyout investment. In Panel A, we compare country-year observations with zero
buyout investment and country-year observations with positive buyout investment,
while Panel B repeats this but by distinguishing between country-year observations
with high and low buyout activity. This initial analysis shows some preliminary
evidence on the positive association between buyout investment and capital market
development. The mean (and median) stock market capitalization in country-year
observations with positive buyout investment is more than double that of country-
year observations. Likewise, a similar pattern emerges for syndicated debt issuance.
All of these differences are significant at the 1% level. What’s more, these differences
persist, and increase in magnitude, when we distinguish between country-year obser-
vations with high and low buyout investment. The average stock market capitaliza-
tion in high buyout country-years (74%) is considerably higher than in low-buyout
country-years (30%). Again, these differences are paralleled for countries’ syndicated
debt issuance and the differences in means are strongly statistically significant. We
then turn our attention to the other variables in our study. Country-years with pos-
itive (high) amounts of buyout investment have significantly lower unemployment
than country-years with zero (low) buyout investment. Likewise, domestic lending
and expenditure on research and development is significantly higher in the former.
Finally, all of our measures of political risk associated with countries are significantly
higher in country-years with positive and high amounts of buyout investment, giv-
ing an early indication that high levels of buyout investment scaled by GDP are
associated with lower political risk.
Finally, in an effort to obtain an initial insight into the role played by political risk in
driving countries’ level of buyout investment, in Table 53 we split our sample of ob-
servations based on the associated political risk, using our three measures described
in the previous section. We split observations based on their position relative to
the median (ie country-years with above median ratings are classified a slow risk
and country-years with lower ratings are classified as high risk). The results are
telling: under all three measures of risk, country-years with lower risk have signif-
icantly higher buyout investment normalized by GDP. For example, when we use
the political risk rating assigned to countries, we find that countries with a higher
rating (and therefore less risk) have, on average, buyout investment of 0.29% relative
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to GDP. Countries with a lower rating and which are riskier have a mean buyout
investment-to-GDP ratio of 0.11%. This gives us an initial insight to the relation-
ship between countries’ level of buyout investment and their political risk. Buyout
investment appears to prevail in countries associated with less political instability.
Considering our variables capturing capital market development, under each proxy
for political risk, countries with less political risk have more liquid capital markets.
The differences between high and low risk countries are strongly statistically signifi-
cant. Overall, the univariate analysis indicates that countries with less political risk
have more liquid capital markets and receive more buyout investment.
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Table 52: Buyout vs No Buyout
The following table compares country-level variables between country-years with positive buyout
investment and zero buyout investment (Panel A) and between country-years with above-median
buyout investment and below-median buyout investment (Panel B).
Positive buyout Zero buyout
Variable N Mean (Median) N Mean (Median) P-value-mean
GDP Growth 347 1.79 (1.96) 95 1.57 (2.58) 0.22
Unemployment 347 8.34 (7.14) 95 15.60 (15.17) -7.25***
Stock market cap 219 60.92 (44.60) 30 29.24 (21.90) 31.68***
Loans 337 90.51 (86.52) 85 59.96 (57.50) 30.55***
R&D expenditure 310 1.66 (1.48) 83 0.66 (0.60) 1.00***
Corporate tax rate 347 21.30 (21.00) 90 14.58 (12.00) 6.72***
Political risk rating 343 78.30 (78.00) 60 67.94 (69.50) 10.39***
Investment profile 343 9.90 (10.50) 60 8.36 (8.25) 1.53***
Law & order 343 7.86 (8.00) 60 5.54 (5.50) 2.32***
Buyout=High Buyout=Low
GDP Growth 221 1.63 (1.71) 221 1.86 (2.63) -0.23
Unemployment 221 7.67 (6.93) 221 12.14 (9.62) -4.46***
Stock market cap 145 74.25 (57.19) 93 29.93 (22.58) 44.32***
Syndicated debt issuance 129 5.14 (4.57) 41 2.54 (2.09) 2.59***
Loans 217 105.29 (97.00) 205 62.21 (56.66) 43.08***
R&D expenditure 195 2.00 (1.84) 198 0.91 (0.79) 1.09***
Corporate tax rate 216 17.06 (18.00) 221 22.72 (24.00) -5.65***
Political risk rating 221 81.14 (82.00) 182 71.49 (72.50) 9.65***
Investment profile 221 10.36 (11.00) 182 8.83 (9.00) 1.52***
Law & order 221 8.51 (8.50) 182 6.31 (6.50) 2.19***
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Table 53: High vs low institutional risk
The following table compares country-level variables between country-years with high and low
political and legal risk. Specifically, Panel A distinguishes between country-years with above
median political risk rating and below-median political risk ratings. Panel B does likewise but
partitioning the sample based on country-years’ investment profiles, while Panel C splits the sample
based on country-years’ law & order rating.
High political risk Low political risk
Variable N Mean (Median) N Mean (Median) P-value-mean
Buyout investment (euro,m) 210 721,079 (15,232) 193 1,951,716 (749,975) 1,230,637***
Buyout investment (% GDP) 207 0.11 (0.03) 193 0.29 (0.21) 0.18***
GDP Growth 210 1.46 (2.03) 193 1.89 (1.96) 0.42
Unemployment 210 10.75 (9.40) 193 6.23 (5.85) 4.51***
Stock market cap 101 34.35 (25.44) 133 73.35 (53.96) 39.00***
Syndicated debt issuance 49 3.02 (2.64) 121 5.12 (4.46) 2.10***
Loans 200 69.75 (59.67) 188 104.43 (96.53) 34.68***
R&D expenditure 196 1.05 (0.86) 167 2.12 (1.97) 1.07***
Corporate tax rate 193 22.14 (22.88) 205 19.78 (19.00) 2.36***
Weak investment profile Strong investment profile
Buyout investment (euro,m) 220 723,887 (58,366) 183 2,015,588 (654,801) 1,291,701***
Buyout investment (% GDP) 217 0.13 (0.05) 183 0.29 (0.20) 0.16***
GDP Growth 220 1.63 (2.03) 183 1.70 (1.95) 0.07
Unemployment 220 10.29 (8.85) 183 6.52 (6.11) 3.77***
Stock market cap 115 37.46 (29.82) 119 74.94 (53.31) 37.47***
Syndicated debt issuance 67 3.37 (2.59) 103 5.27 (4.90) 1.90***
Loans 213 73.46 (61.70) 175 102.48 (95.07) 29.02***
R&D expenditure 208 1.29 (1.01) 155 1.89 (1.67) 0.60***
Corporate tax rate 183 21.18 (22.00) 215 20.71 (20.00) 0.47
Weak legal system Strong legal system
Buyout investment (euro,m) 295 1,266,922 (93,167) 108 1,429,3128 (764,382) 162,389
Buyout investment (% GDP) 292 0.13 (0.07) 108 0.37 (0.29) 0.24***
GDP Growth 295 1.62 (2.07) 108 1.76 (1.82) 0.13
Unemployment 295 9.41 (8.10) 108 6.33 (5.85) 3.07***
Stock market cap 170 51.34 (34.61) 64 70.27 (61.20) 18.92**
Syndicated debt issuance 57 2.86 (2.40) 113 5.36 (4.79) 2.50***
Loans 213 73.46 (61.70) 175 102.48 (95.07) 29.02***
R&D expenditure 208 1.29 (1.01) 155 1.89 (1.67) 0.60***
Corporate tax rate 202 19.36 (19.00) 196 22.54 (24.25) -3.17***
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7.4 Empirical Model
Our baseline model looks to examine the impact of capital market development on
buyout investment and the country-level using a sample of 34 European countries
over the period 2007 to 2019. Specifically, we estimate multivariate panel regressions
with country and year fixed effects to gain a clearer understanding of the role played
by capital market development in international buyout markets. We estimate the
following regression equation in our primary analysis:
(yit) = αt + αi + β1(CapMkt) + θXit + εit (12)
Where Yit represents buyout investment at the country-year level, normalized by
GDP. CapMkt refers to capital market development, which is stock market capitali-
sation scaled by GDP and syndicated debt issuance scaled by GDP. We include year
fixed effects, denoted by αt, to control for any time-orientated shocks affecting global
buyout capital. Likewise, we include country fixed effects, denoted by αi, to control
for any time-invariant country characteristics. θXit is a vector of country-specific
factors to control for macroeconomic, technological and legal environment. These
include GDP growth, the unemployment rate, R&D expenditure relative to GDP,
domestic lending relative to GDP and the corporate tax rate.
We provide several robustness checks to our main results. First, we scale buy-
out investment by population as opposed to GDP. Second, we control for lagged
values of capital market development to allow for investors using prior knowledge
over previous years when making investment decisions. We also run a Tobit model
left-censored at zero, to control the fact that many country-year observations have
zero buyout investment. Next, we rerun our main specifications and only include
country-year observations with positive buyout investment. We show the results are
not driven by the large size of the UK buyout market by removing all UK obser-
vations from the sample. Finally, we scale buyout investment by other important
international investment flows to observe the relative importance of capital market
development for buyout markets. Our main results are robust to these checks.
We then investigate the role played by the recent financial crisis. After assessing the
effect of capital market development on buyout investment, we assess the sensitivity
of the effect of capital market development on buyout investment to the recent
financial crisis. The impact of the crisis on private equity buyout markets is well
documented, and as the economic downturn ensued, portfolio companies struggled.
Moreover, the freezing of credit markets restricted investors access to the leverage
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required to structure transactions. Accordingly, we augment ?? by interacting our
variable for capital market development with a Crisis dummy variable which takes
the value one in the years 2008 to 2010 and zero otherwise. If the interaction terms
are significantly different during the crisis period from the same interaction during
the tranquil period, we can identify the additional response of buyout investment to
the variables during different periods of the business cycle. The model is as follows:
(yit) = αt +αi +β1(CapMkt ∗Crisis) +β2(CapMkt ∗ 1−Crisis) + θXit + εit (13)
All of the fixed effects and control variables used in the model are the same as those
used in Equation 12.
Lastly, we extend the model to account for countries’ varying degrees of political
risk. We investigate whether the effect of capital market development on buyout
activity differs between countries with different levels of political risk. Given the
wide variation in countries levels of buyout investment, we are keen to understand if
these cross-country differences can be explained by varying levels of capital market
development across our sample. La Porta et al. (1997), Porta et al. (1998) argue
that a country’s legal environment determines the size and depth of its capital
markets and plays a significant role in firms’ ability to obtain external financing.
As a result, we would therefore expect countries with less political and legal risk
to be characterised by a stronger effect of capital market development on buyout
investment. The model estimated is as follows:
(yit) = αt + αi + β1(CapMkt ∗Risk) + β2(CapMkt ∗ 1 −Risk) + θXit + εit (14)
Risk is a dummy variable taking the value on for countries exhibiting above-median
risk measures, and zero otherwise. As before, we cluster standard errors at the
country-level. All fixed effects and control variables are the same as in Equation 12.
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7.5 Regression Analysis
7.5.1 Role of capital market development for buyout capital investment
The univariate analysis implied that capital markets are more liquid and active in
countries with more buyout capital and in countries with lower levels of political and
legal risk. We now move to a multivariate analysis to gain a clearer understanding
of the role of capital market development for international buyout markets. In Table
7, we display the results from estimating Equation 12. Under both capital market
measures, we find strong evidence that more developed capital markets are asso-
ciated with higher levels of buyout investment. The coefficients are robust to the
inclusion of country and year fixed effects which are included in each specification.
Moreover, the coefficients are unaffected by the inclusion of a host of country-level
controls, including GDP growth, unemployment, R&D expenditure, corporate tax
rates and domestic credit provided to the private sector. The estimates indicate
that a country’s level of capital market activity and development, specifically it’s
stock market and market for syndicated debt issuance, help to determine how much
buyout investment it receives. Venture capital literature has arrived at similar con-
clusions, arguing that more active markets provide liquidity and exit routes for
investors (Black and Gilson (1998), Jeng and Wells (2000)). The magnitude of the
effect is meaningful. Taking columns 1 of Table 54, a one-standard deviation in-
crease in stock market capitalization (52.93) is associated with an average increase
of approximately 11% in buyout investment. Similarly, in column 3, a one-standard
deviation increase in syndicated debt issuance (3.18) is associated with an average
increase of approximately 4% in buyout investment.
These baseline results are robust to a battery of robustness checks. Firstly, in Table
55, we scale buyout investment at the country-year level by population as opposed to
GDP. The magnitude of the coefficients falls slightly, however they remain strongly
statistically significant, particularly where stock market capitalization is concerned.
Second, we remove the UK from our sample. The UK has the largest and most
active buyout market in Europe (see Bernstein et al. (2019)), and so to check if the
UK market is driving our results, we exclude the UK from our analysis. The results,
in Table 56, are upheld. Third, we include lagged values of capital market develop-
ment. This allows for the fact that investors may use knowledge of capital markets
in prior years when making investment decisions at the country-level. Accordingly,
we include one-year lagged values of capital market development in Table 57, and
our results are largely unaffected 59. Fourth, we control for the distributions of our
59In unreported regressions we also include two-year lagged values and the main results remain
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dependent variable, buyout investment relative to GDP. The sample contains many
country-year observations with zero buyout investment, so the data is naturally
truncated at zero. We therefore run a Tobit model which is left-censored at zero.
Again, our results in Table 58 remain unaffected by the different choice of econo-
metric model. Lastly, and on a similar note, we rerun our baseline specification in
12 on the sub-sample of country-years with positive buyout investment, and present
the results in Table 59. The results are robust to the type of specification used: in
country-years with positive buyout investment, the results indicate that countries
with more developed capital markets receive higher amounts of buyout investment.
intact
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Table 54: Effect of capital market development on buyout markets
This table investigates the effect of capital market development on buyout investment by running
the regression equation in Equation 12. In columns 1 and 2 the proxy for capital market develop-
ment is stock market capitalization scaled by GDP, and in columns 3 and 4 it is syndicated debt
issuance scaled by GDP. The dependent variable is the amount of buyout invested scaled by GDP.
Even-numbered columns contain a vector of country control variables including GDP growth, un-
employment rate, domestic lending, R&D expenditure and the corporate tax rate. Standard errors
are clustered at the country-level. *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5%
level, and * at the 10% level.
Market capitalisation Syndicated debt issuance
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CapMkt 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.013* 0.014*
(0.002) (0.001) (0.007) (0.0.009)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm controls No Yes No Yes
Observations 249 223 170 163
Table 55: Robustness: buyout investment scaled by population
This table repeats the estimation of Equation 12 in Table 54 but normalizes buyout capital invested
by population instead of GDP. In columns 1 and 2 the proxy for capital market development is stock
market capitalization scaled by GDP, and in columns 3 and 4 it is syndicated debt issuance scaled
by GDP. The dependent variable is the amount of buyout invested scaled by GDP. Even-numbered
columns contain a vector of country control variables including GDP growth, unemployment rate,
domestic lending, R&D expenditure and the corporate tax rate. Standard errors are clustered at
the country-level. *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at
the 10% level.
Market capitalisation Syndicated debt issuance
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CapMkt 0.003** 0.003*** 0.007** 0.006*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm controls No Yes No Yes
Observations 249 223 170 163
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Table 56: Robustness: no UK
This table repeats the estimation of Equation 12 in Table 54 but reduces the sample by removing
the UK which has the largest private equity market in Europe. In columns 1 and 2 the proxy
for capital market development is stock market capitalization scaled by GDP, and in columns
3 and 4 it is syndicated debt issuance scaled by GDP. The dependent variable is the amount
of buyout invested scaled by GDP. Even-numbered columns contain a vector of country control
variables including GDP growth, unemployment rate, domestic lending, R&D expenditure and
the corporate tax rate. Standard errors are clustered at the country-level. *** denotes statistical
significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level.
Market capitalisation Syndicated debt issuance
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CapMkt 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.012* 0.015*
(0.002 (0.001) (0.007) (0.008)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm controls No Yes No Yes
Observations 236 211 160 153
Table 57: Robustness: lagged values of capital market development
This table repeats the estimation of Equation 12 in Table 54 but also includes lagged 1-year values
of our main explanatory variable, capital market development. In columns 1 and 2 the proxy
for capital market development is stock market capitalization scaled by GDP, and in columns
3 and 4 it is syndicated debt issuance scaled by GDP. The dependent variable is the amount
of buyout invested scaled by GDP. Even-numbered columns contain a vector of country control
variables including GDP growth, unemployment rate, domestic lending, R&D expenditure and
the corporate tax rate. Standard errors are clustered at the country-level. *** denotes statistical
significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level.
Market capitalisation Syndicated debt issuance
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CapMkt 0.004* 0.004** 0.012** 0.015*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.007)
CapMktLagged 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.0.003 0.006
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.004)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm controls No Yes No Yes
Observations 220 199 153 147
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Table 58: Robustness: left censored Tobit model
This table repeats the estimation of Equation 12 in Table 54 but instead uses uses a Tobit model
where values are left censored at zero, to account for the fact that many country-year observations
have zero buyout investment. In columns 1 and 2 the proxy for capital market development is stock
market capitalization scaled by GDP, and in columns 3 and 4 it is syndicated debt issuance scaled
by GDP. The dependent variable is the amount of buyout invested scaled by GDP. Even-numbered
columns contain a vector of country control variables including GDP growth, unemployment rate,
domestic lending, R&D expenditure and the corporate tax rate. Standard errors are clustered at
the country-level. *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at
the 10% level.
Market capitalisation Syndicated debt issuance
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CapMkt 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.016*** 0.015***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm controls No Yes No Yes
Observations 249 223 170 163
Table 59: Robustness: only observations with positive buyout investment
This table repeats the estimation of Equation 12 in Table 54 but only includes country-year ob-
servations with positive buyout investment. In columns 1 and 2 the proxy for capital market
development is stock market capitalization scaled by GDP, and in columns 3 and 4 it is syndi-
cated debt issuance scaled by GDP. The dependent variable is the amount of buyout invested
scaled by GDP. Even-numbered columns contain a vector of country control variables including
GDP growth, unemployment rate, domestic lending, R&D expenditure and the corporate tax rate.
Standard errors are clustered at the country-level. *** denotes statistical significance at the 1%
level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level.
Market capitalisation Syndicated debt issuance
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CapMkt 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.014* 0.016*
(0.002) (0.001) (0.007) (0.008)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm controls No Yes No Yes
Observations 219 170 196 163
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7.5.2 Buyout capital investment relative to other capital flows
Our results so far imply that well-developed and active capital markets play a im-
portant part in attracting and stimulating buyout capital investment at the country-
year level. Nevertheless, a plausible concern could be that other forms of investment
flows into countries may well be affected in a similar way, and buyout investment
may be no different to other investment flows. Accordingly, we examine the im-
portance of capital market development for countries’ relative buyout investment.
That is, we scale countries’ buyout investment by two other important capital flows:
foreign direct investment inflows (FDI), and gross fixed capital formation (GFCF).
By scaling buyout capital flows by FDI flows and GFCF flows, we can obtain a bet-
ter understanding as to the importance of capital market development for buyout
investment relative to other capital flows of countries.
Our model is the same as in 12, however our dependent variable is now relative
buyout investment. We present the results in Table 60. where in columns 1 to 4 the
dependent variable is the ratio of buyout investment to FDI inflows, and in columns
5 to 8 it is buyout capital scaled by GFCF flows. As before, all models include
year and country fixed effects and the control variables remain the same. When
scaled relative to countries’ FDI inflows, there is no discernible effect of capital
market development on countries’ relative buyout investment activity. However,
in columns 5 to 8 where we scale buyout capital by countries’ gross fixed capital
formation, we are able to distinguish a significant positive effect on relative buyout
activity under both stock market capitalization and syndicated debt issuance. The
coefficients are robust to the inclusion of year and country fixed effects and the
vector of control variables. The reason the effect is insignificant where FDI flows are
concerned may be due to the volatility of countries’ levels of FDI affecting the results.
Incidentally, the standard deviation of buyout investment scaled by FDI inflows is
1.82 while that of buyout capital scaled by gross fixed capital formation is 0.01.
Taken together, we build upon our main results and improve our understanding of
the importance of capital market development for markets for buyout capital relative
to other international capital flows.
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Table 60: Buyout capital relative to other capital flows
This table repeats the estimation of Equation 12 in Table 54 but the dependent variable is instead buyout capital scaled by FDI inflows (columns 1 to 4)
and gross capital fixed formation (columns 5 to 8). In columns 1, 2, 5 & 6 the proxy for capital market development is stock market capitalization scaled
by GDP, and in columns 3, 4, 7 & 8 it is syndicated debt issuance scaled by GDP. The dependent variable is the amount of buyout invested scaled by GDP.
Even-numbered columns contain a vector of country control variables including GDP growth, unemployment rate, domestic lending, R&D expenditure and
the corporate tax rate. Standard errors are clustered at the country-level. *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at
the 10% level.
Buyout/FDI Buyout/GFCF
Market capitalisation Syndicated debt issuance Market capitalisation Syndicated debt issuance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
CapMkt -0.001 -0.001 0.012 0.013 0.001** 0.001*** 0.005* 0.006*
(0.005) (0.003) (0.026) (0.029) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 248 223 170 163 249 223 170 163
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7.5.3 Accounting for the financial crisis and political environments
We then assess the sensitivity of the effect of capital market development on buyout
investment to changes in the business cycle. The buyout market has been shown to
be intensely cyclical (Kaplan and Stein (1993), Axelson et al. (2013)). Accordingly,
we run Equation 13 in Table 61 to better understand if the positive effect of capital
market development on buyout markets exhibits is similarly cyclical. The coefficients
on the interaction terms involving the non-crisis period are positive and significant
in each model. Moreover, the difference between the crisis and non-crisis interaction
terms in each model are statistically significant implying a significant difference in
the effect of capital market development on buyout investment between crisis and
non-crisis periods. The interaction terms between capital market development and
the crisis period are statistically insignificant in each model. All in all, the findings
suggest that increasing capital market development during non-crisis periods has
a significant positive effect on buyout investment. Buyout investment is therefore
more sensitive to changes in capital market development during tranquil periods,
while the effect during crisis periods is found to be insignificant. This confirms the
well-documented cyclical nature of the private equity market (Kaplan and Stein
(1993), Kaplan and Stromberg (2009)), where leverage and valuations rise during
downturns, resulting in higher-than average returns (Kaplan and Stromberg (2009),
Axelson et al. (2013)). Conversely, during market peaks, leverage and valuations rise
and investors overpay for and over-lever investments leading to lower returns. We
find the effect of capital market development on buyout investment to show similar
cyclicality, having a strong, significant effect during market peaks, while failing to
detect a significant effect during crises.
Finally, we turn our attention to the varying levels of political risk in different coun-
tries. In our regression analysis in Table 62, we partition our sample into country-
year observations exhibiting low and high risk across three measures, where low-risk
refers to country-year observations below the median level of risk. All three measures
come from the PRS International Country Risk Guide database. The first measure
we use is countries’ political risk rating. This is an index which assesses the political
stability of a country on a comparable basis with other countries by assessing risk
points for each of the component factors of government stability, socioeconomic con-
ditions, investment profile, internal conflict, external conflict, corruption, military
in politics, religious tensions, law and order, ethnic tensions, democratic account-
ability, and bureaucracy quality. Risk ratings range from a high of 100 (least risk)
to a low of 0 (highest risk). Our second measure of risk is the investment profile of
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a country, which is a measure reflecting factors which impact the risk to investment
that are not covered by other political, economic and financial risk components.
Specifically, the rating assigned is the sum of three sub-components: Contract Vi-
ability/Expropriation, Profits Repatriation, and Payment Delays. Finally, we use
a measure to capture the legal framework of a country. We use the ’Law & or-
der’ variable from the PRS database which captures two measures comprising one
legal risk component. Each sub-component equals half of the total. The “law”
sub-component assesses the strength and impartiality of the legal system, and the
“order” sub-component assesses popular observance of the law.
Our results are striking: irrespective of the measure of political or legal risk, our
results indicate that capital market development has a significantly greater impact
on buyout capital markets in country-years with lower political and legal risk. This
holds for each measure of capital market development: stock market capitalization
and syndicated debt issuance, and is robust to the inclusion of a host of country-level
control variables. In each case, capital market development development exhibits a
positive effect on buyout capital invested in countries with lower levels of political
and legal risk. This is consistent with our hypothesis, based on our main findings
in Table 54 that capital market development is important for international buyout
investment, and prior research which has suggested a positive link between levels of
private investment and political stability (Brunetti and Weder (1998)). Moreover it
reflects our univariate comparison in Tables 14 & 15 where we found political and
legal risk to be significantly lower in country-years with positive levels of buyout
investment relative to country-years with zero investment, and in country-years with
high levels of buyout capital relative to those with low levels of buyout investment.
While, syndicated debt issuance is found to significantly affect buyout markets in
high risk countries when we split the sample based on the investment profile or the
legal framework of country-years, the effect is significantly greater in countries with
lower risk and the magnitude is likewise significantly smaller.
Overall, we find evidence confirming our previous findings, that capital market de-
velopment has an important role to play in buyout capital markets. Moreover, we
find it to be of greater importance to countries which are characterised by lower po-
litical risk. The results therefore suggest that countries with lower levels of political
risk exhibit a higher sensitivity of buyout investment to capital market develop-
ment and that increasing capital market development in countries with less political
risk can be an important stimulant to buyout investment. Our results align with
prior research which considers the effect of institutional risk on different aspects of
private capital. Lerner and Schoar (2005) find early-stage investments in countries
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with inefficient institutional frameworks have lower valuations and Cumming et al.
(2010) find that cross-country differences in institutional systems and accounting
standards significantly affect the governance of private equity investments, as it fa-
cilitates investor’s board representations, improving the screening of deals. Brunetti
and Weder (1998) suggest a positive link between a country’s political stability and
level of private investment. As such,an active, well-developed private equity mar-
ket can indicate a stable political environment. Political risk may also reflect levels
of bribery and corruption. Hain et al. (2016) consider institutional trust in cross-
border venture capital investments in China, and find that corruption has a negative
effect on venture capital inflows into a country. Furthermore, a country’s legal set-
ting plays a role too: capital market development has a stronger positive impact on
buyout capital in countries with a more robust legal system. This is in line with
La Porta et al. (1997), Porta et al. (1998) who reason that a country’s legal system
is important in determining the size and depth of its capital markets. Nahata et al.
(2014) show that transactions executed in countries with weak institutional frame-
works turn out to be less successful than investments in countries with stronger legal
frameworks and better law enforcement. Similarly, Tykvova (2018) finds the effect of
legal frameworks on venture capital success to depend on the type of deal, with the
effect being more pronounced in domestic deals and in syndicated deals. Moreover,
Bottazzi et al. (2009) develop a model illustrating how optimal financial contracts
depend on a country’s legal system. Groh et al. (2010) develop an index quantifying
countries’ attractiveness for private equity and venture capital investment and show
that a country’s legal framework is an important factor in determining its ability to
attract private capital investment. We add to this literature by examining the effect
of capital market development on buyout investment and how it varies across coun-
tries characterised by higher and lower legal risk. Specifically, we find countries with
lower legal and political risk to exhibit a higher sensitivity of buyout investment to
capital market development.
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Table 61: Accounting for the financial crisis
This table reports the estimates of Equation 2 to address whether capital market development
affects buyout investment differently in crisis and non-crisis periods. In columns 1 and 2 the proxy
for capital market development is stock market capitalization scaled by GDP, and in columns
3 and 4 it is syndicated debt issuance scaled by GDP. The dependent variable is the amount
of buyout invested scaled by GDP. Even-numbered columns contain a vector of country control
variables including GDP growth, unemployment rate, domestic lending, R&D expenditure and
the corporate tax rate. Standard errors are clustered at the country-level. *** denotes statistical
significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level.
Market capitalisation Syndicated debt issuance
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CapMkt*Crisis -0.001 0.001 0.007 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.018) (0.017)
CapMkt*NonCrisis 0.004** 0.003** 0.014** 0.14**
(0.002) (0.001) (0.0.006) (0.0.006)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm controls No Yes No Yes
Observations 249 223 170 163
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Table 62: Accounting for countries’ political risk
This table reports the estimates of Equation 3 to address whether capital market development affects buyout investment differently across country-years
with varying degrees of political risk. In columns 1 and 2 the proxy for capital market development is stock market capitalization scaled by GDP, and in
columns 3 and 4 it is syndicated debt issuance scaled by GDP. The dependent variable is the amount of buyout invested scaled by GDP. Even-numbered
columns contain a vector of country control variables including GDP growth, unemployment rate, domestic lending, R&D expenditure and the corporate
tax rate. Standard errors are clustered at the country-level. *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level.
Political risk rating Investment profile Law & Order
Market capitalisation Syndicated debt issuance Market capitalisation Syndicated debt issuance Market capitalisation Syndicated debt issuance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
CapMkt*LowRisk 0.006*** 0.003*** 0.015* 0.014 0.006*** 0.003* 0.030** 0.029* 0.007*** 0.003* 0.036*** 0.042***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.008) (0.009) (0.001) (0.002) (0.0.015) (0.0.016) (0.001) (0.002) (0.009) (0.004)
CapMkt*HighRisk -0.001 0.001 0.014* 0.019 0.001 -0.001 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.001 0.001 0.007* 0.008*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.010) (0.0.016) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 141 123 121 114 128 109 103 97 121 117 131 124
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7.6 Concluding Remarks
In spite of the dramatic increase in global buyout activity over the last three decades,
there is a lack of understanding as to what stimulates buyout activity at the macro-
level. We study the role of capital market development in driving buyout activity
in 34 European countries over the period of 2007 to 2019. In particular, we consider
stock and credit markets and their relation with buyout capital investment. We
find robust evidence that more liquid and active capital markets are positively as-
sociated with increased levels of buyout capital investment. Our findings are robust
to a battery of checks and re-specified models, and moreover, we show that capi-
tal market development is more important to buyout investment relative to other
types of international investment flows. Lastly, we underline the importance of legal
and political landscapes for fostering buyout activity. The positive effect of capital
market development is found to be significantly greater in country-years exhibiting
lower levels of political and legal risk.
Our contribution is important as it further develops our understanding of the drivers
of private capital markets. Given the diverse range of benefits of buyout investment
at the industry-level (Bernstein et al. (2017), Aldatmaz and Brown (2020)), the firm-
level (see for example Boucly et al. (2011), Lerner et al. (2011), Bernstein and Sheen
(2016), Lerner et al. (2019)) and the employee-level (Agrawal and Tambe (2016)),
an enriched knowledge of what spurs buyout capital investment across countries is
of rich importance. This is all the more important given the spectacular growth of
global buyout activity since the turn of the century.
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8 Conclusion
In this thesis we explore issues related to the private equity buyout market from
three different perspectives. First, we explore the exporting behaviour and activ-
ity of private equity-backed firms relative to similar non-sponsored firms. We find
robust evidence that private equity ownership is associated with increases in ex-
porting at the extensive margin and at the the intensive margin relative to similar
non-sponsored firms. That is, private equity-backed firms have a higher probability
of exporting, they experience a greater increase in the value of their exports and
they similarly experience a greater increase in their exporting intensity (the ratio
of their export sales to their total sales) relative to control firms. The findings are
found to be significantly higher for target firms which are more likely to be in con-
strained positions: smaller targets, those with higher pre-deal leverage, and private
firms. This implies that private equity firms can mitigate financing constraints fac-
ing portfolio companies. Moreover, we find that private-equity firms had a stronger
exporting resilience amid the global financial crisis. In a bid to explain why buyout-
backed firms are able to outperform similar non-backed firms in the export market,
we explain the apparent outperformance by virtue of improvements in their working
capital management relative to control firms. In light of the associated benefits of
exporting to firms and the exponential growth of private capital markets in recent
decades, our findings enrich our understanding of how firms respond to important
changes in ownership.
Second, we examine bank-affiliated private equity buyouts and study how portfolio
firms respond to external shocks affecting their parent banks. We investigate how
the 2011 EBA Capital Exercise impacted the portfolio companies of the private
equity arms of affected and unaffected banks. We find that companies associated
with affected banks experience weaker investment and financing at the onset of the
shock. We then show that these companies under-performed companies linked to
unaffected banks in terms of their asset and employment growth. We document
heterogeneity in our results. First, the negative effect on company performance is
stronger for companies which were more likely to be constrained. Second, the effect
is stronger on portfolio companies whose private equity owner is less experienced.
These findings are important in enriching our understanding of how adjustments to
banks’ capital requirements transmit to the real economy.
Third, we explore the drivers of aggregate buyout activity. Specifically, we assess
the role played by capital market development in international buyout markets. We
conclude that well-developed capital markets drive buyout activity. Our results are
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upheld after a range of robustness checks and alternative models, and moreover, we
show that capital market development is more important to buyout investment rela-
tive to other types of international investment flows. Finally, we show that countries’
institutional environments matter for their buyout activity. That is, the positive ef-
fect of capital market development on buyout capital is stronger in country-years
with lower legal and political risk.
Th research in this thesis is not without limitations. In particular, the samples of
data used in the second and third chapters expose weaknesses. Our sample of port-
folio companies of unaffected banks’ private equity arms is relatively small, while
in chapter 3, our dataset of country-level buyout investment flows is considerably
smaller than the dataset used in Aldatmaz et al. (2020), who are able to use data
from Burgiss and access a sample of 61 countries over a time span of 27 years,
which is more than twice the size of our panel. Finally, in the first chapter, while
we successfully examine the effect of private equity ownership on the extensive and
intensive margins of firm exporting, it would be interesting to gain a clearer un-
derstanding of what firms are exporting and where they are exporting to. With
more granular data, we could uncover more detail regarding country-level patterns
of international trade, and the effect private equity investment can have at the
industry- and aggregate-level. Investigating potential spillover effects of portfolio
companies’ exporting may also merit attention. Nevertheless, we lay the founda-
tions and groundwork for potential future avenues of research to explore this.
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Lerner, J., Sorensen, M., and Strömberg, P. (2011). Private equity and long-run
investment: The case of innovation. The Journal of Finance, 66(2):445–477.
Leslie, P. and Oyer, P. (2008). Managerial incentives and value creation: Evidence
from private equity. Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Levchenko, A. A., Lewis, L. T., and Tesar, L. L. (2010). The collapse of international
trade during the 2008–09 crisis: in search of the smoking gun. IMF Economic
Review, 58(2):214–253.
Levine, R. (1998). The legal environment, banks, and long-run economic growth.
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, pages 596–613.
Levine, R. (1999). Law, finance, and economic growth. Journal of Financial Inter-
mediation, 8(1-2):8–35.
Lichtenberg, F. R. and Siegel, D. (1990). The effects of leveraged buyouts on pro-
ductivity and related aspects of firm behavior. Journal of Financial Economics,
27(1):165–194.
Lin, T. H. and Smith, R. L. (1998). Insider reputation and selling decisions: the
unwinding of venture capital investments during equity ipos. Journal of Corporate
Finance, 4(3):241–263.
Ma, S. (2019). The life cycle of corporate venture capital. Review of Financial
Studies.
Manova, K. (2013). Credit constraints, heterogeneous firms, and international trade.
Review of Economic Studies, 80(2):711–744.
Manova, K., Wei, S.-J., and Zhang, Z. (2015). Firm exports and multinational
activity under credit constraints. Review of Economics and Statistics, 97(3):574–
588.
191
Manova, K. and Yu, Z. (2016). How firms export: Processing vs. ordinary trade
with financial frictions. Journal of International Economics, 100:120–137.
Mathews, R. D. (2006). Strategic alliances, equity stakes, and entry deterrence.
Journal of Financial Economics, 80(1):35–79.
Mauro, P. (1995). Corruption and growth. The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
110(3):681–712.
Mayer, C., Schoors, K., and Yafeh, Y. (2005). Sources of funds and investment
activities of venture capital funds: evidence from germany, israel, japan and the
united kingdom. Journal of Corporate Finance, 11(3):586–608.
Melitz, M. J. (2003). The impact of trade on intra-industry reallocations and ag-
gregate industry productivity. Econometrica, 71(6):1695–1725.
Metrick, A. and Yasuda, A. (2010). The economics of private equity funds. The
Review of Financial Studies, 23(6):2303–2341.
Meuleman, M., Wilson, N., Wright, M., and Neckebrouck, J. (2020). Private equity
firms’ role as agents and the resolution of financial distress in buyouts (accepted).
Journal of Small Business Management.
Michaely, R. and Roberts, M. R. (2011). Corporate dividend policies: Lessons from
private firms. The Review of Financial Studies, 25(3):711–746.
Minetti, R., Mulabdic, A., Ruta, M., and Zhu, S. (2018). Are banks engines of
export? financial structures and export dynamics. The World Bank.
Minetti, R., Murro, P., and Zhu, S. C. (2015). Family firms, corporate governance
and export. Economica, 82:1177–1216.
Minetti, R. and Zhu, S. C. (2011). Credit constraints and firm export: Microeco-
nomic evidence from italy. Journal of International Economics, 83(2):109–125.
Mizen, P. and Tsoukas, S. (2012). The response of the external finance premium
in asian corporate bond markets to financial characteristics, financial constraints
and two financial crises. Journal of Banking & Finance, 36:3048–3059.
Morris, P. and Phalippou, L. (2020). Thirty years after jensen’s prediction: Is
private equity a superior form of ownership? Oxford Review of Economic Policy,
36(2):291–313.
Muscarella, C. J. and Vetsuypens, M. R. (1990). Efficiency and organizational
structure: A study of reverse lbos. The Journal of Finance, 45(5):1389–1413.
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